1 A (Continuing) relations between forces of nature,
2 they cease being religious theories.
3 But when they specify the relationship to God, then they
4 become religious theories and obviously God is very much
5 in the picture.
6 This is very different from a scientific form of
7 theory. They are testable, if that's the right word, in
8 terms of experience and, perhaps, in terms of a new mode
9 of living. That is to say, being released, being
10 redeemed, having a new kind of courage, a new kind of
11 benevolence, and so forth and so on. That is the kind of
12 fruitfulness that religious ideas have where it's quite
13 different than anything scientific.
14 Q Now, are you, sir, aware of the field of religious
15 apologetics?
16 A I am.
17 Q Could you please state for me what your
18 understanding of the concept of religious apologetics is?
19 A Apologetics has been used for a long time to
20 describe certain kinds of religious speaking and religious
21 writing, or writing by religious persons, with a religious
22 purpose.
23 It refers to an argument by members of a community to
24 those outside the community, seeking to show the
25 meaningfulness and the validity of the doctrines, the
201.
1 A (Continuing) truths, the position of the community.
2 This is a very old tradition. One finds it, of course,
3 in the earliest writings, some of the earliest writings of
4 the Christian church in a group who were, in fact, called
5 the apologists, and quite deliberately sought to speak to
6 the Roman empire and to argue for Christianity on the
7 basis of what Romans could accept.
8 One finds this in the medieval period. Saint Thomas
9 Aquinas was probably the great example of this in some of
10 his documents. They are not theological documents; they
11 are arguments to the world about the truth of certain
12 elements, particularly the truth of the Creator. Certain
13 elements, one finds them in Jewish documents as well. You
14 find them also in the modern world.
15 Q The purpose of apologetics is that one purpose of
16 it—to spread the faith?
17 A Yes, yes. I am not sure that `evangelize' is quite
18 the right word. Generally, we use the word `evangelize'
19 with preaching. This is argument. It is certainly to
20 convince people, persuade people, and so forth, of the
21 validity of the faith, that one represents.
22 Q Does religious apologetics always speak with a
23 religious framework or does it use language and concepts
24 from other fields?
25 A Well, in seeking to speak to those without the
202.
1 A (Continuing) faith it must find some kind of
2 common ground. This may be a common ground in morals; it
3 may be in the customs of a community; it may be in certain
4 forms of philosophy; it may be—And in the scientific age,
5 this may be the best way to do it—It may be science.
6 That is to say, when it seeks the common ground of
7 scientific facts in order to persuade others of the
8 validity of one's own idea.
9 In that case, one could say the ideas do not arise out
10 of the facts, but they are brought to them to show the
11 ideas made more sense of the facts than any other idea.
12 Q Is what you are, saying, Doctor Gilkey, that even
13 though a religious apologist may speak in science, his
14 purpose is religious?
15 A At this point, I would say the religious apologist
16 probably tends to disagree with some of the theories of
17 science, seeks to except the facts that science has
18 developed and to show that his or her own idea makes more
19 sense of those facts.
20 Q His or her own religious idea?
21 A Yes, his or her own religious idea, correct.
22 Q Do you have a view, sir, an opinion, sir, to a
23 reasonable degree of professional certainty, as to whether
24 creation-science is engaged in religious apologetics?
25 A I certainly do have such an idea. I look at the
203.
1 A (Continuing) logic of it, and it seems to me
2 precisely what I have described. And there is a concept
3 here of a sudden creation at the beginning of separate
4 kinds by a deity. That is an old traditional conception
5 within the Christian community, given here a particular
6 interpretation, I may say, which is presented as making
7 more sense of the various facts or some of the facts that
8 are claimed to be scientific facts.
9 This is the structure, the logical structure, of
10 apologetics. Now, let me say there is nothing wrong with
11 apologetics. I've done it, and I'm not at all ashamed of
12 that. I don't know how good it was but I have done it.
13 I think the only problem with apologetics is when you
14 seek to dissemble that you are doing apologetics, when you
15 quote an authority, when one has two hats on and hides one
16 of them. This is what's the problem on it.
17 Q Now, are you aware, sir, of whether or not —Strike
18 the question.
19 Is the sectarian nature of the creation-science argument
20 in any way related to this opinion you have of its
21 apologetic nature?
22 A Yes, though let me say, apologetics are not
23 necessarily sectarian. That is to say, a good number of
24 apologetics take the very general position that is shared
25 by all members of a particular religious tradition.
204.
1 A (Continuing)
2 In that sense one could say the tradition as a whole is
3 sectarian vis-a-vis other traditions, but that is not the
4 usual meaning of the word.
5 In this case I would say that is definitely the case.
6 The apologetic that is carried on here in the name of
7 creation gives, and insists upon giving, a particular
8 interpretation of that concept of creation. In a sense it
9 is doubly particular, so to speak. It is particular to
10 the Christian tradition as opposed to others, though
11 Jewish persons may agree with it but on the whole they
12 know this is a Christian idea. It is significantly
13 different from ideas in other religions, for example,
14 Hindu ideas, Buddhist ideas and, not least important,
15 American Indian ideas. But also within the Christian
16 tradition it is particularistic, and that is why I am
17 happy to be a witness. It is particularistic in that it
18 identifies the concept of creation with a particular view,
19 sets it over against evolution and says, `This is what
20 creation means.' And it is a very particular view. It's
21 been made evident here, a literal interpretation of
22 creation, of creation in recent time, of fixed species,
23 and so forth and so on.
24 Q In your examination of Act 590, Doctor Gilkey, are
25 you aware of whether or not the Act sets up a dualist
205.
1 Q (Continuing) approach to origins?
2 A It seems to me it very definitely does. And that
3 is to say, I agree with the testimony that said its kind
4 of neutrality presupposes that there are only two views
5 and these are mutually exclusive.
6 I think on both counts, that is to say that there are
7 only two views and on the account that they are mutually
8 exclusive, are both factually wrong.
9 That is to say, there are many other views of origins
10 than these two views. There are other views within the
11 history of religions; there are other views within
12 philosophical speculation, although those don't have a
13 deity, as I've said.
14 One could list any number of views of origins that are
15 significantly different than either one of these. This is
16 simply wrong.
11 Secondly, the view that these two are mutually
18 exclusive, it seems to me, is, in fact, false. There are
19 people who believe in God who also accept evolution.
20 Now, that possibility depends upon something that I
21 think is not evident in the document. That is to say,
22 that science is our most reliable way of publicly
23 knowing. — I certainly believe that. I couldn't come by
24 airplane and leave by airplane if in some sense I didn't
25 believe that.
206.
1 A (Continuing)
2 On the other hand, it is a limited way of knowing, and I
3 am speaking here as a theologian, as well as a
4 philosopher. That is to say, it can't and doesn't wish to
5 and doesn't purport to speak of all things, of all the
6 things that are.
7 It is difficult for science to get at our inner-personal
8 being, which I firmly believe. It is, as I said, by its
9 own rules, rules out discussions of a deity. In this
10 sense it is not at all saying, as a science, there is no
11 deity. It does not presuppose there is no creator.
12 It presupposes that a scientific statement cannot speak
13 of such a thing. Now, that's a quite different matter.
14 Some may conclude that is no creator. That is a religious
15 or philosophical judgment, not a scientific judgment.
16 The limitation of science is very important in this
11 whole case. One might say science asks questions that can
18 be measured, shared, mutually tested in certain ways, but
19 doesn't ask a number of important questions.
20 Personally, those are the questions that interest me.
21 That is why I am a theologian.
22 MR. SIANO: One moment, your Honor.
23 No further questions.
24
25
207.
1
2
3 BY MR. CAMPBELL:
4 Q Professor Gilkey, can you distinguish between
5 primary causality and secondary causality in discussing
6 origins?
7 A Yes. And I must say I am glad you brought that
8 up. This is a distinction that arose during the medieval
9 period and was made particularly prominent by St. Thomas
10 Aquinas to distinguish between two different types of
11 questions about origins.
12 Another important issue in this: Not all questions
13 about origins are religious questions; not all questions
14 are about ultimate origins.
15 One could ask, `What is the origin of —Well, let's
16 see— the city of Chicago'? That is a profane question
17 if there ever was one.
18 One can ask about the ultimate origins of the universe.
19 That is a quite different kind of question.
20 Q Let me ask you this. Scientists cannot talk about
21 first causality, can they?
22 A Well, I was getting to your question. The first
23 kind of question is a typical question about secondary
24 causality. That is to say, out of what set of finite
25 forces and causes of various sorts did something we now
208.
1 A (Continuing) see around us arise?
2 This is a question of secondary causality. It appeals
3 to no ultimate supernatural kinds of causes. It stays
4 within the world of finite or natural historical causes.
5 If one asks, `Where did that whole system come from' one
6 is asking the question not of particular origins but of
7 ultimate origins.
8 This is a philosophical but primarily a religious
9 question — and I will be willing to say why I think that
10 is; I think I already have —in which one moves beyond the
11 available system of experience to ask about its origin.
12 And that is what Thomas meant by first causality.
13 Q Scientists cannot talk about first causality, can
14 they?
15 A I, actually—I would like to appeal to the point
16 that was made that I don't want to pretend to say
17 everything scientists do or don't talk about. However, I
18 think in obedience to their own canons, they, so to speak,
19 will not do. If they do they are straying a little bit, a
20 good deal beyond what it is intelligent for a scientist,
21 any scientist to talk about.
22 As Aristotle said, `Nothing can come from nothing'.
23 Therefore, one always has to presuppose scientifically
24 that is something before what we are talking about.
25 Science does talk only about secondary causes.
209.
1 Q And cannot talk about first causality without
2 getting into theology or philosophy; isn't that correct?
3 A I believe that is correct. That is right.
4 Q The question of how a finite form of life arises
5 out of secondary causality could be secondary or could be
6 a scientific question, couldn't it?
7 A Precisely.
8 Q Secondary causality is what we would ordinarily
9 call, and I believe you referred to, as natural,
10 historical and human causes?
11 A (Nodding affirmatively)
12 Q In your opinion primary causality would always be
13 divine cause, wouldn't it?
14 A Well, I think that is pretty near a tautology.
15 That is to say, when you are talking about something quite
16 beyond the system of causes that are available to us that
17 we would in our own day call natural, then the minute one
18 is talking that kind of thing one is talking about what is
19 generally agreed to be a divine figure, a deity.
20 Q And so long as we are talking about secondary
21 causality, we are talking about an area that can be dealt
22 with in science; is that correct?
23 A Correct.
24 Anytime that scientific inquiry leaves the area of
25 secondary causality and discusses ultimate origins, it has
210.
1 Q (Continuing) left the laboratory and is entered
2 into theology and philosophy?
3 A I would think so.
4 Q Do you think that primary and secondary causality
5 are discussed in the Bible?
6 A Oh, no. No, no. Those are words that
7 came—Actually, the word `causality' probably has origins,
8 I think one could say, in Aristotle. It certainly came
9 down into Roman philosophy and was a way that those of a
10 philosophical bent who were Christians who wished to
11 express what creatio ex nihilo meant made the distinction
12 between primary and secondary causality.
13 Q Do you think primary and secondary causality can be
14 implied from Genesis and Psalms?
15 A Well, I would say that some authorities, for
16 example, St. Thomas Aquinas who certainly outranks me,
17 would say that that is the case.
18 Now, that is obviously a controversial issue. Some
19 people say it is not Biblical; it has no place in
20 Christianity, and so forth. Others would say that's a
21 pretty good shot at expressing what Genesis has in mind.
22 Q It could be implied then?
23 A Oh, yes, yes.
24 Q Do you see the Bible as a guide in your own life?
25 A I certainly do.
211.
1 Q Would you use the Bible as a guide to your
2 understanding of the world?
3 A Myself understanding, being a theologian, would be
4 yes. That is what I meant by saying you had better have
5 the Bible as a basis.
6 Now, there are other things, for example, the tradition
7 of one's faith to take into account, but the primary
8 source for a Christian theologian is the Scriptures.
9 Q So your opinion of your own religion would also be
10 influenced by the Bible?
11 A Yes. Let me qualify that to say that when I teach
12 other religions I seek to present the other religions as
13 much in their own point of view as I can. But I think it
14 is useful to remind your students that you are a white,
15 male, Protestant character and that they had better watch
16 it.
17 Q Would your opinions on philosophy likewise be
18 influenced by the Bible?
19 A Oh, yes, indeed.
20 Q And your opinions on science?
21 A Yes. I hope everything is.
22 Q Do you think the scientific community is the only
23 body that can tell us what is and what is not in science?
24 A No, no. There are historians of science who are
25 doing a very good job at the present of reminding
212.
1 A (Continuing) scientists of a lot of things they've
2 sought to forget.
3 Q Do you recall our discussion concerning whether or
4 not the scientific community could tell us what is and
5 what is not science when I took you deposition on the—
6 A Well, let me put it this way. I think —Let me
7 back up a bit if that is permissible —that any discipline
8 or any community has the right to seek to define itself
9 and has a kind of authority in that definition.
10 So, myself, I would go, first of all, to the scientific
11 community if I were asking what is science. What do they
12 think science is? Now, the qualification to that is, to
13 take an example of my own discipline, religion, I think
14 we've had revealed to us a good deal that we didn't want
15 to study about ourselves by others, by the sociologists,
16 by the psychologists, by the philosophers, and so forth
17 and soon, and in many cases they were right.
18 So that I think that what a discipline is, for example,
19 anthropology, chemistry, and so forth, is, first of all,
20 something in which the members of the discipline and those
21 who have studied it, philosophers and the historians of
22 the discipline, have sort of first rank. But I wouldn't
23 leave it entirely up to them because we always tend to
24 look at our own discipline with a more loving eye than
25 other disciplines look at that discipline.
213.
1 Q So, then, the scientific discipline should decide
2 what is and what is not science?
3 A They should certainly make up their minds about
4 it. I think if they are unclear about it, then we are in
5 real trouble.
6 But let me say, when I am asked, what is the relation
7 between religion and science, I would certainly like to
8 talk with as loud a voice as scientists would on that
9 relation.
10 Q You mentioned a moment ago that scientists have
11 tried to forget certain things and historians have
12 reminded them of them. What things are you talking about?
13 A Well, the relatedness of science to the culture as
14 a whole, the ways in which scientific ideas have
15 developed, and that sort of thing. The, how shall I put
16 it, the cultural relatedness of scientific concepts.
17 Q Scientists had kind of gotten off path?
18 A No, not the scientists. This isn't really their
19 business. One could say the interpretation of science,
20 and it was similar to the interpretation of my own
21 discipline where most theologians thought that everything
22 that we said came directly from on high. And it took some
23 historians to point out that there was influence, the
24 medieval period, the Renaissance, and so forth and so on.
25 Q If the scientists-and this is a hypothetical
214.
1 Q (Continuing) question—felt that there was some
2 evidence to support creation or creation-science as it is
3 spelled out in Act 590, do you think he should be free to
4 discuss that in the classroom?
5 A What classroom?
6 Q In the classroom.
7 A Well, I suppose he could only discuss it in the
8 classroom he found himself in, but I have already made
9 clear that I don't think it is merely evidence that makes
10 something scientific.
11 I am not sure I understand what scientific evidence is.
12 think I understand what a scientific theory is, and my
13 own view is that science is located in its theories and
14 not necessarily in its facts, which are quite public.
15 I would say that creation is not a scientific theory and
16 cannot be taught in that way, so —
17 Q I understand your position. What I am asking is,
18 if a scientist felt that there was legitimate scientific
19 evidence to support creation-science as it is defined in
20 Act 590, would you favor his being able to present that in
21 the classroom?
22 A If he or she felt and was prepared to argue that
23 this was a scientific theory under the rubrics of the
24 general consensus of what a scientific theory was, then I
25 think they should make that argument.
215.
1 A (Continuing)
2 Now, they can make that public, the scientific
3 community, that it is a scientific theory.
4 Q And you think that he should be free to discuss
5 that in the classroom?
6 A Whether that is a biological theory or not in the
7 classroom of biology, I am not sure. I think that-Well,
8 it seems to me that one of the important things is that a
9 profession be able to determine what is or what is not
10 within its general bounds. The general association of
11 biologists, I would say, would be able to be the final
12 authority as to whether something is a biological theory
13 or not.
14 I think these certainly could be well discussed in
15 comparative world views or some other such course. I
16 don't think there is anything wrong with that at all.
17 Q Do you recall in your deposition when I asked you
18 the question. —
19 MR. SIANO: Your Honor, page and line, please.
20 MR. CAMPBELL: This is page 57, beginning on line
21 11.
22 Q I asked you this question. This is a hypothetical
23 question. "If a scientist felt that there was some
24 evidence to support creation science as it is spelled out
25 in Act 590, do you think that he should be free to discuss
216.
1 Q (Continuing) it in the classroom", and your
2 answer, "of course, of course. I don't have any question
3 about that, and the only adjudicating supporters are his
4 or her peers."
5 A Right.
6 MR. SIANO: Your Honor, that is not the complete
7 answer.
8 MR. CAMPBELL: I was going on, Mr. Siano.
9 Q "Now they are not in the classroom, but the
10 principle. I would say the same about a teacher of law.
11 I believe that. I think that is a part of science, that
12 one should be quite open to new interpretations. Now we
13 can discuss whether this is possibly scientific and I am
14 willing to state my opinion on that, though not as a
15 philosopher of science."
16 "MR. SIANO: And not as a scientist."
17 And your answer, "Not as a scientist, correct, but let's
18 leave that one out. I agree with that thoroughly,
19 absolutely."
20 Do you recall that answer?
21 A (Nodding affirmatively).
22 Q Do you think that science should be more interested
23 in how to think about an idea rather than trying to
24 emphasize that a particular idea is true?
25 A As I understand the scientific method, the
217.
1 A (Continuing) concentration is almost entirely on
2 the how to think about an idea. That is to say, as the
3 scientific movement developed, the emphasis became more
4 and more on methods rather than conclusions.
5 Conclusions were regarded as always hypothetical,
6 approximate, to be criticized, to be changed. What
7 remained solid was the methods and, as I've said, the
8 canons that makes a theory legitimate and so on within the
9 scientific world.
10 So I would say yes, as a method they do concentrate on
11 the how.
12 Q And in teaching how to think about an idea, should
13 alternative viewpoints be considered?
14 A Within the realm of that idea, yes, certainly.
15 That is to say, I think alternative scientific theories
16 certainly should be created, be discussed. And if this
17 one can make a case—I don't think it can, but if it can
18 make a case that's another thing. Requiring that it be
19 taught is another issue.
20 Q Despite the fact that parts of the definition of
21 creation-science as it appears in Section 4 (a) of Act
22 590, is, in your opinion, consistent with Christian and
23 Jewish traditions—
24 A Let's be careful of the Jewish there.
25 Q If there were some legitimate scientific evidence
218.
1 Q (Continuing) to support a part of that definition,
2 shouldn't it be discussed openly?
3 A Certainly, openly. I am not sure it is a
4 scientific concept. I would argue that (a) represents a
5 scientific concept. I don't think it has its place—
6 Q I understand your response. What I am saying is,
7 if there was some legitimate scientific evidence to
8 support one of those parts, should not it be discussed
9 openly?
10 A My point has been that, say, evidence, scientific
11 or otherwise, a common experience, supports an idea,
12 notion, that's not science. That's, I suppose one could
13 say, only philosophy. This makes sense of this. This
14 makes it intelligent. That is not the scientific method.
15 So that the conception, scientific facts proving or
16 making probable or simply an idea, is not an example of
17 scientific methods.
18 Now, `openly' I don't know just what that means. I
19 think this is a concept that certainly should be openly
20 discussed. Whether it should appear as a part of a
21 scientific discipline is quite another matter to me.
22 Q That would be for the scientists to determine?
23 A Correct. The scientific community to determine.
24 Q And if a member of a scientific community felt that
25 there was legitimate evidence to support a part of
219.
1 Q (Continuing) creation-science as it is defined in
2 Act 590, he should be free to discuss that?
3 A Yes, I think that the responsibility of any
4 scientist is to be a part of that community, listening to
5 its general views and consensus; of course, quite free to
6 disagree with it, and there should be the ability to
7 present something as a scientific theory.
8 Q Would you say that creation is essentially a part
9 of — I believe you were the one who used the words
10 Jewish and Christian traditions; is that correct?
11 A Right. I am glad you said that because my
12 correction of you was only to be uneasy to be stating
13 something that Jews believe that I have no business
14 stating they believe. That it came out of the Jewish
15 scriptures, there was little question. That is probably
16 the meaning of what I meant, but I don't wish to state
17 what the beliefs of the various synagogues of our country
18 are or should be.
19 Q Is creation a part of Greek religion?
20 A Ideas of creation are there. They are
21 significantly different ideas about creation. They
22 usually picture one god, for example, Zeus, as arising out
23 of other gods. In fact, he was regarded as one of the
24 children of a former god and winning a victory over other
25 gods and, perhaps, establishing order, and so forth and so
220.
1 A (Continuing) on. This is not the conception of
2 absolute beginning.
3 Q So the concept of creation as it is known in the
4 western religious circles would be different than that
5 concept of creation in Greek religion?
6 A Very significantly, and this is the thrust of a
7 good number of the early arguments of the church, as I
8 indicated.
9 Q Likewise, would Western religious views of creation
10 differ from the Buddhist religion?
11 A Oh, very definitely.
12 Q And, likewise, would the Western view of creation
13 differ from Babylonian religion?
14 A Yes. Not as much as with Buddhist.
15 Q So if creation-science were taught to a Greek, a
16 Buddhist or a Babylonian student, that student would not
17 view it as inherently religious, would he?
18 A Oh, he would. They would view it as a Christian
19 view. That is very specifically what they would view it
20 as.
21 Q They would not view it as religious in their own—
22 A Oh, they wouldn't view it as Buddhism, certainly.
23 They would view it as simply wrong. They would have no
24 question about that. In fact, if you go to Japan, and
25 China and talk with Buddhists, you will find this is one
221.
1 A (Continuing) of the points they really will tackle
2 you on. "This is an absurd idea", they would say.
3 There is no question of its Christian character when it
4 appears within another context. They would regard it as
5 religious but not as true. And mind you, not everything
6 religious is true.
7 Q They would only view it as religion if we were
8 talking about ultimate origins, wouldn't they?
9 A No. I haven't said that everything religious has
10 to do with ultimate origin, but then everything having to
11 do with ultimate origin is religious, which is a quite
12 different statement.
13 Q If there are empirical scientific evidences which
14 support a science or a theory of science, it would not
15 matter if it were religious apologetics or not, would it?
16 A Well, that is a pretty hypothetical case because I
17 can't, at the moment, think of a genuinely scientific
18 theory which remaining a scientific theory becomes a part
19 of religious apologetics.
20 Q But if there were?
21 A Well, give me an example.
22 Q I am just asking you a hypothetical.
23 A Well, I don't understand. I've got a blank in my
24 mind. You cannot help me out?
25 Q You cannot answer that question?
222.
1 A I cannot conceive of a case in which a theory in
2 science that remains a theory in science—Now, there are
3 many which might be regarded as excluding certain
4 religious theories, but I can't conceive of a case which
5 would become, remaining a theory in science, an aspect of
6 religious apologetics.
7 Q If there were scientific evidence to the view that
8 the earth was less than four billion years old, that
9 scientific evidence would not be religious apologetics,
10 would it?
11 A No. It would lead the scientists to ask, how are
12 we going to understand this. Now, they might pop up with
13 the idea of an absolute beginning. Then they are not
14 submitting a scientific explanation.
15 I am not saying there aren't explanations. I think none
16 of us know what possible kinds of explanations. I would
17 say that would be an interesting event which would call
18 for a total reworking of all scientific theories that I
19 know anything about and the production of other scientific
20 theories giving it in terms precisely of secondary
21 causality.
22 Q Can there be such a thing as atheistic apologetics?
23 A Yes. Of course, Bertrand Russell was a very good
24 example of that.
25 Q I believe you mentioned that scientists ask `how'
223.
1 Q (Continuing) questions; is that correct?
2 A Yes.
3 Q And scientist are interested in observable
4 processes?
5 A Yes, they are. Yes, we all are, but they use those
6 as testing devices in quite particular ways. That doesn't
7 mean they are confined to observable processes.
8 Q You stated that religion asks `why' questions?
9 A Among other questions.
10 Q And you opined, I believe, that the definition of
11 creation-science as it appears in Section 4 (a) of Act 590
12 was inherently religious; isn't that correct?
13 A I would like a little heavier word than `opine'.
14 Q Well, is it your opinion—That's got more letters.
15 A Okay, I'll settle for that. I would assert that.
16 That would be a better way of putting it.
17 Q In looking at the definition of creation-science as
18 it appears in Section 4 (a), there are six parts of that
19 definition. I would like for you to review that with me,
20 and tell me where the `why' question is in the definition
21 of creation-science as it appears in Section 4 (a).
22 In other words, where is the `why' question in "sudden
23 creation of universe, energy and life from nothing"?
24 A Well, as I say, there are other questions in
25 religion than `why' questions.
224.
1 Q I understand, but you did say that religion asks
2 `why' questions primarily?
3 A Yes, but that is not the only kind of question.
4 `Where did it all come from' is also a religious question,
5 as I have stated, I think, as clearly as I could. Where
6 did it all come from, and that is number one.
7 Q Where are the `why' questions, though, in the
8 definition of creation-science as it is defined in Section
9 4(a) of Act 590?
10 A Well, there are all kinds of answers to `why'
11 questions in number 1, inclusively in number 1, and that's
12 why—
13 Q I didn't ask where the answer are. I asked where
14 the question was.
15 In other words, aren't you assuming in making your
16 assertion that the definition of creation-science in
17 Section 4 (a) is religious? Aren't you assuming that your
18 definition of creation-science is actually answering `why'
19 questions?
20 A I said it was answering them, so I don't find the
21 question in any religious doctrine.
22 Q You do not find a question asked in the definition
23 of creation-science?
24 A I haven't claimed that in a statement of a creed
25 you find the question to which the creed is the answer.
225.
1 A (Continuing)
2 What you find in statements of religious belief are answers.
3 Now, I said you can get at the meaning of those answers by
4 asking kinds of questions.
5 Therefore, I said that, number one, states an answer.
6 Q I understand, but we talked about the `why'
7 questions that religion asks. Can you testify that there
8 are no `why' questions -
9 A I can testify there aren't any questions at all
10 there, and I would say in any statement of a creed there
11 aren't questions; there are answers. And I tried to make
12 that quite clear.
13 Theology is not, thank the good Lord, confined to
14 questions.
15 Q Is it your opinion that science cannot answer the
16 `why' questions?
17 A It depends on what you mean by `why'. There has
18 been general agreement since—and I think I am right—the
19 seventeenth century, at least since the impact of Galileo
20 and the reinterpretation of that by Descartes, an agreement
21 that purpose kinds of causes, causes that appeal to
22 purpose—What Aristotle called final causes—Why is this
23 going on—were not relevant to scientific inquiry.
24 And I take it that this has been generally agreed. If
25 you mean why did this happen—If you mean by that question
226.
1 A (Continuing) `what forces brought it about' and
2 one could use that, in ordinary speech, then, of course,
3 `why are we having rain today', well, the answer is
4 because of a cold pressure front and so forth and so on.
5 That kind of `why' question, but the kind of `why'
6 question that is quite different, `why did it happen to
7 rain on my wedding', is not the kind of question the
8 weatherman will be able to answer.
9 Q Is there such a thing as religious humanists?
10 A Yes, there certainly is. At least, there is a
11 group that calls themselves humanists that has written a
12 couple of manifestoes in my lifetime, I think, and a group
13 called the Ethical Culture Society and perhaps some other
14 groups that are exclusively humanist and that also are
15 happy to claim the word `religious' connected with them,
16 and I suppose the great founder of positivism, Auguste
17 Comte, sought to found a humanistic or positivistic
18 religion in the nineteenth century.
19 Q Once evolution begins to examine ultimate origins,
20 it is not within science, is it?
21 A I would say so.
22 Q Are you saying it is not or it is?
23 A It is not within science. Yes, I am agreeing with
24 a portion of your question, it has moved out of science
25 into a wider arena.
227.
1 Q Into the area of theology and philosophy?
2 A Right, correct.
3 Q As one who has studied religions, are there any
4 religions which have taken evolution from its original
5 scientific state and adopted it as part of their belief
6 system?
7 A They have taken evolution—Yes, I would say so, and
8 I would say some of the forms in the nineteenth and
9 twentieth century of what you would call, although they
10 may or may not have liked that word, religious humanism,
11 have taken that form.
12 Perhaps the great formulator of this was Herbert
13 Spencer, though he wouldn't have, wanted to be called
14 religious, and he said he was an agnostic.
15 Nevertheless, here was a picture of the whole of the
16 universe, and so forth and so on, and there have been a
17 number of evolutionists, Julian Huxley, that was appealed
18 to here and who is a good example of that. A good number
19 of them have taken that position.
20 This is perfectly possible for this idea. There is a
21 number of ideas to leave its particular residence, so to
22 speak, within a particular discipline, subject to its
23 canons and to expand out to doing the job of a religious
24 idea.
25 Q In some sense, is evolution atheistic?
228.
1 A No. That is to say, I would say any scientific
2 method—This is not a presupposition; this is a canon. It
3 does not talk about God.
4 In the same way history is atheistic. That is to say, a
5 historical account of he Second World War won't talk about
6 the judgment of God.
7 I suppose law is atheistic in exactly that sense. An
8 account of a murder which explained the murder by an act
9 by God, by God rubbing this fellow out, let's say, is not
10 an admissible theory.
11 In this sense, these are what we mean by secular
12 disciplines. That is to say, they do not bring in a
13 divine cause as an explanatory factor in what they are
14 trying to explain.
15 This does not mean, and I think the example of the
16 history of law made perfectly clear, this sort of factor
17 is not there. This is not a presupposition. It is a rule
18 of the road, a rule of that kind of talking.
19 Q Is evolution consistent with Buddhism?
20 A Now, there I will have to speculate on that. I
21 don't put myself forward as an expert on Buddhism. I
22 would say no, not consistent with historic Buddhism in the
23 sense that historic Buddhism has held to the set of ideas
24 that are also true of historic Hinduism, namely, that time
25 goes in a circle.
229.
1 A (Continuing)
2 Now, that is a significantly different idea than
3 nineteenth century and twentieth century evolution where
4 time is lineated and there is no set cyclical.
5 Within those concepts, one cay say that both Hindu and
6 Buddhist conceptions state of the world as coming to be in
7 the cycle and then going out of existence again, and then
8 coming in.
9 This is not evolution. That is not at all the same idea.
10 Now, the main problem with Buddhism is they are
11 convinced of the unreality of things rather than the
12 reality of things. Now, if you want to discuss that, we
13 can do it but I think that would try the patience of
14 everybody in the room.
15 Q You mentioned that evolution is not consistent with
16 historical Buddhism, but would it be with contemporary
17 Buddhist beliefs?
18 A As somebody said, almost anything is possible.
19 People in the history of religion have put the two most
20 seemingly antithetical ideas together to create theory
21 that one beforehand could have believe they were going to
22 do it. I would say this would take an awful lot of work
23 on the part of some enthusiastic Buddhist to put the two
24 together, but it could be done.
25 Q Is evolution consistent with Taoism?
230.
1 A My answer would be substantially the same. That is
2 to say, Taoism and Buddhism and Hinduism are forms of—
3 Well, I am risky here—Pantheism, Monism, where each have a
4 cyclical view of time, insofar as they have any view,
5 and probably you have very much the same situation there.
6 Q If evolution is expanded into a world view, will we
7 get into metaphysics?
8 A It depends on how it's done. That is to say, a
9 metaphysical idea is partly determined not by what it
10 talks about but the way it does about constructing itself.
11 And those within the philosophical community who still
12 think metaphysics interesting and possible, and they are
13 not everybody, would probably be very much interested in
14 the grounds, the warrants, the reasons why an idea was
15 advanced as being.
16 So, it isn't so much the content of the idea as its
17 method or I should say both of them.
18 Insofar as you mean by metaphysics a view of a whole and
19 a recent view of a whole, I would say say. Yes, that is
20 exactly what, for example, the great philosophy of Alfred
21 North Whitehead is. One could say it is an expansion of
22 some evolutionary idea into a total view of the universe.
23 Q And once evolution is discussed in terms of
24 metaphysics, it is no longer science, is it?
25 A It has a cousin once removed relation to science.
231.
1 A (Continuing) Let's put it that way. It is
2 certainly not at that point dependent upon science.
3 Q Is scientific inquiry generally set within a
4 framework of presupposition?
5 A Again, I am glad you asked that question because I
6 think it is good to try to clarify that point. I'd say
7 there are two different kinds of presuppositions we are
8 talking about here.
9 One of them is that set of presuppositions, and it would
10 be rather hard quickly to state them accurately so that
11 there's no disagreement, that having characteristic of
12 Western culture, arising out of the Jewish and the
13 Greek-Roman background.
14 Now, these are genuine presuppositions of the scientific
15 method, it seems to me, and that is quite rightly used.
16 There was a very well known book by E. Burt, The
17 Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Empirical Science,
18 which I think stated the point very well.
19 The puzzle would be the reality of the empirical world.
20 The reality, therefore, — The cognitive value of sense
21 experience. The fact that the world involves, we don't
22 know what kind, but some sort of order.
23 These are presuppositions of the scientific method.
24 There are other things that I call canons or rules of the
25 road that are really quite different.
232.
1 A (Continuing)
2 They themselves, perhaps, have presuppositions, but they
3 are not quite presuppositions.
4 Q Is falsification a presupposition?
5 A No, that's an aspect of method, I would say. That
6 is what is meant by testing. That is not a
7 presupposition; this is a canon. Every idea that is
8 scientific must be tested, and what we mean by that is, it
9 is not falsified. Or, at least, that's Popper's theory
10 of that.
11 Q Do you recall your deposition when I asked you
12 questions concerning presuppositions, beginning on page
13 135 of your deposition, I asked this question: "Assuming
14 a scientific inquiry is based on some, within a framework,
15 of presupposition, could a theory ever be truly
16 falsified?"
17 Mr. Siano interjected, "And that's a hypothetical
18 question", which I responded, "Do you understand what I am
19 asking?"
20 Mr. Siano again interjected his comments, "you started
21 out assuming, and that is what I asked, if it is a
22 hypothetical question. Is it a hypothetical question?"
23 I responded, "Yes, it can be a hypothetical question.
24 Actually, it is a philosophical question."
25 Mr. Siano: "It may be a philosophy of science question."
233.
1 The Witness: "It is totonegy. It is just utterly
2 totogeny."
3 THE WITNESS: Tautology.
4 MR. CAMPBELL: It is misspelled in the deposition.
5 THE WITNESS: I know. I think that one went right
6 over the reporter's head and bounced around.
7 Q (Continuing) This is your answer: "Falsification
8 itself has presuppositions, which is your answer. Without
9 presuppositions that lie in the back of scientific
10 methods, there is no meaning to the word `falsification'.
11 You have to agree to having a mode of falsifying what kind
12 of data are relevant, what kinds of experience gets us in
13 touch with those data, what type of methods are relevant.
14 What have to agree on that."
15 MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, this answer goes on for
16 two and a half pages. Would you like me to—
17 MR. SIANO: Your Honor, since the only appropriate
18 use of this deposition is to impeach Mr. Gilkey, I would
19 suggest that Mr. Campbell now continue to read the answer
20 if he intends to impeach my witness.
21 MR. CAMPBELL: I am certainly not trying to impeach
22 the witness, your Honor. I am just trying to refresh his
23 memory with regard to this area of falsification.
24 MR. SIANO: Your Honor, I haven't heard anything —
25 THE COURT: I think you can ask him the question.
234.
1 MR. CAMPBELL: (Continuing)
2 Q Do you remember making that statement?
3 THE COURT: Well, let him answer —I mean, whatever
4 point you are making, why don't you just ask the question
5 without referring to the deposition?
6 THE WITNESS: I remember making that statement. I
7 am under the impression that I have just repeated it, but
8 I may be wrong.
9 Q So falsification does have some presuppositions?
10 A Oh, yes, yes, and I have tried to make clear that
11 those general presuppositions that I spoke of first, lie
12 back not only of, let's say, the conclusions of science
13 but the method of science. That is to say that sensory
14 experience places into touch with what we wish to find out
15 about. This is not a universally held view. In many
16 cultures sensory experience is regarded as the pathway to
17 illusion.
18 Now, that presupposition is there if you and I are going
19 to agree that a sensory observable experiment will falsify
20 an idea. We have got to agree on that point.
21 That is what I meant by the terms of falsification or in
22 the other side verification. They have got to be agreed
23 on, and I think has been becoming increasingly clear to
24 the scientific community since the rise of the empirical
25 sense as to meaning what we mean, that some kind of
235.
1 A (Continuing) shareable experiment will test this
2 thing. You say and I say.
3 Q Does the history of science reveal that in actual
4 practice science is based upon creative leaps of
5 imaginative vision?
6 A I would certainly say so, though as I said to you
7 in the deposition, that takes a certain knowledge of the
8 biography of great scientists that I don't pretend to have
9 within my—Well, I hesitate to say educated guess, but my
10 somewhat educated guess is, of course.
11 Q Weren't these creative leaps of imaginative vision,
12 from an historical standpoint, considered unscientific and
13 illogical at the time that they were being taken?
14 A Correct in many cases; not in all, many.
15 Q Were the men and women who have taken creative
16 leaps of imaginative vision in science, to your knowledge,
17 generally considered to be in the mainstream of the
18 scientific community in their times?
19 A When they took the leap, to use your phrasing, I
20 would say no. Shortly after they landed, yes.
21 Q Professor Gilkey, isn't the phrase, "creative leap
22 of imaginative vision" actually your phrase?
23 A I don't know whether I ought to claim it or not. I
24 don't remember.
25 Q Do you recall writing an article on the "Religious
236.
1 Q (Continuing) Convention of Scientific Inquiry",
2 which appeared in Volume 50, Number 2, of the Journal of
3 Religion, July, 1970? Do you recall whether or not you
4 used the phrase, "creative leaps of imaginative vision" in
5 that article?
6 A Yes. I am just wondering whether I thought it up
7 myself or picked it up somewhere else. I am not sure
8 about that. It's a rather catchy phrase, so I suspect
9 I got it from somebody else.
10 Q Was Copernicus within the mainstream of the
11 scientific thinking of his day?
12 A That's a very touchy question. There was
13 certainly— He didn't arise like the universe, ex nihilo.
14 Let's make that clear. There were things that lay back,
15 in my view. I am no expert on this. There are many
16 people who are. I think that there were many ideas, many
17 possibilities, Aristotelian, Platonic, Ptolemaic, and so
18 forth that lay back of those. He certainly rearranged
19 things in a new way and this was, with some qualification,
20 a quite new set of ideas. It certainly appeared in his
21 time as a new set of ideas. It was not completely new
22 under the sun, however.
23 Q Likewise, was Galileo in the mainstream of
24 scientific thinking in his day?
25 A By that time, much more, though the mainstream is a
237.
1 A (Continuing) very small river at that point. We
2 mustn't think of it in terms of the present. That is, the
3 number of scientists who were coming in that tradition is
4 really minimal. We now think of science as a very large
5 part of the intellectual community. That was not so
6 then. So, within that Galileo certainly builds on
7 foundations it seems to me more than Copernicus did.
8 Newton much more than Galileo.
9 Q Would it be fair to say that Copernicus, Galileo and
10 Newton all were somewhat outside the contemporary
11 scientific community at their time?
12 A Well, I hate to bring up an old word, but one is
13 almost saying with figures like that, a chronological
14 statement. That is to say, each one of those is producing
15 a really quite new synthesis of what was known and, of
16 course, giving new elements to it.
17 This is why they are so important. This is why we know
18 their names. This is why Newton was such a transcendent
19 figure really in the seventeenth and especially, perhaps,
20 the eighteenth century.
21 So that creative leap, imagination, everything, are
22 completely appropriate. This doesn't mean, as I say, they
23 arrived de novo. Newton built on Galileo; Galileo built
24 on names that preceded him, including some Roman
25 philosophers, and so forth and so on, and lots of things
238.
1 A (Continuing) that had been going on.
2 But I will be quite happy to talk about the creative
3 leaps of imagination. Now, the issue of testing is a
4 little different than a leaping, let's say.
5 MR. CAMPBELL: I understand. I have no further
6 questions. Thank you, sir.
7
8 BY MR. SIANO:
9 Q Doctor Gilkey, what is your understanding of the
10 meaning of the word `secular'?
11 MR. WILLIAMS: Objection, your Honor. That's not
12 in the scope of direct.
13 THE COURT: That's overruled.
14 MR. SIANO: It's not outside the scope of cross.
15 Let me rephrase the question.
16 Q Because a concept is secular, is it necessarily
17 atheistic?
18 A Not at all, not at all. The separation of church
19 and state legally specifies what one might call the
20 secular world. It is a world of the law, a world of
21 government, a world of our vocations that are not grounded
22 in, established by authoritatively ruled by in any way
23 religious doctrines or religious authority.
24 Now, that world is a world of American experience
25 generally since the founding of the Constitution and by no
239.
1 A (Continuing) means is it irreligious. So, that,
2 now, I've testified and I've got to emphasize the fact
3 that inherently science has a secular character. It
4 cannot be appealed to a supernatural cause.
5 In this sense it is a secular endeavor. Now, that
6 doesn't mean it is atheistic, and that is why empirically
7 there are scientists who are believers in God and there
8 are scientists who are not believers in God. I suspect,
9 though this is speculating, that those believing or not
10 believing is based on other grounds than their science.
11 In this sense if evolution is a secular theory, and I
12 believe it is, this doesn't mean at all and historically
13 it has not meant, that it was an atheistic theory. In
14 fact, two of the closest friends of Darwin argue with him
15 at this point, Asa Gray and Wallace did. And there have
16 been a number of theistic evolutionists.
17 MR. SIANO: No further questions, your Honor.
18 THE COURT: May this witness be excused?
19 MR. SIANO: Yes, your Honor.
20 MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, your Honor.
21 THE COURT: We will reconvene at 9:00 a.m.
22 tomorrow. Court will be in recess.
23 (Thereupon, Court was in recess at
24 5:10 p.m.)
25
241.
1
2 Witness:
3 On Behalf of the Plaintiffs:
4
5 MICHAEL E. RUSE
6 Direct Examination by Mr. Novik Page 244
7 Cross Examination by Mr. Williams Page 301
8 Redirect Examination by Mr. Novik Page 369
9 Recross Examination by Mr. Williams Page 376
10 JAMES HOLSTED
11 Direct Examination by Mr. Kaplan Page 379
12 Cross Examination by Mr. Williams: Page 405
13 GARY B. DALRYMPLE
14 Direct Examination by Mr. Ennis Page 406
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 EXHIBIT OFFERED RECEIVED
22
23 Plaintiffs' No. 94 245 245
24 Plaintiffs' No. 98 407 407
25 Plaintiffs' No. 86 442 442
242.
1 (December 8, 1981)
2 (9:00 A.M.)
3 THE COURT: Mr. Williams, I have gone over the
4 Motion in Limine and the brief. Do you have anything else
5 you'd like to say in connection with that?
6 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I think the Motion
7 is largely self-explanatory. I would just reiterate that
8 the legislature has not seen fit to try to define what a
9 scientific theory is. Therefore, it does not fall to this
10 Court to have to find that either. And on this ground we
11 think that the evidence on that point should be properly
12 excluded.
13 THE COURT: Perhaps you are right about that,
14 that I won't be called upon to decide whether or not this
15 is science, but as I understand the thrust of the
16 plaintiffs' case, they first undertake to try to prove the
17 Act is, or the definitions in the Act, what is set out in
18 Section 4(a), is not science but religion. And I can't
19 very well tell them they can't put on evidence of that.
20 I don't know whether they can actually sustained
21 that position or not.
22 MR. WILLIAMS: The point that I wanted to make
23 in the Motion in Limine is that what the Act says, that
24 the scientific evidence for both creation-science and
25 evolution-science are to be taught, it never tries to
243.
1 MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) elevate or state that
2 either is a scientific theory, as such. So that really is
3 the only purview of the issue in this case, and it really
4 is irrelevant.
5 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will deny the Motion in
6 Limine.
7 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, one other preliminary
8 matter that I would like to bring up now. Yesterday—
9 This may already be in the record, but to make sure that
10 it is, I want to move into the record those portions of
11 Mrs. Nelkin's deposition that I quoted to her yesterday to
12 the degree that they were inconsistent with her earlier
13 testimony.
14 This is pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil
15 Procedure and Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence.
16 THE COURT: Okay, sir. Do you— I don't quite
17 understand. Did you read the parts that you wanted to
18 yesterday?
19 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. The parts which I read into the
20 record.
21 THE COURT: Well, they will be in the record anyway.
22 MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I want to make sure they are
23 going in as evidence and simply not for the purpose of
24 impeachment.
25 Counsel for plaintiffs yesterday made an assertion at
244.
1 MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) one time that some of
2 the quotes being read from the deposition could only go to
3 impeach the witness.
4 THE COURT: I think he was complaining about the
5 method of using the deposition and not whether or not
6 it— Once it's in the record, it's in there.
7 MR. WILLIAMS: I just wanted to make sure. Thank
8 you, your Honor.
9 THE COURT: Mr. Cearley, are you ready to call your
10 next?
11 MR. CEARLEY: Yes, sir. Michael Ruse will be the
12 first witness, your Honor, and Mr. Jack Novik will handle
13 the direct examination of the witness.
14 Thereupon,
15 MICHAEL E. RUSE,
16 called on behalf of the plaintiffs herein, after having
17 been first duly sworn or affirmed, was examined and
18 testified as follows:
19
20 BY MR. NOVIK:
21 Q Would you state your full name for the record?
22 A Michael Escott Ruse.
23 Q Have you been sworn?
24 A I have.
25 Q What is your address? Where do you live?
245.
1 A I live at 44 Edinburg Road, North, Ontario, Canada.
2 Q Are you a Canadian citizen?
3 A I am indeed.
4 Q And what is your occupation?
5 A I'm professor of history and philosophy at the
6 University of Guelph, Ontario.
7 Q What is your particular area of academic specialty?
8 A I'm a historian and philosopher of science.
9 Typically, history and philosophy of biology. I also
10 teach other areas in philosophy, philosophy of religion
11 and philosophy of education. General philosophy.
12 Q Doctor Ruse, is this your curriculum vitae?
13 A Yes.
14 MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, this has previously been
15 marked as Exhibit Ninety-Four for identification. Our
16 copies of the exhibits are not yet here. I'd be glad to
17 pass you a copy. We will fill it in with the—
18 THE COURT: Okay. It will be received. And if you
19 would, make sure it's in the record.
20 MR. NOVIK: Yes, sir, I'll do that.
21 In light of Doctor Ruse's qualifications as described
22 in the curriculum vitae, which has previously been made
23 available to the defendants, I move that Doctor Ruse be
24 qualified as an expert in philosophy of science and
25
246.
1 MR. NOVIK: (Continuing) history of science, in
2 particular, the philosophy and history of biology.
3 THE COURT: Mr. Williams.
4 MR. WILLIAMS: No objection, your Honor.
5 MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
6 Q Doctor Ruse, will you please describe to the Court
7 your understanding, as a philosopher and historian of
8 science, of what science is today?
9 A Well, Mr. Novik, I think the most important thing
10 about science, if I was going to extract one essential
11 characteristic, is that it be predominantly brought in the
12 law. In other words, what one's trying to do in science
13 is explained by law, whereby "law" one means unguided,
14 natural regularities.
15 Q When you say "law", you mean natural law?
16 A I mean natural law. I mean Boyle's Law, Mendel's
17 Law, Cook's Law.
18 Q Doctor, is there any one single definition of
19 science?
20 A I wouldn't say there is one single definition of
21 science, but I think the philosophers today would
22 generally agree on that point.
23 Q Are there other attributes of science that
24 philosophers today would generally agree are important in
25 defining what is a science and what is not?
247.
1 A Well, you say philosophers. Let's broaden it. I
2 hope we can include historians. And I'd like to think
3 that scientist agree with what we say.
4 Yes. I think what one's got to do now is start teasing
5 out some of the attributes of science, starting with the
6 notion of law.
7 Particularly, science is going to be explanatory.
8 Another thing there, another very important aspect of
9 science is it's going to be testable against the empirical
10 world. Another characteristic, and perhaps we can stop
11 with these, is that it's going to be tentative. It's
12 going to be, in some sense, not necessarily the final word.
13 Q Would you explain to the Court what you mean in
14 saying that science must be explanatory?
15 A Yes. When I talk about science, or when
16 philosophers and scientists talk about science being
17 explanatory, what we mean is that in some sense we can
18 show that phenomena follow as a consequence of law.
19 Perhaps I can give you an example to sort of explain a
20 little bit more what I mean. And let's take a very
21 mundane example. I like to take mundane examples because
22 one of the things I really want to point out is that
23 science isn't that different from the rest of human
24 thinking.
25 Suppose, for example, you've got, say, a baseball which
248.
1 A (Continuing) is being pitched from the pitcher to
2 the hitter, and the ball goes along and then suddenly it
3 dips down. The guy swings and the ball is not there,
4 not— You know, I suspect the pitcher, you know, might
5 start thinking in terms of divine intervention.
6 But a scientist would be saying things like, well, now,
7 why did this happen. Well, let's look at Galileo's Laws;
8 let's look at laws to do with air resistance together with
9 initial conditions like the speed the ball was thrown and
10 so on and so forth.
11 Q In connection with these characteristics of science
12 that you've identified, can you tell us what you mean by
13 testable?
14 A Yes. Again, it all follows, I think, very much from
15 the nature of law. A scientific theory is not a
16 hypothesis of a body of science. It must, in some sense,
17 put itself up against the real world. That is to say, one
18 must be able to do experiments, either in the lab or out
19 in nature and try and get inferences from the main body of
20 science, and then to see whether or not they follow and
21 whether or not they actually obtain in the world.
22 I think one would want to say that any science that's
23 worth its salt is certainly going to have a lot of
24 positive evidence in its favor. More than that, I think a
25 very important aspect of science is that somehow it must
249.
1 A (Continuing) be sort of self-generating. In other
2 words, a scientific hypothesis, a scientific theory is not
3 only going to explain what it set out to explain, but it's
4 going to lead to new areas as well, and one has got to be
5 able to test it in this respect.
6 Q Is it fair, then, to say that a science has to
7 generate new facts which then can be tested against a
8 theory?
9 A Well, it's not generating the facts, but it's
10 generating inferences about expected facts. Do you want
11 an example or two?
12 Q No. That's fine.
13 In connection with the attributes of science and
14 this issue of testability, does the concept of
15 falsifiability mean anything to you?
16 A Yes. The concept of falsifiability is something
17 which has been talked about a great deal by scientists and
18 others recently. It's an idea which has been made very
19 popular by the Austrian-English philosophist, Karl Popper.
20 Basically, the idea of falsifiability is that there must
21 be, as it were, if something is a genuine scientific
22 theory, then there must, at least, conceivably be some
23 evidence which could count against it. Now, that doesn't
24 mean to say that there's actually going to be evidence. I
25 mean, one's got to distinguish, say, between something