McLean v. Arkansas Documentation Project

Testimony of Dr. Michael Ruse, Professor of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Ontario Canada (Plaintiffs Witness) - transcript paragraph formatted version. 


MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) one time that some of the quotes being read from the deposition could only go to impeach the witness.

THE COURT: I think he was complaining about the method of using the deposition and not whether or not it— Once it's in the record, it's in there.

MR. WILLIAMS: I just wanted to make sure. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cearley, are you ready to call your next?

MR. CEARLEY: Yes, sir. Michael Ruse will be the first witness, your Honor, and Mr. Jack Novik will handle the direct examination of the witness.



called on behalf of the plaintiffs herein, after having been first duly sworn or affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:



Q: Would you state your full name for the record?

A: Michael Escott Ruse.

Q: Have you been sworn?

A: I have.

Q: What is your address? Where do you live?


A: I live at ** ********, North, Ontario, Canada.

Q: Are you a Canadian citizen?

A: I am indeed.

Q: And what is your occupation?

A: I'm professor of history and philosophy at the University of Guelph, Ontario.

Q: What is your particular area of academic specialty?

A: I'm a historian and philosopher of science. Typically, history and philosophy of biology. I also teach other areas in philosophy, philosophy of religion and philosophy of education. General philosophy.

Q: Doctor Ruse, is this your curriculum vitae?

A: Yes.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, this has previously been marked as Exhibit Ninety-Four for identification. Our copies of the exhibits are not yet here. I'd be glad to pass you a copy. We will fill it in with the—

THE COURT: Okay. It will be received. And if you would, make sure it's in the record.

MR. NOVIK: Yes, sir, I'll do that.

In light of Doctor Ruse's qualifications as described in the curriculum vitae, which has previously been made available to the defendants, I move that Doctor Ruse be qualified as an expert in philosophy of science and



MR. NOVIK: (Continuing) history of science, in particular, the philosophy and history of biology.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams.

MR. WILLIAMS: No objection, your Honor. MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q: Doctor Ruse, will you please describe to the Court your understanding, as a philosopher and historian of science, of what science is today?

A: Well, Mr. Novik, I think the most important thing about science, if I was going to extract one essential characteristic, is that it be predominantly brought in the law. In other words, what one's trying to do in science is explained by law, whereby "law" one means unguided, natural regularities.

Q: When you say "law", you mean natural law?

A: I mean natural law. I mean Boyle's Law, Mendel's Law, Cook's Law.

Q: Doctor, is there any one single definition of science?

A: I wouldn't say there is one single definition of science, but I think the philosophers today would generally agree on that point.

Q: Are there other attributes of science that philosophers today would generally agree are important in defining what is a science and what is not?


A: Well, you say philosophers. Let's broaden it. I hope we can include historians. And I'd like to think that scientist agree with what we say.

Yes. I think what one's got to do now is start teasing out some of the attributes of science, starting with the notion of law.

Particularly, science is going to be explanatory.

Another thing there, another very important aspect of science is it's going to be testable against the empirical world. Another characteristic, and perhaps we can stop with these, is that it's going to be tentative. It's going to be, in some sense, not necessarily the final word.

Q: Would you explain to the Court what you mean in saying that science must be explanatory?

A: Yes. When I talk about science, or when philosophers and scientists talk about science being explanatory, what we mean is that in some sense we can show that phenomena follow as a consequence of law. Perhaps I can give you an example to sort of explain a little bit more what I mean. And let's take a very mundane example. I like to take mundane examples because one of the things I really want to point out is that science isn't that different from the rest of human thinking.

Suppose, for example, you've got, say, a baseball which


A: (Continuing) is being pitched from the pitcher to the hitter, and the ball goes along and then suddenly it dips down. The guy swings and the ball is not there, not— You know, I suspect the pitcher, you know, might start thinking in terms of divine intervention.

But a scientist would be saying things like, well, now, why did this happen. Well, let's look at Galileo's Laws; let's look at laws to do with air resistance together with initial conditions like the speed the ball was thrown and so on and so forth.

Q: In connection with these characteristics of science that you've identified, can you tell us what you mean by testable?

A: Yes. Again, it all follows, I think, very much from the nature of law. A scientific theory is not a hypothesis of a body of science. It must, in some sense, put itself up against the real world. That is to say, one must be able to do experiments, either in the lab or out in nature and try and get inferences from the main body of science, and then to see whether or not they follow and whether or not they actually obtain in the world. I think one would want to say that any science that's worth its salt is certainly going to have a lot of positive evidence in its favor. More than that, I think a very important aspect of science is that somehow it must


A: (Continuing) be sort of self-generating. In other words, a scientific hypothesis, a scientific theory is not only going to explain what it set out to explain, but it's going to lead to new areas as well, and one has got to be able to test it in this respect.

Q: Is it fair, then, to say that a science has to generate new facts which then can be tested against a theory?

A: Well, it's not generating the facts, but it's generating inferences about expected facts. Do you want an example or two?

Q: No. That's fine.

In connection with the attributes of science and this issue of testability, does the concept of falsifiability mean anything to you?

A: Yes. The concept of falsifiability is something which has been talked about a great deal by scientists and others recently. It's an idea which has been made very popular by the Austrian-English philosophist, Karl Popper. Basically, the idea of falsifiability is that there must be, as it were, if something is a genuine scientific theory, then there must, at least, conceivably be some evidence which could count against it. Now, that doesn't mean to say that there's actually going to be evidence. I mean, one's got to distinguish, say, between something


A: (Continuing) being falsifiable and something being actually falsified. 

But what Popper argues is that if something is a genuine science, then at least in the fault experiment, you ought to be able to think of something which would show that it's wrong.

For example, Popper is deliberately distinguishing science from, say, something like religion. Popper is not running down religion. He's just saying it's not science. For example, you take, say, a religious statement like God is love, there's nothing in the empirical world which would count against this in a believer. I mean, whatever you see-- You see, for example, a terrible accident or something like this, and you say, "Well, God is love. It's free will," or, for example, the San Francisco earthquake, you say, "Well, God is love; God is working his purpose out. We don't understand, but nothing is going to make me give this up."

Now, with science, you've got to be prepared to give up.

Q: I was going to ask you for an example of falsifiability in the realm of science. 

A: Well, let's take evolutionary theory, for example. Suppose, I mean, contemporary thought on evolutionary theory believes that evolution is never going to reverse itself in any significant way. In other words, the dodo,



A: (Continuing) the dinosaurs are gone; they are not going to come back.

Suppose, for example, one found, say, I don't know, somewhere in the desolate north up in Canada, suppose one found evidence in very, very old rocks, say, of mammals and lots and lots of mammals and primates, this sort of thing, and then nothing for what scientists believe to be billions of years, and then suddenly, mammals come back again.

Well, that would obviously be falsifying evidence of evolution theory. Again, I want to make the point, you've got to distinguished between something actually being shown false and something being in principle falsifiable. I mean, the fact that you've got no contrary evidence doesn't mean to say that you don't have a theory. I mean, it could be true.

Q: The last characteristic you mentioned was that science was tentative. Can you explain that characteristic of science?

A: Yes. Again, this is all very much bound up with the points I've been making earlier. What one means when one says that science has got to be tentative is that somewhere at the back of the scientist's mind, he, or increasingly she, has got to be prepared to say at some point, "Well, enough is enough; I've got to give this



A: (Continuing) theory up." It doesn't mean to say you are going to be every Monday morning sort of requestioning your basic principles in science, but it does mean that if something is scientific, at least in principle, you've got to be prepared to give it up.

Q Doctor Ruse, in addition to those four characteristics, natural law, explanation, testability and tentativeness, are there other characteristics of science, methodological characteristics of science which serves to distinguish science from non-scientific endeavors?

A: Yes, I think there are. of course, one starts to get down from the body of science and starts to talk more about the community of scientists. Fairly obviously, scientists have got in some sense to try to be objective. One has got to, even though scientists might have personal biases, personal issues, at some level you've got to try to filter these out in science.

Science has got to be public. In other words, if you've got some sort of scientific ideas, you've got to be prepared to let your fellow scientists see it. 

Science has got to be repeatable. Fairly obviously, again I say, science has got to try to be honest. I mean, obviously not all scientists all the time have been all or any of these things. But speaking of science as sort of a general body of knowledge and a body of men and women



A: (Continuing) working on it, these are the sorts of ideals we are aiming for. They are not that different from philosophers and lawyers.

Q How does science deal with a new observation or new experimental data which is not consistent with a theory that science has generally accepted to be true for a period of time?

A: Well, you know, it's a little difficult to answer that question because what can one say. It depends on the scientific theory which is threatened. It depends on the new evidence.

I guess a good analogy would say science is something as happens here. Suppose, for example, there was some question about whether or not somebody is going to be convicted of a crime. Well, you have them up, you have a trial, and then let's suppose they are found guilty. Now, they are found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. You accept the supposition. That doesn't mean to say that never, ever could you open up the case again.

For example, if somebody else was found the next week committing exactly the same crime, you'd probably look very hard at the first one. So, I mean, there are things that would make you change your mind.

And I think it's the same with science. I mean, if you just establish something, and then something pretty



A: (Continuing) massive comes up fairly soon afterwards, then you're going to rethink it. On the other hand, suppose somebody has been convicted twenty years ago, and his mother on the deathbed says, "Well, he didn't really do it." Well, you might say, "I'm not too sure about that."

It's the same with science. If you've got something which is really working, really going well, lots of evidence for it, you get something which seems to be a bit against it, I mean, you don't ignore it. You say, "Let's try and explain it."

On the other hand, you don't suddenly say, ooh, I've lost everything. I've got to start again.

Q Do scientists work at trying to fit the new data into the old theory?

A: They work at trying to fit it in. What can I say. mean, sometimes they, I suspect that first of all they are going to look very carefully at the data again. Other scientists are going to see if the data really is what it's supposed to be, try new experiments, so on and so forth.

Q Doctor Ruse, have, you ever seen reference to observability as an attribute of science?

A: Well, I've certainly seen reference to it in the scientific creationist literature.



Q How do creation scientist use the term "observability"?

A: Well, they seem to make it an essential characteristic of science, and they tend to use it in the sense of direct eyewitness observation.

Q Now, as a philosopher of science, do you believe that observability is an attribute of science?

A: It's funny you say that. Certainly empirical evidence is important, but I wouldn't want to say that direct empirical evidence is important for every aspect of every science. We don't see electrons, for example.

Q Why is science not limited to the visible, to what you can, to what an observer can actually see?

A: Well, because-- This takes us right to the heart of the way science works. I mean, scientists pose some sort of hypothesis, some sort of idea, suppose about the nature of the electrons, something like this. From this he tries to derive inferences, ultimately trying to find something out about the real world, and then you argue back to what you haven't seen.

I mean, you don't see that I've got a heart, but you can infer that I've got a heart from all of the observable characteristics like the fact that it thumps and so on and so forth.

Q Speaking of your heart, I note--



A: Yes. It's thumping quite a bit at the moment.

Q --I note that your latest book is titled _Darwinism Defended_. Does the title of that book suggest that evolution is in question and that evolution is in need of defense?

A: Certainly I hope not. Certainly-- Well, let me put it this way. I do not want to imply that the happening of evolution, as we understand it today, is in any sense under attack by credible scientists.

I am concerned, I'm talking in the book about mechanisms, forces and so forth.

Q Do I understand you to be drawing a distinction between the happening of evolution and the mechanics of evolution?

A: Yes.

Q And what is that distinction?

A: Well, the happening of evolution is claims about the fact or the supposition that we all today, and the fossil record is a function of the fact that we all evolved, developed slowly over a long time from, to use Darwin's own phrase, one or a few forms.

The mechanism, the cause of evolution is -- what shall I say -- it's, I won't say why, but it's the 'how did it happen' sort of question.

Q When scientists today speak of the theory of



Q (Continuing) evolution, are they referring usually to the theory that evolution happened, or are they referring to the theory about how evolution happened?

A: Well, I guess I'd have to say it tends to be used somewhat ambiguously. Sometimes you see it one way; sometimes you see it the other way. To a great extent, I think you have to look at the context in which the discussion occurs.

But I think usually it's true to say that scientists today are concerned about the mechanisms. They accept that evolution occurred.

Q Do you know of any scientists other than the so-called creation scientists who question the happening of evolution?

A: No, I don't really think I know anybody I would call a scientist. I say scientist in the sense of professional, credible scientist. Now, certainly the creation scientists want to argue that it didn't occur.

Q You say that scientists today agree that evolution happened.

A: Yes.

Q Why is that so?

A: Well, quite simply, the evidence is overwhelming.

Q What is the history of the consensus in the scientific community that evolution has happened?



A: Well, like everything, I think in Western intellectual thought, you could well go back to the Greeks. But probably the story, at least as affects us, of the scientific revolution picks up off Copernicus' work showing that the earth goes around the sun and not vice versa.

I think it's true to say that Copernicus' ideas and the ideas of the Copernicans spurred a number of things which led ultimately to evolution thought.

For example, on the one hand, one had the fact that even Copernicus' ideas put certain pressure on the Bible taken literally. For example, in the Bible, it talks of the sun stopping for Joshua, implying the sun moves. And people pointed out-- In fact, Luther and Calvin pointed out, even before Copernicus published, that this seemed to go against the truth of the Bible.

And as people began to accept Copernicanism, they started to say, "Well, you know, if one part is not literally true, maybe another part isn't either." That was one thing.

Another thing was although the Copernican theory, per se, doesn't talk about how things actually came about, certainly it set people thinking this way. And certainly during the eighteenth century, there was an awful lot of speculation and hypothesizing about the way in which the



A: (Continuing) universe might have come about through natural law.

And in particular, there was a very popular hypothesis known as the nebular hypothesis which was developed including part of this by the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, which suggested the fact this universe of ours has evolved gradually by natural law from clouds, clouds of gases.

So in physics one is getting what I say analogical directions. Then in the biological sciences themselves, people are finding more and more evidence which were leading them to think that maybe Genesis wasn't quite all that could be said.

For example, more and more fossils were being found, and people were starting to realize that these fossils simply weren't just curiously shaped pieces of stone, so on and so forth.

To cut a long story short, I think by the end of the eighteen century a lot of people were starting to think that maybe organisms had, in fact, developed slowly. In fact, one of the first people to think up the idea was Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, who used to write unbelievably bad verse all about how we all evolved up from the oak tree and everything like this. Probably the first really credible scientist to put



A: (Continuing) everything together was a Frenchman by the name of Lamarck, Jean Baptiste de Lamarck, who published a work on evolutionary science or evolutionary theory in 1809.

After that, people started new evolution ideas. They didn't much like them, but they talked about them more and more. Certainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, evolutionism got a big discussion with the publication in 1844 of a book by an anonymous Scottish writer known as Robert Chambers.

So again the people went on talking and talking and talking. Finally in 1859, Charles Darwin published _Origin of Species_. And I think it's true to say that within a very short time, and I mean a very short time, certainly the scientific community was won over to evolutionism. And from that day on by the professional body of scientist, certainly by biologist, I don't think evolution has ever been questioned.

Q When you say the scientific community was won over to evolution, I take it you mean that shortly after the publication of Origin of Species, the scientific community accepted that evolution happened, is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q Charles Darwin also proposed a theory of describing



Q (Continuing) the mechanics of evolution, did he not?

A: He did indeed.

Q What theory was that?

A: Well, it was the theory of natural selection.

Q Now, do scientist today generally agree about how evolution happened?

A: No, not at all. In fact, sort of looking about the courtroom at the moment, I can see several people who, as it were, when they get outside start to disagree very, very strongly indeed about the actual causes.

Q Can you describe the nature of that debate about the mechanics of evolution that is ongoing today?

A: Yes. I would say that if you like to use sort of a boxing metaphor, in one corner you've got the more orthodox Darwinians who think that natural selection is still a very, very major factor.

I don't think anybody, even Darwin himself, ever thought that natural selection was all there was to it. But certainly, you've got some people who want to argue that natural selection still plays the major role.

On the other hand, you've got some people who want to argue that there are other factors which are probably very important random factors, some important genetic drift -- I'm sure you will be hearing more about that -- and other sorts of factors which could have been involved in evolution.



Q Doctor Ruse, you testified earlier that creation scientists often confuse the difference between the happening of evolution and the how of evolution, is that right?

A: I did indeed.

Q Would you please explain what you meant by that, please?

A: Well, what they do is they'll, say, take a passage where a scientist, a biologist, something like this, is talking about the question of causes, the question of reasons, this sort of thing, and they will quote just this one sentence or half a sentence, one paragraph, and then as it were, automatically assume and lead the reader to assume that what's under question here is the actual occurrence of evolution itself.

So one gets, I think, this sort of mixing of the two.

Q Doctor Ruse, are you familiar with creation science literature?

A: Yes.

Q In your book, Darwinism Defended, do you analyze creation science literature?

A: Well, I analyzed one work in particular. This is a work edited by Doctor Henry Morris of the Institute for Creation Research. 

It's one-- It's not only edited by him, but I think



A: (Continuing) there are some thirty other scientists, including Doctor Gish, who were either, co-authors or co-consultants.

This is the work which was published in 1974 call Scientific Creationism. It's a work which was published in two versions. One was the public school edition, and the other was the Christian school edition or the Christian edition.

I analyzed the public school edition. It seemed to me that this was about as frank and as full a statement of scientific creationism as one was likely to find.

Q That was analyzed in your book?

A: That's analyzed in the final two chapters in my book, yes.

Q In addition to the book, Scientific Creationism -- Excuse me, Doctor Ruse. There are two editions of Scientific Creationism. One is the sectarian edition, and one is the public school edition. Which of those did you consider in your book?

A: I considered the public school edition.

Q Doctor Ruse, in addition to Scientific Creationism, the book Scientific Creationism, have you read scientific literature excuse me creation science literature extensively?

A: Yes, I have.



Q Could you describe some of the books that you've read?

A: Well, I've read a couple of books by Doctor Gish. I've read Evolution: The Fossils Say No and the book for children, Dinosaurs: Those Terrible Lizards. I should add, by the way, that Doctor Gish and I are sort of old friends, old adversaries. And we've debated together, and I've been reading this stuff for a while now. Also, I read what I believe is taken to be the classic by creation scientists. That's the Genesis Flood by, I think, Whitcomb and Morris.

I have read a couple of recent books by a man called Parker, one which is his testimony on how he got converted to creationism, and another which is a very recent book, the most recent book I've found by the creationists, called Creation, something on the facts or the facts say so, something like that.

The Handy-Dandy Evolution Refuter by a chap called Kofahl, and another book by him. Creation Explanation: A Scientific Alternative to Evolution, that's by Kofahl and I think somebody called Segraves.

Q Is it fair to say you have read widely in creation science literature?

A: Well, I think so.

Q Have you considered the creation science literature



Q (Continuing) in your scholarship?

A: Yes.

Q Have you examined that literature as a philosopher and historian of science?

A: Yes, I have.

Q You testified earlier that creation scientists often confuse the difference between the happening and the how of evolution. And you suggested they do so in part by taking quotations out of context. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q Do you know any examples of that?

A: Yeah. Well, for example, in Parker's book, which I said was the most recent, I think, or the most recent book I've come across by creationists, I think you'll find at least one very flagrant example of that.

Q Doctor Ruse, I'd like to show you a copy of Act 590?

A: Yes.

Q Act 590 has previously been admitted as exhibit number twenty-nine.

Doctor Ruse, I'd like to direct your attention to the references to creation science in Act 590. In particular, I'd like to refer your attention to Section 4(a) of the Statute.

As a historian and philosopher of science and someone who has read extensively in the creation science



Q (Continuing) literature, how does Act 590 relate to the body of creation science literature that you have read?

A: I would say very closely indeed. In fact, so closely I would want to say identical.

Q What are the similarities that you see between the description of creation science in Act 590 and creation science as it appears in the body of literature that you've read?

A: Well, a number of things. But I think what one would want to say is, there are at, least three features which are obviously interrelated.

First of all, one has this sort of stark opposition between two supposed positions, so-called creation science and so-called evolution science. And one is often sort of an either/or, this sort of notion of balanced treatment of these two models. Let's call that sort of a dual model approach.

Secondly, the fact that creation science in 4(a) deals point by point with all and virtually only the things that the scientific creationist deal with.

And thirdly, the fact that 4(b) -- what shall I say -- this hybrid, this hodgepodge known as evolution science appears described here, and once again that is something which occurs, basically as a unit like this, I think, occurs only in the scientific creationist literature.



Q Doctor Ruse, I'd like to explore each of those areas with you. First, what is your understanding of the theory of creation?

A: Well, that the whole universe, including all organisms and particularly including ourselves, was created by some sort of supernatural power very recently. As it was tacked on, the fact that having done this, he or she decided to wipe a lot out by a big flood.

Q Where does that understanding of the theory of creation come from?

A: Well, my understanding comes from the reading of the scientific creationist literature.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't catch what you said earlier. What was the question and the response? Do you mind starting on that again?

MR. NOVIK: Not at all. Did you hear his understanding of the theory of creation?


MR. NOVIK: I could start after that.

THE COURT: Start with that, if you would.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q What is your understanding of the theory of creation? 

A: That the world, the whole universe was created very



A: (Continuing) recently. And when I talk about the whole universe, I'm talking about all the organisms in it including ourselves.

And as I said, sort of added on as sort of a -- what shall I say -- a sub-clause, that some time after it was done that everything or nearly everything was sort of wiped out by a big flood.

Q How was that creation accomplished according to the theory of creation?

MR. WILLIAMS: Objection, your Honor, to the use of the term "the theory of creation." As previously pursued in our Motion in Limine, the term "theory of creation" is used nowhere within the Act.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, a few more questions, and I think that objection will answer itself.

THE COURT: Okay, sir. Go ahead. 

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q Doctor Ruse, I believe I asked you whether the creation you mentioned was accomplished by any force?

A: Yes. By a creator.

Q Where does your understanding of the theory of creation come from?

A: Well, from my reading of the scientific creationist literature.

Q Is that theory of creation a part of Act 590?



A: Well, I think so, yes.

Q Is the creation, the theory of creation that you have identified in the creation science literature the same as the creation science theory identified in Act 590?

A: Yes.

Q Does Act 590 mention a creator with a capital C?

A: It doesn't actually use the word.

Q Where do you see in Act 590 the theory of creation?

A: Well, I see it very much in the first sentence of 4(a). And I think all the time when looking at 4(a), one has got to compare it against 4(b) because these are obviously intended as two alternative models.

And if you look, for example, at 4(b), you see that evolution science means the scientific evidences for evolution, inferences from those evidences.

We are talking about scientific evidences. Scientific evidences for, well, what we mean, a theory. Scientific evidences outside the context of a theory are really not scientific evidences.

Q What theory do the scientific evidences in 4(b) support?

A: Well, they are talking about this theory of evolution science. What I want to say is if we go back to 4(a), then if we are going to start talking about scientific evidences, then presumably we are talking about



A: (Continuing) scientific evidences for some theory. And analogously, what we are talking about is the theory of creation.

Q Where in Act 590 do you see a reference to a creator?

A: Well, again, as I say, I don't see the word creator. I think the, Act is very carefully written so that I wouldn't.

However, I think if you look at 4(a)(1), sudden creation of the universe, energy and life from nothing, I think a creator is clearly presupposed here.

Again, if you look at 4(b)(1), which says "Emergence" -- that's not a word I care for particularly -- "Emergence" by naturalistic processes of the universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from non-life.

Now, you will notice that the key new word here is naturalistic processes, which doesn't occur in 4(a)(1), sudden creation.

So my inference is that we are dealing with non-naturalistic processes in 4(a)(1) and non-naturalistic processes, meaning by definition a creator.

Q Looking at--

THE COURT: Wait a second. Let's go back over that again. 

A: What we are dealing with is the question of to what extent 4(a)(1) implies some sort of non-naturalistic



A: (Continuing) creator.

And the point I was trying to make, your Honor, was that I think if you look at 4(b)(1), it says emergence--

THE COURT: Okay. Fine.

A: --emergence by naturalistic processes. I feel very strongly that to understand 4(a) you've got to compare it all the time with 4(b) and vice versa. And my point simply was that 4(b) talks about naturalistic processes, so presumably in 4(a), which doesn't, we're talking about non-naturalistic processes.

Q In 4(a), the language to compare with naturalistic processes you said was sudden creation, is that correct?

A: Yes. Right.

Q Now, looking at 4(b)(3) and 4(a)(3), can you comment on those sections with respect to the issue of creator?

A: 4(b)(3), "Emergence by mutation and natural selection of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds." Again, the word "kind" has a superfluous connotation. It makes me feel a bit uncomfortable, certainly in talking about it in the context of science.

Q But in 4(b)(3), does the Statute make reference to naturalistic processes?

A: Well, it doesn't mention naturalistic processes. It doesn't use the word "naturalistic," but clearly one is talking about naturalistic processes. Mutation, natural



A: (Continuing) selection, these the epitome of naturalistic processes.

Q Yes, sir. And how does that compare with 4(a)(3)?

A: Well, one's only got changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds. And I take it originally created since we are not dealing with naturalistic processes. We are dealing with non-naturalistic processes.

Q Does the word "kind" in 4(a)(3) have any special significance in that context?

A: Well, as I mentioned, the word kind certainly is not a word which we find used by biologists. It's a word which occurs in Genesis.

Q Do scientists use the word kind at all in any professional taxonomic sense?

A: Well, I'm sure if you went through the literature you might find that some scientists some day. But, no, it's not one of the categories.

Q Doctor Ruse, I believe you testified earlier that each of the six elements of creation science identified in Sections 4(a)(1) through 4(a)(6) were identical to the elements of creation science as you knew them through the literature. Is that so?

A: Yes.



Q Would you please give an example of the similarity between the elements of creation science in Act 590 and the elements of creation science in the literature?

A: Well, by an example, what I want to say is that every one of these elements in 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2), so on and so forth, as you go down them, can be found mirrored virtually exactly in almost the same order in Morris' edited book, _Scientific Creationism_.

If one wants to pick out specific examples, for example, section 4(a)(5) talks about a worldwide flood. And this is something which is discussed at some length in Scientific Creationism.

Q Doctor Ruse, I believe you also testified that another similarity between creation science literature generally and Act 590 is the reference to evolution science in 4(b) of the Act, is that so?

A: Yes.

Q Would you explain what you meant by that?

A: Well, this term "evolution science," as we can see in 4(b) includes a great many different things. And my reading both of the work of scientists and the work of scientific creationists is that it's only the scientific creationists who want to deal with this as one package deal. Evolutionists and other scientists separate them out and deal with them separately.


Q What other scientific disciplines are implicated by the provisions of 4(b)?

A: Well, it's almost a question of what isn't. I would say physics and chemistry in (b)(1). I would suspect that most of the social sciences in (b)(4). I would have thought geology in (b)(5).

Q Doctor Ruse, you are not a scientist, are you?

A: No.

Q Do you have any training as a biologist?

A: No.

Q Do you have any training in the philosophy and history of biology?

A: Yes.

Q What do scientists generally mean by the word evolution?

A: That organisms descended through constant generation from one or a few kinds.

Q Does the theory of evolution presuppose the nonexistence of a creator or the nonexistence of a God?

A: I don't think the theory of evolution says anything at all about the Creator. I mean, in other words, it doesn't say if there is one; it doesn't say that there isn't one.

Q Understanding that scientists do not generally use the term, "evolution science," let me, nonetheless, direct



Q (Continuing) your attention to the definition of evolution science in the Statute.

Looking first at Section 4(b)(1), what is your professional assessment of 4(b)(1) as a scientific statement?

A: "Emergence by naturalistic processes of the universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from non-life." Well, the word "emergence," I think, is not one that scientists would readily use. But taken as it stands like that, I think it's at least potentially a scientific statement.

Q Does 4(b)(1) reflect an accurate description about scientific learning about the origins of the universe and the origins of life on this planet?

A: It certainly doesn't represent the consensus. In fact, there's quite a debate going on at the moment about where life came from originally on this earth. Certainly, I think a substantial body. of scientists would think that it developed naturally on this earth from inorganic matter.

Q Doctor Ruse, is the study of origins of the universe and the study of origins of life on this planet the same discipline in science?

A: No, I would have said not. In fact, evolutionary theory takes, as it were, like _Mrs. Beeton's Cookbook_, it



A: (Continuing) take the organism or the initial organisms given and t hen starts from there.

For example, The Origin of Species is very careful. it never mentions about where life comes from. And I think this has been a tradition of evolutionists. I mean, obviously, evolutionists are going to be interested in the topic, and today certainly textbooks will probably mention it. But it's not part of the evolutionary theory proper.

Q What is your professional assessment of 4(b)(2)?

A: "The sufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds."

Well, it's potentially a scientific statement. I don't thing that anybody has ever believed this.

Q That mutation and natural selection are sufficient?

A: No. Charles Darwin didn't and today's evolutionists would certainly want to put in other causes as well.

Q How does that provision in 4(b)(2) relate to the provision in 4(a)(2)?

A: "The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism."

Well, in fact I think one would. find that most evolutionists would feel more comfortable with 4(a)(2) except I'm not sure they would want to, say it all came



A: (Continuing) from a single organism.

In other words,. we've got sort of a paradoxical situation here where I think the evolutionists would be somewhat happier with part of 4(a) rather than 4(b).

Q Do you understand the meaning of Section 4(b)(3)?

A: "Emergence by mutation and natural selection of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds." Well, I take it this mean this is what actually occurred. I take it, it means it occurred by naturalistic processes since we are comparing it with 4(a)(3), which talks of originally created kinds.

With the proviso that the word "kind" is a bit of a, what shall I say, mushy word. Yes, I think that is something I understand.

Q Again referring to 4(a)(3), what does changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals mean?

A: Obviously, on the one hand, one is making reference to sort of supernatural causes starting everything. But on the other hand, I see 4(a)(3) as an ad hoc device which creationists have had to think up to get away from some of the obvious indisputable cases of evolution that evolutionists in the last hundred years have come across. I mean, since Darwin, evolutionists have been working hard to find places where they can say, "Look, here is



A: (Continuing) something that actually did evolve from one form to another," and they came up with some examples.

Now, the scientific creationists can't get away from this fact. And so, as I see it, what they've done is they've sort of hurriedly, or not so hurriedly, added ad hoc hypotheses to get around these sorts of problems. For example, and probably the most famous case is of the evolution of moths in England. England, as I'm sure everybody knows, has gotten a lot dirtier in the last hundred years because of the industrial revolution. And a number of species of moths have gotten darker and darker over the years.

Q Excuse me, Doctor Ruse. You are making reference to a picture in what book?

A: It's a Scientific American book called Evolution. It first appeared as an issue of Scientific American, I think, in September of '78.

Q What page are you referring to?

A: I'm looking at page-- Well, they don't put a page number on it. It's two pages after 114. It's opposite an article called "Adaptation" by Richard Lewontin.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I intend to use this reference solely for purposes of explaining the witness' testimony. I believe that's appropriate under the rules.


THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. NOVIK: And I have no interest in admitting it into evidence unless Mr. Williams would like to admit it.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q Please proceed.

A: Here is a classic case of evolution actually being seen going on. If we look down at the bottom, we see that there are two moths. You have to look rather hard to see one of them.

And this, the model form was the standard original kind of this particular sort of moth. And the main predator is the robins who sort of fly along and eat the moths. And obviously, they see the dark forms very easily, and so they pick them off.

However, over the last hundred years or so because of the industrial revolution, parts of England has gotten a lot dirtier around Birmingham and these sort of places. So consequently, the trees have sort of changed from the bottom form up to looking much more like the top form. And what has happened is that the moths have evolved along with the change in the trees, so that now what happens -- and there is experimental evidence to show this -- robins are much more likely to pick off the original model forms.

Here we have got a beautiful case of evolution in



A: (Continuing) action, natural selection working. Scientists and biologists have studied it time and again. They found that it happens with other species of moths, so on and so forth.

It's evolution that you just can't get away from.

Q How did the creation scientists deal with this question of evolution?

A: Well, what they do is they try to run around it. They introduce, as I said, ad hoc hypotheses saying, "Oh, well, we're not against all forms of evolution. In fact, we ourselves admit a certain amount of evolution. It's just only evolution within fixed kinds." "In other words, we admit to evolution that evolutionists have found. That's just not enough."

Q In terms of the philosophy of science, what is the significance of the contrast between the unrestrained evolutionary change identified in 4(b)(3) and accepted by most scientists, and the evolutionary changes only within fixed limits of created kinds referred to in 4(a)(3)?

A: Well, I would want to say this means that evolutionary theory is, lays itself open to falsification in a way and testing in a way that so-called creation science doesn't, and that it leads to a certain sort, of fertility.

One expects to see evolution occurring and having



A: (Continuing) occurred so very much more generally. And this, of course, is the sort of thing one expects of a Science.

Q In your reading of the creation science literature, have you found any explanation, scientific explanation from the creation scientists as to why evolution should stop at the limit of a kind?

A: Not really, no.

Q Doctor Ruse, let me direct your attention to Section 4(b)(4) and ask your professional assessment of that section?

A: Well, emergence, I guess one would say, that man and apes-- Emergence of man from a common ancestor with apes. I think that evolutionists would certainly want to agree that man and woman, too, come from common ancestors with gorillas, orangutans.

Of course, nobody has ever wanted to claim that we come from a common ancestors of apes or monkeys which are living today.

Q How does that relate to 4(a)(4)?

A: Well, again, separate ancestry for man and apes, which, again, is something which is very important within the scientific creationist literature, is something which is, what can I say, again shows some sort of special consideration for man and certainly puts in mind that the



A: (Continuing) Creator had some sort of special place for man in mind when he set about doing his job.

Q Doctor Ruse, looking at Sections 4(a)(5) and 4(b)(5), do you understand the use of the words "catastrophism" and "uniformitarianism" as used in the Statute?

A: Not really.

Q What is your understanding, then, of how uniformitarianism is used in the creation science literature?

A: Well, I think they, confuse issues. What they say uniformitarianism is, is causes of the same kind and the same intensity interacting today have been responsible for the gradual development of the earth up to its present form.

Q Is that something that scientists agree on today?

A: Certainly not. Scientists today certainly think that in the earth's past there were all sorts of events which occurred which are not of the kind which occur today.

Q Were they, nonetheless, a junction of the same operation of natural law?

A: Yes. Of course, this is the trouble. What one's got is just sort of conflation, I think, in the scientific creationist literature between two possible senses of uniformitarianism. And if by uniformitarianism, you mean exactly the same laws and the same kinds of causes, like the law of



A: (Continuing) gravity, then I don't think any scientist -- well, I know that no scientist, no geologist is going to deny that.

But then on the other hand, if you want to mean by uniformitarianism, not only the same causes, same laws, but always acting in the same intensity, the same amount of rain, the same amount of frost, then certainly scientists today don't accept this.

Q How do you interpret catastrophism in 4(a)(5)?

A: "Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood

Well, my understanding is that what we've got is some sort of special divine intervention at this point bringing about major upheavals of one sort or another.

Q Doctor Ruse, do you find much reference to the words "uniformitarianism" and "catastrophism" in the creation science literature?

A: Oh, yes.

Q What is your professional opinion about the significance of the worldwide flood contention as it relates to creation science?

A: Well, it certainly puts-- I mean, again, this is something which comes up again and again in the creation science literature. And it's obviously to be identified with Noah's flood. I mean, Genesis Flood, for example, is



A: (Continuing) quite explicit on this. By Genesis Flood, I'm referring to one of the creation science books.

Q Who is the author?

A: Whitcomb and Morris. I think it was published in 1961.

Q Doctor Ruse, what is the relationship between a worldwide flood and the subject of origins, which, after all, purport to be the subject of this statute?

A: Well, I don't think there is any relationship. I think it's something which is being tacked on to, as it were, added on to Genesis. I mean, if you're going to talk about worldwide floods, why not talk about the Chicago fire.

Q Finally, Doctor Ruse, do you have any professional observation with respect to Subsection 6 of 4(b)?

A Yes. I'd say that an inception several billion years ago of the earth and somewhat later of life, I think that evolutionists would accept this.

Q And how does that relate to 4(a)(6)? 

A: Well, a relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds, again, this is the position which is taken in the scientific Creationist literature.

No actual times are given here. I mean, I take it, it could be anything from five million years ago to about a


A: (Continuing) week last Thursday. But certainly we think it would be interpreted in this way, along with the scientific creationist literature that what we are talking about is six, ten thousand years ago. The sort of Genesis scale that we heard about yesterday.

Q Do you find that theory of a young earth in the creation science literature?

A: Yes.

Q Do you find that theory of a young earth any place other than in the creation science literature?

A: No.

Q Doctor Ruse, does a creation theory necessarily require a young earth?

A: I wouldn't have thought so, no. I would have thought that one could have a relatively old earth and still have some sort of creation theory.

Q Doctor Ruse, you also testified that another similarity between the Statute and the body of creation science literature is the reliance on a two model approach to the teaching of origins?

A: Yes.

Q Would you please describe what you meant by that?

A: Well, what 'I mean by this is that everything is being polarized in the Act. And this polarization is something which is very distinctive of the scientific



A: (Continuing) creationist literature. You've got to be either one or the other.

And as I see matters, truly, and if you look at what evolutionists and other scientists are saying is, they are saying, "Well, no, there could be other options." One doesn't have to say, "Well, it must be one or it must be the other." There are all sorts of possibilities.

Q Doctor Ruse, the Act 590 does not use the words "dual model approach." Where do you see references to this so-called dual model approach that you've identified in the creation science literature?

A: Well, just as a point of order, Mr. Novik, on page one I see "balanced treatment of these two models." So, I mean, I think we are getting very close to a talk of dual is models.

But of course, dual model approach is something which is adopted time and again in scientific creationist literature. I mean, for example, once again referring to Morris' book, the two models are set out quite explicitly side by side, and they look very much like 4(a) and 4(b).

Q Have you encountered this so-called dual model approach to teaching science any place other than the creation science literature?

A: No.



Q Doctor Ruse, as a philosopher of science, what is your professional opinion about the logic of the dual model approach by which disproof of evolution is offered as proof of creation?

A: Well, it seems to me sort of fallacious because what one is saying is you've got two alternatives and they are contradictious.

And as I understand the true situation, what one's got is several options. Not all of them could be true, but at least one's got more than just two options.

Q Can you give an example of a particular discipline of science which the creationists set up as a dual model, but, in fact, you see more than two theories at work?

A: Yes. Well, if you look, for example, at 4(b)(1), "emergency by naturalistic processes of the universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from nonlife," well, if one's going to talk about this, in fact, there are all sorts of hypotheses. I mean, there's several-

Q Excuse me. Are you referring to the "origin of the universe or to the origin of life?

A: I'm sorry. I'm talking specifically about the origin of life here on earth, which certainly seems to be included under 4(b)(l).

And there are all sorts of hypotheses being floated around at the moment. I mean, on the one hand you've got



A: (Continuing) people who believe some sort of, form of, and by Genesis that life is created or life was produced by natural law gradually from inorganic matter here on earth. And there's certainly several hypotheses about how this might have happened.

Then, again, for example, just recently Francis Crick, Nobel prize winner of Watson-Crick fame, has suggested that maybe life here on earth was seeded by intelligent beings from outer space.

Then, again, another idea coming out of England, Sir Fred Hoyle, and a colleague of his, Wickramasinghe, who I think is one of the defendants' witnesses, they suggested that possibly life came here on earth because we were somehow passed through some sort of comet or some comet passed close to us which carried life.

So, what I'm saying is that there are three, four, five hypotheses being floated around at the moment as to how life started here on earth.

And as I see it, this 4(a), 4(b) is sort of locking us into saying that it is just one.

Q Does the two model approach take into account these various theories of how life began?

A: No. I think it sort of, what shall I say, pushes them all together. They are very different.

Q And as a philosopher of science, focusing



Q (Continuing) specifically on this issue of the origins of life, what do you think about, what is your professional opinion about the logic of doing that?

A: I think it's fallacious.

Q Now, we've been using The Origins of Life as an example. Does creation science, as you know it in the literature, apply the same two model approach to every other aspect of the issues raised in its model?

A: Yes, I think it does. Yes. For example, I was thinking of some aptitude towards geology. Either you've got to be a uniformitarian, whatever that means, or you've got to be a catastrophist. 

And I think that geologist today would certainly want to sort out a lot of different options here.

Q Doctor Ruse, having examined the creationist literature at great length, do you have a professional opinion about whether creation science measures up to the standards and characteristics of science that you have previously identified in your testimony here today?

A: Yes, I do.

Q What is that opinion?

A: I don't think it does.

Q Does creation science rely on natural law which you identified as the first characteristic of science?

A: It does not. It evokes miracles.


Q Would you explain that a bit?

A: Well, by reading the creation science and having thought about specific examples, if you want me to, is that creation scientists quite openly and frequently talk of supernatural interventions or processes lying outside natural law.

Again, this goes back to something which was being talked about yesterday. Nobody is saying that religion is false. The point is it's not science.

Q Are there any examples in the creation science literature that you've read that creation science does not rely on natural law?

A: Yes, there are.

Q Do you know of any such examples?

A: Yes. I can give you some examples.

Q Could you give us one?

A: Yes. For example, Doctor Gish's book, Evolution: The Fossils Say No, states this quite explicitly.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, this book identified by the witness as being produced by the plaintiffs as plaintiffs, exhibit 78 for identification, certain portions of that book have been extracted and introduced for identification. I believe Doctor Ruse is going to refer to a page that has been already produced.

THE COURT: All right, sir.



A: Mr. Novik, before I begin, perhaps I might note that since this book was discussed yesterday that this edition we are dealing with here states quite explicitly on the front page that it's the public school edition, and there are no disclaimers on the inside cover. Okay. I'm turning now to page 40 of Evolution: The Fossils Say No by Doctor Duane Gish. And this was published in 1978, or at least this edition. I think it came out earlier. 

And I quote: "By creation, we mean the bringing into being by a supernatural Creator -- That's a capital C, by the way -- of the basic kinds of plants and animals by the process of sudden, or fiat, creation.

"We do not know how the Creator created, what processes He used, for," and this is all now in italics, "He used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural universe," end italics. "This is why we refer to creation as special creation. We cannot discover by scientific investigations anything about the creative processes used by the Creator."

I don't think you can get much more blatant than that.

Q As a philosopher of science, what do you make of that statement?

A: Well, it's certainly not science.

Q Doctor Ruse, with respect to the second



Q (Continuing) characteristic of science that you mentioned earlier, the matter of explanation, do you think that creation science is explanatory?

A: No, I don't because I think that as soon as anything comes up, they evoke all sorts of ad hoc hypotheses, which are naturally explanatory.

To give you an example which has a nice historical connotation, there is a widespread phenomenon in the organic world known as homology. That's to say, the sort of structural similarities that you find, say, for example, between the bones of animals of different species. The bones of the human arm, for example, are very similar to the bones of the horse, the foreleg of the horse, the wing of the bat, the flipper of the porpoise and all these sorts of things.

Now, these are real problems for creationists because they are used for different functions and yet, why should you have these similarities.

What creationists say, and incidentally, this is something that people used to say before Darwinism, "Oh, well, if you don't find any homologies, then God was just working His purpose out. If you do find homologies, then, well, God would have a special plan in mind."

I mean, in other words, it doesn't matter what comes up, you know, we've got an explanation. And something which



A: (Continuing) can explain anything is certainly no true scientific explanation at all.

Q But isn't the creation science theory explanatory in some sense? For example, the eye has to be admitted to be a remarkable organ. Creation science would say it was made by the Creator. Isn't that an explanation?

A: Well, it's an explanation, but it's not a scientific explanation because you are evoking a creator, you are not doing it through natural law. And basically, you are not saying, for example, why one eye is one way, another eye is another way or particular features of the eye, per se.

Q Doctor Ruse, do you think that creation science is testable?

A:Not really genuinely testable, I wouldn't say.

Q Could you explain that?

A: Again, this goes back to some of the points we've been making. Every time one comes up with any kind of evidence, the creation scientists, as I see it, sort of wriggle around it.

One comes up with the case, for example, of the moth saying, "Oh, no, this is not something which counts against us." One comes up with fossil record, "Oh, no, this is not something which counts against us." Everything and nothing--



Q Is creation science falsifiable?

A: No. I'm sorry. As I was saying, there's basically nothing one can think of that creation scientists couldn't fit in. And I'll go even further than this, the creation scientists themselves are quite explicit about this in their writings.

They state time and again that, "Look folks, we start with the Bible, this is our framework. If it doesn't fit in, then we are not going to accept it."

Q And do you have any examples of that?

A: Yes. I think I could give you some examples of that.

Q And what is that specific example?

A: Well, one thing is the oath or the pledge that one has to sign or accept if one's going to become a member of the Creation Research Society, which is, I think, a society out in California, founded in California for creation scientists with masters or other degrees. And it states quite explicitly in that--

Q Excuse me. Do you have a copy of that oath?

A: Yes, I do. Do you want me to read some of this?

THE COURT: Is that different from the oath that was read yesterday?

MR. NOVIK: No, it's not, your Honor. I'm not going to have him read it.



THE COURT: You don't need to read it again for me. I heard it yesterday.

MR. NOVIK: Yes, sir.

A: Also, if you look in the literature itself, you find explicitly time and again stated that one must follow the limits set by the Bible.

Q Doctor Ruse, does this also bear on whether creation science is tentative?

A: Yes. Well, as I said earlier on, I mean, these are all really very much a package deal, these various features we are talking about. And it's obviously the case that nothing is going to shake the position of creation scientists about their fundamental claims.

Q Do you have an example in the creation science literature of creation science not being tentative?

A: Yes. In, I think it's Kofahl and Segraves' _The Creation Explanation_ there is several cases. 

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, the book, The Creation Explanation: A Scientific Alternative to Evolution, written by Kofahl and Segraves has been identified as an exhibit for identification, number 87.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q Doctor Ruse, would you identify for us the portion of the book you are referring to?



A: Yes. Referring to the book, _The Creation Explanation: A Scientific Alternative to Evolution,_ on page 40 we find the following statement: "Ultimate historical evidence always involves human eyewitness testimony or documents left by eyewitnesses, but no such testimony or documents are available for the early history of the earth."

"One document, however, purports to give authoritative testimony about the early earth from a Person -- Capital P, Person -- who was present. This document is the Bible, and its contents are to be classified not as scientific evidence but as divine revelation. Such revelation is either accepted by faith or rejected. Christians by faith accept the biblical revelation in all of its details, including its reports of early earth history. Thus the Christian student of origins approaches the evidence from geology and paleontology with the biblical record in mind, interpreting that evidence in accord with the facts divinely revealed in the Bible."

That is not tentative and that is not science.

Q Doctor Ruse, do you find that creation science measures up to the methodological considerations you described earlier as significant in distinguishing scientific from nonscientific endeavors?

A: No. My feeling is that really it doesn't. I think


A: (Continuing) that, for example, they play all sorts of slights of hand; they quote all sorts of eminent evolutionists out of context, implying that evolutionists are not saying quite what they are saying, implying they are saying other sorts of things.

In other words, what I'm saying is, I think that the creation scientists do all sorts of things that I teach my students in introductory logic not to do.

Q With respect to the quotation out of context, do you have an example of that?

A: Yes. For example, if we look at Parker -- this is the recent book--

MR. NOVIK: Excuse me, Doctor Ruse. Your Honor, the witness is referring to a book by Gary Parker entitled Creation: The Facts of Life. It has previously been marked for identification as exhibit 84.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q Would you identify the page you are referring to?

A: Yes. I'm looking now at page 144. And incidentally, what we're talking about and what Parker is going to be referring to is the article by Lewontin, your Honor, which is in the book you've already got upon your desk, Evolution, and it's the page exactly opposite the picture of the moths.

And what I'm suggesting is that Parker takes Lewontin


A: (Continuing) right out of context. It certainly leaves the impression that Lewontin is saying something other than what he's really saying.

Q The Lewontin article is on what page?

A: It's page 115. 1 don't think it's numbered. Just as a little background, Lewontin is not an eminent evolutionist, but he states quite categorically on that page that he is, that he accepts the evolutionary theory. If you look at the final column there half way down, beginning at the paragraph, Lewontin talks about the modern view of adaptation is the external world has certain problems and so on and so forth.

Q You were going to identify an out of context quotation?

A: Yes. Now, what Parker says, and I quote, is: "Then there's 'the marvelous fit of organisms to the environment,' the special adaptations of cleaner fish, woodpeckers, bombardier beetles, etc., etc., -- what Darwin called 'Difficulties with the Theory,' and what Harvard's Lewontin (1978) called 'the chief evidence of a Supreme Designer.'" The quote is "the chief evidence of a Supreme Designer." In fact, if you look at the original, you will see that this actual passage occurs in the second column. And what Lewontin is saying in the old days before we



A: (Continuing) taught Darwin, people believed that adaptation was the evidence of a designer. The first paragraph, "It was the marvelous fit of organisms to the environment much more than the diversity of forms." That was the chief evidence of a Supreme Designer.

Q So Lewontin was referring to the belief in a Supreme Designer prior to Darwin?

A: Certainly.

Q And it's quoted in Parker as if he believed presently in the evidences of a designer?

A: That's right. Personally, that strikes me as a rather sleazy practice.

Q Doctor Ruse, you also mentioned honesty as a methodological type attribute of science. Do you believe that creation science approaches its subject honestly?

A: I really don't. I think that one gets all sorts of--

THE COURT: Who wrote the Creation book?

A: This is Creation: The Facts of Life by Gary E. Parker.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q Doctor Ruse, do you believe that creation science approaches its subject honestly?

A: No, I don't.

Q Would you explain that, please?



A: I think that they pretend to be scientific and they are not going to be scientific at all. They know they are not going to be scientific. And I think that they are putting up a facade of being scientific when they know perfectly well that they are pushing a religious belief.

Q Do you have any examples of the dishonesty of creation science?

A: Well, again, it's— Well, I think, for example, they take things out of context like this. I think that's dishonest.

I think, for example, in Morris' book, Scientific Creationism, where they are talking about homologies. They deal with it somewhat dishonestly. It's a general position.

Q Doctor Ruse, do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty about whether creation science is science?

A:Yes, I do.

Q And what is that opinion?

A:That it is not science.

Q What do you think it is?

A:Well, speaking as a philosopher and speaking, also, as one who teaches philosophy of religion, I would say that it is religion.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I have no further questions.



THE COURT: We will take a recess until 10:30.

(Thereupon, Court was in recess from 10:15 a.m. to 10:38 a.m.)



Q Doctor Ruse, isn't it true the last time you were actually enrolled in a course in biology was at the age of approximately thirteen or fourteen?

A: Probably more like thirteen or fourteen.

Q That's what I said, thirteen or fourteen.


Q And you have not made any independent examination of the scientific data to determine whether there are scientific evidences which support creation science, have you?

A: No.

Q You stated that all scientists that you were aware of believed that evolution happened?

A: Yes.

Q Do all scientists that you are aware of believe that life evolved from non-life?

A: No.

Q So to the extent that's part of evolution, all scientists don't agree with that, do they?

A: Well, to the extent that's evolution. But of


A: (Continuing) course, as I said in my, earlier on, I don't conclude that in evolution. I say I don't. I don't think that evolutionists do.

Q Do not some scientists include that?

A: Well, creation scientists.

Q Do not some scientists say that life emerged from non-life?

A: Well, the word "emerged", of course, is a bit of a funny word.

Q Evolved, I'll use that word.

A: Certainly some scientists would say that. But as I said, that's not necessarily part of the theory of evolution.

Q But it is a scientific theory, nonetheless, isn't it?

A: Well, it's a scientific hypothesis.

Q It is science?

A: Yes.

Q And do some scientists say that, or have theories about how the universe was formed?

A: They do.

Q And is that science?

A: Yes.

Q How it was formed initially? The ultimate origin of the universe?

A: Well, you know, you'd have to tell me what exactly


A: (Continuing) they are saying at a particular time. I mean, scientists, a lot of them are very religious, and certainly, I'm quite sure that some scientists have made claims that I would certainly judge to be religious and have then gone on to make scientific claims.

Q Are you aware of what is commonly referred to as "the big bang theory"?

A: I've certainly heard of it, but, no, this isn't my area of expertise.

Q I understand that. But you consider that to the degree that you are aware of the theory to be a scientific hypothesis?

A: To the degree that I'm aware of it, yes.

Q Does the theory of evolution state exactly where man evolved from?

A: Not really. The theory of evolution shouldn't be confused with sort of phylogeny, the actual path of evolution. A theory is something to do with the actual causes, the processes, rather than what actually happened right down the line like that.

Now, certainly, I would say that evolutionists today believe that man evolved naturally. And I'm sure we all know that there is an awful lot of speculation about how this occurred.



A: (Continuing) But I wouldn't have said that the actual point at which man evolved was part of the theory, per se. It's something that you are going to try to explain through the mechanisms.

Q You mentioned, I believe, was it Kant, is that correct?.

A: K-a-n-t. Immanuel Kant.

Q And he spoke of, perhaps, evolution of the world from some sort of clouds?

A: Right.

Q Would you consider that to be a scientific hypothesis?

A: Well, I'd say it's a scientific hypothesis. Certainly at that point it wasn't much more. In the nineteenth century, quite a bit of work was done on the nebular hypothesis, and certain aspects of it seemed to work and others didn't.

Q So again, that is science?

A: Yes. I would want to say so, yes. At least I would want to say that it was something which could be dealt with as science.

Q So generally, then, in terms of looking at theories of origin, we are talking about ultimate origins of the universe, the planet earth, and of life; that there are what you consider to be theories or hypotheses of science



Q (Continuing) which address these questions. Is that correct?

A: No. I don't like your words "ultimate origins". I think you are trying to slip that one in there. Talking of origins, yes, I think that they can be scientific theories. If you're going to start talking about ultimate origins in the sense of where did it all begin way back when; start wondering what was before time started, then I don't see that this is necessarily going to be scientific at all.

Seems to me you are really getting into metaphysics or religion.

Q In other words, when you say ultimate, do you consider that to mean, for example, where matter came from, the inorganic matter from which life later evolved?

A: I think you certainly could. But you are talking about the nebular hypothesis, for example.

Now, Kant, as it were, took the gases. I mean, he said, "Look, we start with these gases, and there seems to be evidence of these. Now, how could these, as it were, develop into a universe like ours?"

Now, in that sort of sense of origin, I would say that we could certainly have a scientific theory; we can have a hypothesis. I'm not sure, though, that I'd want to talk about that as ultimate origins.


Q I understand that your theory of evolution, as you have articulated in your testimony here today, takes life as a given; that there was life?

A: Well, it's not my theory.

Q Well, the one that you have articulated and we have adopted?

A: Yes. I would say it takes life as a given. I'm certainly not denying it, but there is going to be obvious interests in, well, where did life come from before that.

Q And that can be a question of science?

A: It certainly can, yes. Not that it can be, but certainly is.

Q Then how can we, first of all, test those theories? For example, the nebular hypothesis, how the world was formed from clouds.

A: Well, do you mind if we talk about how we test, say, a theory, a biological theory, because, as I say, my area of expertise is not positive physics.

Q But you have said this is a science theory, so I'd like to know how—

A: Sure. Well, what you're going to do is a number of things. First of all, for example, with nebular hypothesis, you might see, for example, whether it's happening elsewhere in the universe, whether something analogous is occurring. That's one way. It's sort of a natural



A: (Continuing) experiment. Alternatively, what you might try to do is run some controlled experiments of your own. I mean, for example, you might try to set up some sort of model which you think in some respects is very similar, and then sort of run it and see whether this comes out.

Today, obviously, you are going to be working with, say, computer simulated models and so on and so forth. I mean, clearly you are not going to go back to the original point in time of our universe and start again and see if it works.

Q Why not?

A: Well, because we don't have time machines.

Q You can't do it?

A: You can't do it. That doesn't mean to say that it's not scientific or that the scientists can't make any scientific claims about it.

And of course, to continue, this is the sort of thing which is occurring today on the origins of life. This is the sort of work scientists are doing, running experiments, what they think would be closely analogous, these sorts of things, looking for evidences.

Q Closely analogous?

A: Closely analogous. What they think would be closely analogous.



Q How it might have happened?

A: Well, yes. I mean, the point is, look, we were not there to see it happen. I mean, if we had been, I doubt if you and I would be arguing like — well, we're not arguing — talking like we are at the moment.

But what the scientist is going to do is clear up some sort of hypothesis. For example, suggestion that maybe the earth originally had certain gases, certain sorts of compounds, certain sorts of electrical discharges and so on and so forth.

Now, the hypothesis is that if you start with something like this, then possibly way down the road, life might be naturally produced.

And so you are going to start to think about the sorts of stages in which life might be produced. First of all, you are going to start with inorganic molecules, and then put these people together into, say, amino acids or certain more complex models, so on and so forth. And what the scientist is going to do, what scientists, in fact, have done is say, "Okay, here's my hypothesis. Let's try running experiments to see if this works. Let's mix these various compounds together; let's put some electric sparks through; let's see if the sorts of things that I would like to see occur, my hypothesis predicts, do, in fact, attain."



A: (Continuing) This, of course, is what they've done, and sometimes it hasn't worked. But sometimes it certainly has.

Q How do scientists know what gases there were when the world or the earth was formed?

A: Well, there are various ways in which you can do this. I mean, for example, you can study what there was, you know, what's on other planets, what's on other universes.

Q How do we know what was on this planet?

A: Well, when we look at what the properties of the earth are, these sorts of things, we can calculate what is going to be thrown out from the sun or if something exploded, what sorts of things are on our earth, what sorts of things are on other planets, calculating with gravity what sorts of things would have been lost, say, from Jupiter or Mars but not from our earth, and so on and so forth.

Q And from that we'd know what was on this planet?

A: No. I don't think anybody is talking about `we know what's on this planet.' In fact, you may well know that there's quite a controversy at the moment among scientists. So again, I do want to emphasize I'm not a philosopher of physics. But I read an article in Science I think about this time last year where there's some controversy



A: (Continuing) now about which, exactly which processes or which products, in fact, were on earth. But one's inferring back, as one always does, one is working analogically from other planets and so on and so forth.

Q So if we don't really know what the elements were, how can we test or falsify that?

A: Well, I think you are using the word "know" in either `I know it or I don't know it.' It's sort of black or white. Now, I mean, there's a lots of sorts of shades of gray in between. I mean, we've got certain sorts of hypotheses, these sorts of things. Some things we know or we feel more reasonably assured about than others. And certainly if I've given the impression, for example, that, what shall I say, of beliefs about the origination of life here on earth, it's something that a scientist today would want to claim, "Now I know; now there's no doubt," then I'm sorry. I've certainly given a false impression because that's not so.

This is the way that science works. You try out hypotheses. You throw them up, you work with them. If they seem to go for a while, then they enter as they were in the community of science for a while.

If there seems to be things against them, then you put



A: (Continuing) them on the back shelf, so on and so forth.

Q You've stated that since shortly after Origin of Species was published, evolution had never been questioned, is that correct?

A: No, I didn't say that. What I said was shortly after the Origin of Species was published, credible scientists, certainly scientists working in the field at all interested in the topic — I'm not talking, now, about creation scientists, obviously — were won over almost completely to an evolutionary position. Now, certainly, there were one or two old men who died believing in sort of God's instantaneous creation. Adam Safley, for example.

But my point and the point I certainly want to stand by is that the scientific community was won over incredibly rapidly, certainly, in Britain, which, of course, is what I've written about most, but also, I think, in North America to a great extent.

Now, for example, there's one well-known American, Swiss American, Louie Agassiz, at Harvard who never became an evolutionist. I think he died about 1872, 1873. On the other hand, interestingly, his son, Alexander, became quite a fervent evolutionist.

Q You stated, though, that in looking at Darwin's



Q (Continuing) Origin of the Species that all scientists don't agree on natural selection. Some would argue natural selection. Some would argue random factors such as genetic drift. Is that correct?

A: Well, no. Again, I didn't quite say that. What I said was that there's quite a bit of debate both at the time of Darwin and today about the causes of evolution. My feeling is, and I think I can go so far as to say that this is a very professional feeling, is that there weren't many evolutionists who denied natural selection role.

I think increasingly they've allowed natural selection an important role. And I think — I say even today — I think today that this would be general consensus that natural selection is extremely important.

People from Darwin on have always said that there are other causes, and there is quite a controversy today. But is what is not often known is that there was a great controversy at Darwin's time.

For example, Darwin's supposedly great supporter, T. H. Huxley, who was well-known for getting up and debating with the Bishop of Oxford, in fact, always had quite severe doubts about the adequacy of selection.

Q Also, are not some scientists today arguing something which is commonly termed the "punctuated equilibrium



Q (Continuing) theory of evolution"?

A: They certainly are. In fact, I can see at least two or three of them right here today watching us. I hope they are enjoying themselves.

Yes. Because they are punctuated equilibrists — I suppose that's the sort of term — you might want to slap a subpoena on them and find out exactly what they do believe.

Because they believe it, I would say that they also believe that selection is important. I mean, what they are saying is selection is not everything.

Q And is one of the people who you would identify with that group, in fact, one of the leading authorities on that Stephen J. Gould, one of the plaintiffs' other witnesses?

A: Yes. And furthermore, I'd want to say one of the most important and stimulating evolutionist writing today, a man for whom I've got a great deal of admiration.

Q You've talked about how the creation scientists quote evolutionists out of context, using one sentence. Yet, if an evolutionist should quote a creation scientist out of context, would that be any less dishonest, in your opinion?

A: I think that I would have to say that it would be no less dishonest if one sort of played fast and loose with



A: (Continuing) that point there.

Q And when you quote from some of the books you mentioned earlier, specifically, Doctor Gish's book, you didn't point out to the Court, did you, that Gish goes on to talk about how neither, under the pure definition as articulated by Karl Popper, neither evolution nor creation science can qualify as a scientific theory?

A: I thought it was—

Q Did you point that out? If you did, I didn't hear it.

A: Well, if you didn't hear it, then I expect I probably didn't. But I, you know— Let me add very strongly that I want to dispute the implication that I'm being dishonest at this point.

My understanding was it wasn't evolution on trial here; that it was, if you like, creation. That's the first point. And secondly, as you know, I personally don't necessarily accept everything that Popper wants to say. So I've don't think that I've quoted Gish out of context at all. I was asked to give an example of a passage in scientific creationist writings where the scientific creationists quite explicitly appeal to processes outside the natural course of law.

Now, I'd be happy to reread it, but I think that's what I did, and I think I did it fairly.



Q Doctor Ruse, you and I can agree, can we not, that that book does specifically talk about how in the author's opinion if you used the criteria which you have used this morning of testability, falsifiability and the other criteria, that neither creation science nor evolution science can be classified as a scientific theory?

A: I think we can agree on that. I think I can go further and say that this is a very common claim by the scientific creationists that neither side is— I mean, I don't think they are altogether consistent at times. I mean, for example, I've got a book by these people, what is it, Kofahl and Segraves, who talk about a scientific alternative to evolution.

Sort of on page one, on the cover, I'm told that it is scientific. And then, you know, later on we're told, well, neither is scientific. I mean, you know, to a certain extent, pay your money, take your choice.

Q Don't the creation scientists make the claim that creation science is as scientific as evolution science?

A: Well, you know, it's like—

Q Excuse me. Can you answer my question? Do they make that claim?

A: What? That it's as scientific?

Q Yes.

A: No. They make so many different sort of fuzzy



A: (Continuing) claims. What they say is that, they quite often say that they are the same status. Now, sometimes they want to say they are both scientific; sometimes they want to say they are both philosophical; sometimes they want to say they are both religious, which is certainly true. And of course, this is one of the things I was talking about with Mr. Novik, that the creation scientists want to put evolutionary theory and creation theory on the same footing.

My understanding, that's what the bill is all about.

Q You also quoted some works, a book by Parker?

A: Yes.

Q That was by Gary Parker, is that right?

A: That's right, yes

Q It was not Larry Parker?

A: No. It was Gary Parker, Creation: The Facts of Life.

Q You testified on: direct examination that Section 4(a) of Act 590 as it, defines creation science is identical to— Act 590 is identical to the creation science literature, the definition used. Is that correct?

A: Yes. In the sense that this is one paragraph, and creation science literature is, you know, there's an awful lot of it. Pretty Victorian in its length.



Q The creation science literature that you have read, some of it does rely upon religious writings, does it not?

A: It does.

Q And Act 590 specifically prohibits the use of any religious writing, does it not?

A: Yes. But if you will remember, I was very careful to state and, furthermore, to keep the sorts of references I was dealing with to public school editions as much as I could.

For example, Scientific Creationism, the book that I referred to, that comes in a Christian edition as well. And I deliberately didn't use that one. I wanted to use a nonreligious version.

Q Within Act 590, is creation science ever identified or called a theory?

A: Well, I don't see the word "theory" there, just as I said earlier. I see the whole passages as being written very carefully to avoid the use of the word theory. But as I went on to say, in my professional opinion, I don't think that one can read this without understanding "theory."

And if you remember, I drew this particularly on the analysis of the first two sentences. In other words, 4(a), creation science means the scientific evidences for creation, et cetera. Evolution science means the


A: (Continuing) scientific evidences for evolution. And my point is, was, that it doesn't make any sense to talk about scientific evidences in isolation. I mean, scientific evidences mean, well, what? Scientific hypothesis, scientific theory.

Q How about data, the facts?

A: What about the facts?

Q Cannot scientific evidences mean the scientific data?

A: Not just a naked fact on its own, that's not scientific. I mean, it could just as well be religious or metaphysical or anything mathematical.

You see, the thing is, science is a body of knowledge which you try to bind together to lead to scientific understanding. Facts disembodied on their own are not part of science. It's only inasmuch as your bringing together within a sort of framework that you start to get science.

And that's precisely why I want to say that creation science means scientific evidences for creation is meaningless unless you are talking about a theory of creation.

Q What is a model?

A: In my opinion, a model is — it's one of those words which is very commonly used I think of a model as being a sort of subpart of a theory.



A: (Continuing) For example, another of the witnesses, Doctor Ayala, has written a book called Evolving: The Theory and Processes of Evolution. And presumably, I assume what he's doing is, in the overall context, talking about a theory, and then later on he talks about models where what he's trying to do is set up specific little sort of explanations to deal with specific sorts of situations.

Q So a model is more narrow than a theory? A theory is broader? Is that generally—

A: Well, let me put it this way. That's the way which I would use it as a philosopher of science. And I think most philosophers of science would know what I'm talking about

Q Can you have scientific evidences for a model?

A: Well, a scientific model is certainly something that you use in the context of scientific evidences, but certainly.

Q You talked about the use of the word "kind". You said that's not an exact term?

A: Yes.

Q In taxonomy are the terms species in general and other classifications, are they fixed? Has there been no change in them?

A: What do you mean by "fixed, has there been no



A: (Continuing) change in them"?

Q Well, has the definition of the species or the particular classification of animals, for examples, into species, has that been unchanging through time?

A: Well, you know, that's a very interesting question from a historical point of view. And certainly, I think one can see differences in emphasis.

But I think it's very interesting, for example, that you talk about species that, in fact, you see a concept of species being used, say, in the early nineteenth century, before Darwin, which is very, very similar in many respects to the concept of species today.

That's to say, a species is a group of organisms like human beings which breed between themselves, don't breed with others. And certainly this was a notion of species which certainly goes back, as I know it, a couple of hundred years.

Certainly, again, genera and higher orders, perhaps higher orders are, as we all know, brought up a lot more arbitrary in the sense that it's a lot more place for the taxonomist to make his or her own decisions.

Q Species, you said, though, are groups which interbreed and do not breed with other groups?

A: Basically, yes.



Q For example, is a dog a different species than a wolf?

A: I guess so.

Q Do they interbreed, to your knowledge?

A: Sometimes you get this. But of course, the point is, you see, you can't turn this one against me because I'm an evolutionist and I expect to find that. This is the whole point about the evolutionary theory.

Q But the definition for species that you gave me breaks down in that one example, does it not?

A: Oh, listen, that's the whole— Any definition you give in biology, you are going to find conflicts. For example, what I'm doing is I'm giving you the point about biological concepts, is that they are not like triangles. If I give you a definition of triangle, then if it hasn't got three sides, it ain't a triangle. On the other hand, when you are dealing with concepts in the biological world, then you are dealing with things which are a great deal fuzzier. Now, that doesn't mean to say we don't have paradigm cases.

I mean, for example, humans don't breed with cabbages; we don't breed with horses; we are a good, you know, classification of the species.

Now, of course, as an evolutionist, my belief is that



A: (Continuing) one species will change into another or can split into two different ones.

Of course, I expect to find species all the way from being one species like human beings to being sort of two separate species like, you know, say, some sort of species of fruit fly and human beings. So the fact that we find, you know, borderline cases, it doesn't worry me at all.

Q You testified concerning kinds, that that concept did not have any fixed definition. But your definition of species does not apply to the just one example I mentioned. Is that not correct, Doctor Ruse?

A: Well, I think you are twisting my words, Mr. Williams.

Q I'm just merely asking you, does your definition of species, that they interbreed within themselves and do not breed with others, does that fit the example of the species of a dog and wolf?

A: No, it doesn't. But—

Q Thank you. You had discussed the example of these peppered moths as an example of evolution. Did those peppered moths— There were peppered moths and what was the other, a darker colored moth, is that correct?

A: Yes. There's light and dark.



Q Now, did the peppered moths become dark colored? Did they change into dark colored moths?

A: No. You mean, did the individual moth change?

Q Or the species changed?

A: The species, yes. Certain races or groups, populations within the species did indeed, yes.

Q Are you aware that in discussing that example in the introduction to the Origin of Species, L. Harrison Matthews stated that these experiments demonstrate natural selection in action, but they do not show evolution in progress?

A: Am I aware of that passage?

Q Yes.

A: I have glanced through it. I am quite sure you are reading correctly, and I know those are the sorts of sentiments which he expresses in that introduction.

Q Is L. Harrison Matthews, to your knowledge, a creation scientist?

A: You certainly know perfectly well that I know that he isn't.

Q Was any new species created — excuse me — evolved in that peppered moth example?

A: To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q So you had two species when you started and you had two species—



A: No. You've got two forms within the same species.

Q All right. Two forms. And there were still two forms, correct?

A: Yes.

Q Now, you mentioned that, in discussing the definition of creation science in the Act, that they — "they" being the creation scientists — talk about a relatively recent inception of the earth, and you take that to mean six to ten thousand years?

A: Well, as I say, I interpret that against the scientific creationist literature. As I said, if you just look at the sentence right there, it could be anything from, well, let's say, a hundred million years to, as I said, a week last Friday.

Q So it could be several million years old and still be relatively recent on the scale of the several billion year age which some scientists think the earth is?

A: Yes, I think it could be.

Q You also talked about the two model approach, which you say it polarizes. It's either/or?

A: Right.

Q And just looking at the origin of life and of man and the universe, can you think of any other options besides there was some sort of creator at some point and there was not?



A: Well, you know, I find that very difficult to answer because that's a sort of religious question or at least a metaphysical question.

And I think one would have to specify a little more definitely what you meant by creator in that sort of context.

I mean, now, if you say to me, "Well, by creator, I mean Yahweh of the Old Testament, then, yes, I would say that, for example, I could think of some sort of life force or world force, like, for example, Plato suggests in The Timaes.

So I can think of lots of different notions of creator. And same of the others were talking about some of these yesterday, so I certainly think there are lots of options that are open.

Q But if we talk about creator in the broad context of that word, can you think of any other options besides having a creator and not having a creator?

A: I don't really think I can. But as I say, not having a creator, does that mean that the earth is eternal or that it just was caused by nothing?

Q I'm not asking you what significance you would attach to it. I'm asking if you can think of any other options?

A: Well, I'll tell you something, I'm not altogether



A: (Continuing) sure that I know what the disjunction means. So if I say no, I can't, I have to confess it's at least partly predicated on the fact that your question— And I'm not trying to be clever, now. It's just so fuzzy that I'm really not sure what you're talking about.

Q If there are two approaches, two models, and if they should be mutually exclusive, would not evidence against one be evidence for the other if they are mutually exclusive?

A: If they are, then, of course, I would agree with what you're saying. However, you've got the if in.

Q I understand that.

A: And if wishes came true, then beggars could ride.

Q You also talked about the other theories on, as I understand, the creation of life or how life came about, let me put it that way. And you mentioned one that life was generated by some slow processes. And you mentioned a theory or hypothesis espoused by Crick. And then you mentioned one espoused by Hoyle and Wickramasinghe. Do you consider those to be scientific hypotheses?

A: Well, I'll tell you, I haven't read Crick's book, to be quite honest about it. I just saw a review of it in the New York Review of Books. I have read rather quickly Hoyle and Wick—whatever it is, book. 25



A: (Continuing) I thought, and this, was my opinion, that at least parts of it were acceptable as scientific hypotheses. Personally, I thought that they ignored an awful lot of evidence, but I thought parts of it.

On the other hand, I think that finally there are parts of their book where they certainly seemed to me to slop over into religion.

However, I would want to say that at least as far as life coming here on this earth is concerned, I would have thought that this is at least a form that science could be. I mean, it's not well confirmed science, as far as I know.

Q Directing your attention to Act 590, again, let's look at 4(a)(2) which mentions the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism. First of all, do you know whether there is any scientific evidence to support that portion of the definition?

A: Well, I don't like the term "single organism" there. I don't know that there is any scientific evidence to suggest that it's a single organism or many organisms. And I'm not sure that anybody else does.

Q All right. Let's look at the first part?

A: The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection

in bringing about development of all living kinds. Yes.



A: (Continuing) I would have thought that, for example, there is good evidence to suggest that certain random processes are also extremely important.

Q And could there be natural laws which would be utilized in looking at that aspect of the definition?

A: I would have thought so, yes. Of course, it doesn't necessarily— I mean, part of the excitement is we don't know all of the laws. And if we knew all of the laws, there would be no jobs for evolutionists.

The excitement of being a scientist is that a lot of the laws we don't know at the moment, but we are working towards them.

Q And science is a changing—

A: It's an ongoing process, yes.

Q And when we look back now at some of the things which were considered to be scientific years ago, in light of our present-day knowledge, they don't seem very scientific, do they?

A: You know, again, that's an interesting question. They certainly wouldn't be very scientific if we held them, and certainly there are some things that we would count out.

We'd say today, for example, "Well, that's not scientific; that's obviously religious. On the other


A: (Continuing) hand, there are some things I think we'd want to say, well, no. Obviously we wouldn't hold them as scientific today, but they certainly were validly scientific by our own criteria in the past. I mean, for example, the Ptolemaic system belief that the earth was at the center, and in my opinion, was a perfectly good scientific theory. It made a lot of sense.

Q As we, to the extent that we can, look into the future, do you think that people will look back on this day and age and look at what we consider now to be scientific and have the same sort of impression that that is not scientific as they look at it, although it may have been today?

A: Do you know, that's a very interesting question. I hope I'm around two hundred years from now to answer that. I hope we are both around.

But I'm not sure I agree with you there. I think in the last two, three hundred years the notion of science has started to solidify, and that, for example, at the time of Newton, people were getting to the point where they could have a good feel for what science was.

Now, certainly, I think you are right to suggest that, say, a couple of hundred years from now people will look back at us and say, "Well, how could they have believed all those sorts of things?" And I, you know, I hope very



A: (Continuing) much that's the case. It's going to be a pretty boring future for our grandchildren, otherwise.

Q If we are not, science will be—

A But I don't think they are going to say we are not scientists.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, Mr. Williams on a number of occasions interrupted the witness' answer, and I would appreciate it if he could be instructed not to do that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my understanding is he's finished the answer. Also, the witness has interrupted me on a couple of occasions, too.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, your Honor. You know, professors talk too much.

MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q Now, looking back at the definition in 4(a) again, if you look at 4(a)(3), "changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals," if we start looking at the degree of change, is that not something we can look at by resort to natural laws?

A: That we can use— That we can look at— Now, I'm not quite sure I'm following you.

Q (3) speaks of the degree of change that there is.

A: We can certainly look, for example, at how much change has occurred since certain times in the past and


A: (Continuing) using laws, of course.

Q Does that require miracles to study that?

A: No, I certainly don't think it does, because evolutionists do this and they don't use miracles.

Q And (4), looking at the ancestry for man and apes. It says "separate" there. But separate or not separate, did that require the implication of miracles to study that?

A: No. But of course, it does require the willingness to be prepared to take counter-evidence to what you find. And as I pointed out earlier, I don't think creation scientists would be prepared to take counter-evidence. Again, for example, one could talk about Parker's book where he flatly denies or twists every finding by paleoanthropologists in the last ten years about human ancestry.

Q Looking, then, at (5), explanation of the earth's geology, is explanation of the earth's geology something which we could study by resort to natural laws rather than miracles?

A: Yes it is.

Q And (6) "a relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." There we are talking about the age of the earth and how long life has been on the earth. Can we look at that or resort to natural laws without looking at miracles?

A: We can. However, what I do want to suggest is that



A: (Continuing) very frequently the creation scientists do not. They argue, for example, that the laws change or speeded up or grew in certain intensities and so on and so forth.

So, certainly, I think one can study the age of the earth naturally by using laws and inferring back. I'm quite prepared to accept that.

I'm not prepared to accept that creation scientists do do it.

Q You said that something which can explain everything is not a scientific theory?

A: Right.

Q If that statement were true about the theory of evolution, it, therefore, would not be a scientific theory, would it?

A: Well, it's another of your hypotheticals, Mr. Williams.

Q Well, I'm asking you if it were true?

A: But I'm just saying, accepting the hypothetical that if it were the case, then your consequent follows. However, once again, we've got, "if it were the case." Now, what I'm saying and what I've said earlier is that "it's not the case", so I argue that the consequent doesn't follow.

Q You also talked about creation science or about the



Q (Continuing) quality or attribute or criteria of science as being falsifiable. And you said that creation scientists, they start with the Bible and if it doesn't fit in there, we don't accept it?

A: Right.

Q As you look in Act 590, does it limit the scientific evidence which can be brought in to support creation science to Biblical references?

A: Act 590 says nothing at all about the Bible in the sense that Act 590 does not use the term "the Bible" anywhere.

Q What does Act 590 say you can use to support creation science?

A: Well, the words are "scientific evidences."

Q All right. Thank you. The books you have referred to, do you happen to know whether those have been accepted by the Arkansas Department of Education for use as textbooks in implementing Act 590?

A: No, I don't.

Q Many of them, in fact, based upon your own knowledge, would not stand the scrutiny of this law because they do rely upon religious references, is that not true?

A: That's the problem, Mr. Williams.



Q Excuse me. Could I get an answer to my question first?

A: Yes. The answer is yes. But of course, if I just finish by saying yes, I've only said half of what I want to say.

Q I'm not trying to cut you off

A: I've just said what you want me to say. Fine.

Q And you state finally that creation science is not a science; it is a religion. And you base that in part upon your own experience in teaching the philosophy of religion. Is that correct?

A: I do, yes.

Q Does the science curriculum in secondary schools have an effect one way or the other for good or ill on a student when that student enters a university to study science?

A Is this sort of a general question?

Q You can take the question as you will. It's a question.

A: I would have thought so, yes.

Q Do you recall that you told me in your deposition that you said, "I don't know," in answer to that question?

A: Well, as I said, you don't— I think it's a very general sort of question which is so general, I mean, you could put it at different levels. And in the context of



A: (Continuing) our discussion earlier, it could have been much more specific, in which case I would have said I don't know.

Q Is creation science taught in the public schools of Canada?

A: My understanding — and again, please understand I do not speak as a professional educator at that level in Canada, but my understanding is that in some schools it is certainly taught and not simply in private schools, but in some of the public schools.

I believe, for example, that in the Province of Alberta it is taught.

Q Have you ever made any effort to find out how creation science is taught in Canada?

A: Have I made any effort?

Q Yes.

A: In fact, interestingly, since you took my deposition, I have certainly talked to some of the evolutionists on campus. I confess I haven't found out very much yet, but I intend to.

Q Has the teaching of creation science ever been a matter of much great debate in Canada?

A: It's growing debate. For example, like that of the event of welcoming Doctor Gish onto my campus in February, I think it is.



A: (Continuing) And certainly, for example, about two months, ago I debated with one of the creationists, in fact, one of the co-authors of Doctor Morris' book on the equivalent of public television.

Q But in the past, has it been a matter of much debate or controversy in Canada?

A: I wouldn't say it's been a matter of great debate, great controversy. I confess, you know, an awful lot of Canadian news tend to be about you folks, and you polarize things much more quickly than we do. That's not a criticism, by the way.

Q When you teach your courses in philosophy, do you try to give some sort of balanced treatment to different is theories, different types of philosophy?

A: I certain try to give a balance treatment to what I teach. But it doesn't follow that I should teach every particular philosophy that every particular philosopher has ever held or anybody else has ever held.

Q But you do teach some philosophies which might be conflicting or at least not consistent with each other?

A: I certainly do, in a historical context. I mean, I teach— Look, I teach creationism in a historical context. I mean, I teach history of science, I talk about creationism as it was up through the 1850's and this sort



A: (Continuing) of thing. So, I mean, of course, I'm teaching it in a historical context.

Q But you try to be fair in teaching these different philosophies, don't you?

A: I certainly do. For example, I'd like to think that I'm being fair to the creationists, for example, in my book on The Darwinian Revolution.

Q Do you have any objection to all of the scientific evidence on theories of origin being taught in the public school science classroom?

A: Well, you used that term "scientific evidence" again. I'm not prepared to accept scientific evidence without talking about the theory.

If you say to me, do I have any objection to all theories which I hold as, what shall I say, which are held by the consensus of scientists being taught, I don't have any objection, with the proviso that, of course, at the high school level, at the university level, undergraduate level, you are certainly not going to try to teach everything.

And in fact, as I see it, high school level and also at the university level, one is going to be teaching the basic, the fundamentals. Certainly, one is going to talk about some of the controversies, some of the ideas, this



A: (Continuing) sort of thing. But as far as, for example, teaching the latest thing in punctuated equilibria at the high school level, somebody said, "Oh, well, we are going to spend, say, six weeks on punctuated equilibria."

I'd say, "Well now, listen, fellow, maybe you should be spending a bit more time on Mendel's laws."

Q What you are saying, then, is because of a limited amount of time, choices do have to be made in curriculum?

A: Not just because of a limited amount of time, but because of the whole general philosophy of proper education that educators must select. Education isn't sort of an indifferent—

THE COURT: Where are you going with that?


THE COURT: What is the point of going into that?

MR. WILLIAMS: The point of that is that in teaching all scientific evidence and that curriculum has to be, he will concede that you have to make some choice of curriculum.

THE COURT: That seems so obvious to me.

MR. WILLIAMS:Well, to some degree. It's not obvious in the plaintiffs' pleadings, your Honor. They want to state that apparently the state has no right to make any choice of curriculum; that, it falls to the



MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing.) individual teacher to teach what they want, when they want, how they want.

THE COURT: I don't believe they make that contention, but let's go on to something else.

MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q What is your personal belief in the existence of a God?

A: I would say that today my position is somewhere between deist — that's to say in believing in some sort of, perhaps, unmoved mover — and agnosticism. In other words, don't really know.

I mean, I'm a bit like Charles Darwin in this respect. Some days I get up and say, "You know, I'm sure there must be a cause." And then other days I say, "Well, maybe there isn't after all."

Q There must be a cause?

A: There must be something that— There must have been something originally.

Q The term "cause", what do you use that in relation to your concept of a God?

A: I'm talking about in the sense of some sort of ultimate religious sort of reason. It doesn't necessarily mean cause in the sense of a physical cause. It could well be final cause or something like this.

Q Is your conception of a God some sort of world



Q (Continuing) force? Is that one way you would describe it?

A: As I say, I don't say my conception of a God is some sort of world force. My conception is, perhaps, sometimes there is more to life than what we see here and now.

Q But you did tell me in your deposition that your conception of God would be that there might be some sort of, quote, world force?

A: There might be because, as I say, I'm not even an expert on my own beliefs in this respect.

Q Do you have a personal belief as to whether a creator, in whatever form, had a hand, figuratively speaking, in creating the universe, the life or man?

A: Not really. It's all so foggy to me.

Q Do you feel a religious person can be a competent scientist, Doctor Ruse?

A: Oh, certainly.

Q As you look at the definition in the Act of creation science, Section 4(a)(1), "Sudden creation of life," et- cetera, is that consistent with your own religious beliefs?

A: Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing. I, you know, to be perfectly honest, to me it's almost a meaningless question. You say, is it consistent. I think that one— This sort of level, I prefer not to talk in terms of consistency.



A: (Continuing) As I say, the whole thing is simply, a mystery to me. And if I say, well, is this consistent, then already I'm starting to define what my position is more than I'm prepared to do.

Q Well, you have earlier equated Section 4(a) to some sort of supernatural intervention by a creator?

A: Right.

Q And is that consistent with your religious beliefs?

A: That some sort of supernatural thing way back when— I don't think it's inconsistent. I don't think, on the other hand, that that's a very exciting part to me. I mean, quite frankly, what concerns me is not how did it all start, but how is all going to end.

Q But did you not tell me in your deposition, Doctor Ruse, that that was— I asked you the question, "Is that consistent with your religious beliefs," and you said, "No." I'm referring to page 52, lines 7 through

A: Okay. I'm prepared to say no. As I say, it's so, foggy that I'm no, yes. We're really getting to the borderline here where if you insist on an answer, I would have to say, "Well, I'll give you an answer if you want it, but it's, you know, it's not something I feel very confident about."

I mean, if you ask me, "Are you wearing glasses," I can



A: (Continuing) say yes, and I'll stand by it. If you ask me, "Was there a creator," I'll have to say, "Well, possibly." And if you say, "Well, do you really think there is, are you not an atheist," and I'd have to say, "Well, no, I'm not an atheist." That's definite. Do I accept 4(a)(1), could I accept 4(a)(1), well, I guess possibly I could in some respects, but other respects, possibly not.

Q Would you look at the definition is 4(b) of evolution science, 4(b)(1), for example. Would that be consistent with your religious beliefs?

MR. NOVIK: Excuse me, your Honor. I've allowed the questioning to go an without objection because I thought the relevance would become apparent. To me, it has not. And I object on the grounds that this line is entirely irrelevant to these proceedings.

THE COURT: What relevance is it?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, if the plaintiffs want to stipulate that the religious beliefs of the witnesses on these matters are not relevant, we will stipulate to that, and I can go on to other matters.

THE COURT: I think the religious beliefs of the witnesses could be relevant on the issue of bias or a question of bias of a witness. I think they are relevant. I just wonder how relevant they are to go into



THE COURT: (Continuing) all this kind of exchange of words. It doesn't seem to get us any place.

MR. NOVIK: That was precisely my point.

THE COURT: It seems to me like you've got about as much out of that as you can. If you want to continue to beat it, that's fine with me.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I want to make sure that the record is clear that, for example, in this witness' case, that the theory or the part of the Act, the definition section, that he personally thinks is more correct is also consistent with his own religious beliefs.

THE COURT: Okay. If you can ever make that clear.

MR. WILLIAMS: I think I'd like to try, at least.

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, it's my soul which is at stake, so I don't mind keeping going if we can find out what—

MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q Doctor Ruse, looking at Section 4(b) generally, 4(b)(4) and 4(b)(6), is it not true that when you talk about man coming from a common ancestor with apes and you talk about an inception of the earth several billion years ago, those are consistent with your own religious beliefs?

A: Oh, certainly. Yes.

Q Do you think that evolution is contrary to the religious beliefs of some students?



A: Yes. I think that I would want to say that, yes. But then again, so is a lot of science.

Q In teaching philosophy courses, do you ever teach theories or philosophies that you don't personally agree with?

A: In a historical context, certainly.

Q And a teacher should not have to teach only those courses which they agree with, isn't that correct?

A: Now, hang on. Try that one against me again.

Q Do you think a teacher should teach only those things he or she agrees with?

A: Well, you say "should only teach those things that they agree with." I mean, for example, I teach a lot of things that I don't agree with. But of course, as I say, I do this in a historical context.

I mean, it seems to me that a historian could certainly teach all about the rise of Hitler without being a Nazi themselves.

Now, one can teach and deal with things that you don't agree with, certainly in a historical context.

Q Are there scientists that you would consider scientists who feel the theory of evolution cannot be falsified?

A: Are there scientists that I would consider scientists— Well, now, you say the theory of evolution.



A: (Continuing) What are you talking about?

Q Well, what would you consider the theory of evolution?

A: Well, I mean, are you talking about Darwinism? Are you talking about punctuated equilibria? Are you talking about—

Q Let's talk about Darwinian evolution.

A: Certainly some people have thought that Darwinian evolution cannot be falsified.

Q As a matter of fact, that's an increasing number of scientists, isn't it?

A: No, I don't think it is. In my opinion, it's a decreasing number of scientists.

I'm glad you made that point because, in fact, one of the leading exponents of the book, Unfalsifiability of Darwinism, is Karl Popper. And recently, certainly, he's started to equivocate quite strongly on this and so are a number of his followers, by the way.

Q When did you write an article entitled "Darwin's Theory: An Exercise in Science"?

A: Well, I wrote it, I think, earlier this year. It was published in June.

Q in that article, did you not state that, "Although still a minority, an increasing number of scientists, most particularly, a growing number of evolutionists,



Q (Continuing) particularly academic philosophers, argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory is no genuine scientific theory at all"?

A: I think that I'd probably say something along those lines

Q So you did state in this article, did you not, that there was an increasing number?

A: An increasing number. I think I said an increasing number, of philosophers, don't I, or people with philosophical pretensions or something along those lines.

Q I think the record will speak for itself as to what was said. I think the word "scientists" was used.

A: You know, I'm not a sociologist of science. I'm not a sociologist of philosophies. You know, you want to take a head count, you could be right, I could be right. Who knows. I certainly know that a number of important scientists, or I'll put it this way, a number of important philosophers have certainly changed their minds.

Q Has Popper changed his mind about that?

A: I really don't know. Popper is an old man, you know. Without being unkind, I think Popper is getting to the point where mind changes aren't that important to him anymore.

Q Did he not state that evolutionary theory was not



Q (Continuing) falsifiable?

A: Oh, no. Certainly at one point, Popper wanted to claim that Darwinism was not falsifiable. Now, where Popper stood on evolutionary theories per se, I think is a matter of some debate.

It's certainly the case that he himself in the early seventies was trying to come up with some theories which he thought would be falsifiable.

In recent years it's certainly true to say that Popper has argued more strongly that at least at some level evolution theories can be falsified.

Q At some level?

A: Yes.

Q But he also said, did he not, that evolutionary theory was, in fact, a metaphysical research program?

A: I think he said that Darwinism was. I'd have to go back and check to see whether Popper ever said that all evolutionary theories are unfalsifiable or metaphysical.

MR. NOVIK: Excuse me, your Honor. We learned from the Attorney General yesterday in his opening argument that the State is interested in demonstrating that evolution is not science, and that evolution is religion. This line of questioning seems to go to that issue. The plaintiffs contend that that entire line of questioning as to both of those points are irrelevant to



MR. NOVIK: (Continuing) these proceedings. Evolution is not an issue in this case.

We have previously submitted to the Court a memorandum of law arguing this issue, and I would request the Court to direct defendants' counsel not to proceed along these lines on the grounds stated in that motion.

I'd be happy to argue that briefly at the present time, if the Court desires.

THE COURT: Is that the purpose of the questioning, Mr. Williams? Are you trying to establish that evolution is a form of religion?

MR. WILLIAMS: Not this particular line of questioning itself. But in view of the Court's ruling on the motion in Limine, that it is appropriate to consider whether creation science is a scientific theory, I think we are entitled to try to show that creation science is at least as scientific as evolution.

Indeed, the Bill on its face raises this issue in some of the findings of fact. And to the extent that they have been attacking the findings of fact in the Act, I think we are entitled to go into this to show one as against the other, the relative scientific stature of these two models.

THE COURT: Why don't we take a ten minute recess, and I'd like to see the attorneys back in chambers.



(Thereupon, Court was in recess from 11:40 a.m. to 11:50 a.m.)

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, just to put this in some perspective, as I understand it, the State is not making the contention that evolution is not science. The purpose of the questions is simply to demonstrate that some scientists do not think that evolution meets all the definitions of science as this witness has given a definition

MR. WILLIAMS: That is it in part, your Honor. Also, just the point being to demonstrate that, we are not demonstrating that evolution is not science, but that if you, according to this particular definition, that creation science clearly would be as scientific in that neither could meet, according to some experts, the definition of a scientific theory.


MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q Doctor Ruse, what is the concept of teleology?

A: Understanding in terms of ends rather than prior causes.

THE COURT: Excuse me. What is that word?

MR. WILLIAMS: Teleology. T-e-l-e-o-l-o-g-y.

THE COURT: What is the definition? That's not one of those words that's in my vocabulary.



THE WITNESS: Shall I try to explain this?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

THE WITNESS: Well, a teleological explanation, for example, one would contrast this with a regular causal explanation. For example, if I knocked a book on the floor, you might say "What caused the book to fall to the floor." In which case, you are also talking about what happened that made it fall.

A teleological explanation is often done in terms of design. For example, in a sense of, "Well, what purpose or what end does this glass serve." In other words, why is the glass here," something along those sort of lines. Sort of things that were being talked about yesterday afternoon.

MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q And is it possible to have both a religious and sort of theological concept of teleology and a nonreligious or nontheological concept?

A: It's possible. I mean, not impossible. I mean, there have been both concepts.

Q How would you distinguish the two?

A: Well, I would say the theological one is where, for example, you explain the nature of the world in terms of God's design, the sorts of things I find in 4(a), where one tries to understand why the world is, as it is because that's what God intended and that was God's end.


A: (Continuing) A non-theological one would be the kind, I think, the kind of understanding that evolutionists, Darwinian evolutionists, for example, who says, "What end does the hand serve." In this case, they are looking at it as a product of natural selection and looking at its value in a sort of struggle for existence in selection.

Q So some modern biologists do consider themselves to be teleologists?

A: Let me put it this way. Some certain philosophers think that biologists are teleologists.

Q Do they always use the term "teleology"?

A: The philosophers or scientists?

Q The philosophers in describing this concept?

A: Not always. In other words, sometimes used as teleonomy, but I personally like the word teleology.

Q Is this word, teleonomy, used to show that they are using the concept of teleology in its non-theological, nonreligious sense?

A: I would think that's probably true, yes.

Q In other words, they are trying to overcome a problem of semantics?

A: Well, they are trying to set themselves up against their predecessors. Scientists like to do this.

Q Do you consider Thomas Coon's book, The Structure of



Q (Continuing) Scientific Revolutions, to be recognized as an authority in either the history or philosophy of science?

A: Well, we don't have authorities in the philosophy of science. You know, they are all pretty independent types. I would certainly say that Thomas Coon's book is considered a very important book. I think it's a very important book.

Q In your book, The Philosophy of Biology, you state that the modern synthesis theory of evolution is true beyond a reasonable doubt, do you not?

A: Right.

Q And you further state that the falsity of its rivals is beyond a reasonable doubt?

A: Right.

Q Is not the so-called punctuated equilibrium theory a rival to some degree to the modern synthesis theory?

A: I'm not sure that it's a rival in the sense that I was talking about it in the book, quite honestly. I dealt with a number of alternatives, and punctuated equilibrium theory certainly wasn't one of those which was there to be considered when the book was written.

What I was saying was things like the original Lamarckism, you know, are false beyond a reasonable doubt. It certainly holds to that.



A: (Continuing)

What I also said was that the importance of selection, mutation, so on, are true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Q Again, to my question, is not the punctuated equilibrium theory a rival, contrasting to the modern synthesis theory which you think has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt?

A: Well, that's a nice point. I think some people would think of it as such. I don't personally think of it as such, and I'm glad to find that a lot of evolutionists like Ayala doesn't think of it as such.

Q Others do, do they not?

A: Well, quite often I think some of the people who put it up like to think of it as a rival. But, you know, we're still- I mean, the punctuated equilibria theory is a very new theory. We're still working on the sort of conceptual links between it and the original theory. And I think it's going to take us awhile yet to decide whether we are dealing with rivals or complements or whatever.

But of course, let me add that in no sense does this at any point throw any doubt upon evolution itself. We are talking just about causes.

Q Is defining a science a task which falls to philosophers rather than to scientists themselves?



A: Well, it falls to people acting as philosophers. Scientists can certainly act as philosophers.

Q So is science a question of philosophy?

A: It's a philosophical question.

Q Do philosophers uniformly agree on what is science?

A: I think that basically we would agree, yes.

Q They would not agree entirely, would they?

A: Well, philosophers never agree entirely. Do lawyers?

Q Do you think that in the society with a commonly held religious belief that religion could properly be taught in the public schools?

A: Try that one on me again.

Q Do you think in a society with a commonly held religion that religion could properly be taught in the public schools?

A: Yes. I think that for example, in medieval Europe where, in fact, everybody is a Catholic, I see no reason not to teach it in the public schools.

Of course, that has absolutely no relevance to us here today. We are talking about America and we are talking about Arkansas.

Q Is part of your opposition to creation science, and more specifically to Act 590, based on your belief that it's just a foot in the door, as you view it, for the fundamentalist religious groups?



A: Yes, I think I would. It's part of my belief. I mean, I think it's important to oppose Act 590 in its own right. I think it's wrong, dreadfully wrong. But certainly I do see it as a thin end of a very large wedge, yes.

Q And you see it as some sort of wedge which includes attacks on homosexuality on women and on other races, don't you?

A: Insofar as it spreads a very natural literalistic reading of the Bible, which as you know and I know certainly says some pretty strong things about, say, homosexuals, for example, certainly, yes, I can see it as a thin end of a very big wedge, yes.

Q But Act 590 has absolutely nothing to say on those subjects, does it?

A: Well, I didn't say that it did. I mean, my point simply is that if you allow this, this is the thin end of the wedge. You don't talk about all the wedge when you are trying to shove the tip in.

Q We are dealing here with the law, Doctor Ruse. And is it not true that part of your reason for being against the law is what you think might happen in the future if this law should be upheld?

A: Certainly. But as I said earlier, my opposition to


A: (Continuing) the law is independent in its own right.

Q I understand that. Who is Peter Medawar?

A: I think he's a Nobel Prize winner, a biologist or biochemist. Lives in England.

Q Is it not true that he has stated and as you quote in your book that there are philosophical or methodological objection to evolutionary theory; it is too difficult to imagine or envision an evolutionary episode which could not be explained by the formula of neo-Darwinism?

A: Medawar as opposed to Darwinism. But of course, that does not mean in any sense that Medawar opposes evolutionary theory in the sense of general evolution per se.

Q But isn't what Medawar is saying there is what we talked about this morning, that Darwinism can accommodate any sort of evidence?

A: But you are doing what we talked about this morning. You are confusing the causes with the fact of evolution.

Yes, Medawar was certainly uncomfortable, let's put it that way. I don't know where he stands today. I know that Popper has drawn back, but Medawar was certainly uncomfortable with the mechanism of neo-Darwinism.



A: (Continuing) But to the best of my knowledge, Medawar has never, ever denied evolution.

Q Is Medawar a creation scientist?

A: I said to the best of my knowledge, Medawar has never, ever denied evolution.

Q Do you consider the Natural History Branch of the British Museum to be a creation science organization?

A: Of course, I don't.

Q Is it true that this museum has had a display which portrays creation science as an alternative to Darwinism?

A: Well, of course, this is hearsay. I guess we are allowed to introduce this, but my understanding is, yes, I read it in the "New Scientist." I've certainly been told about this, yes. I think it was a shocking thing to do, frankly.

Q That's your personal opinion?

A: That certainly is. It goes to show that this is a real problem we've got in Arkansas, in Canada and, alas, in England, too.

Q Whether it's a problem depends on one's perspective, does it not, Doctor Ruse?

A: I don't think so, no. I think the problems can be objectively identified. That it smells of problems.

Q Do scientists, after doing a degree, a lot of work



Q (Continuing) in an area, sometimes, become emotionally attached to a theory?

A: Scientists are human beings. I'm sure they do.

Q And might they also be intellectually attached to a theory?

A: Individual scientists, certainly. But not necessarily the scientific community. I mean, Louie Agassiz that we talked about earlier was emotionally attached to his position, but the scientific community wasn't.

Q Had not, you written that Darwinian evolutionary theory is something which you can love and cherish?

A: Me, personally, yes, I do indeed. I think it's a wonderful theory.

Q Also, have you not advocated that the subject of creation science is a battle which you must fight?

A: That is why I'm here.

Q And how long have you been writing on Darwinism yourself?

A: Oh, altogether, fifteen years. I mean, quite frankly, some of my early stuff was done when I was a graduate student. I mean, I don't know whether you'd call that writing.

Q Doctor Ruse, in an article entitled "Darwin's Legacy", did you state-



MR. NOVIK: What page?


MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q -did you state, first of all, that Christianity and other forms of theism and deism are not the only world religions today; that in many parts of the world there is a powerful new rival?

A: Marxism.

Q And then you write at some length, do you not, about Marxism, particularly as it is affected by evolutionary thought, as it affects that thought?

A: Right. I'm talking, of course, in the context, very much the context of discovery there as opposed to the context of justification.

In other words, what I'm saying is that certain scientists have tried to blend their position with Marxism, and certainly extra scientific ideas have been importantly influential in leading people to certain scientific theories.

I am not at all saying, for example, that evolutionary theory is Marxist.

Q I understand that. Back to the point you just mentioned, science is really not concerned, then, is it, where a theory comes from or a model comes from? The more important question is, does the data fit the model?



A: Well, more important to whom? Certainly, to the scientist, of course, is a question of you get the ideas and then you put them in a public arena, and how do they fare.

For example, Copernicus was a Pythagorean, but we accept Copernicus' theory, not because we are Pythagoreans and Sun worshipers, but because Copernicus' theory works a lot better than the Ptolemaic system does.

Q Do you consider Marxism to be a religion?

A: In a sense. We talked about this in the deposition. As I said, religion is one of these very difficult terms to define.

I would have said if you are going to define religion just in terms of belief in a creator, then obviously not. But if you are going to talk of religion in some sort of ultimate concern, some sort of organization, something like this, then, as I said, I'm happy to talk about Marxism as a religion.

Q In your article at page 57, do you not state, "But cutting right through to the present and quietly admittedly basing my comments solely on a small group of Marxist biologists working in the West, what I want to point out here is that just like Christians, we find that the Marxists try to modify and adapt Darwinism to their own ends and within their own patterns. I refer



Q (Continuing) specifically to such work as is being done by the Marxist biologist, Stephen J. Gould, particularly his paleontology hypothesis of punctuated equilibria introduced and briefly discussed early in this essay?"

A: I say those words. I certainly do not in any sense imply that punctuated equilibria is a Marxist theory. In fact, the co-founder who is sitting over there would be horrified to think that it is.

What I am saying is that Gould as a Marxist, from what I can read and what he has done, has probably been led to make certain hypotheses and claims which he finds certainly empathetic to his Marxism.

I do not want to claim that punctuated equilibria is Marxist, per se, and I certainly don't want to claim that only and all Marxists could accept punctuated equilibria. In fact, my understanding is that a lot of Marxists don't like this.

Q Please understand, what I understand you are saying here, in fact, what you state is, for example, with reference to Gould, that he is strongly committed to an ideological commitment to Marxism in his science. And you have previously equated Marxism with a religion. Is that not correct?

A: No. You know, you are twisting my words here. I'm



A: (Continuing) saying, "Look, here's a guy who, to the best of my knowledge" - and, goodness, you are going to be able to ask him tomorrow yourself - "here's a guy who has got strong philosophical" - if you want to call them religious beliefs, I am prepared to do this - "who certainly would like to see the aspects of these in the world," certainly using his philosophy, his religion to look at the world just as Darwin did, incidentally, and just as Copernicus did.

And I see, you know, nothing strange about this. I see nothing worrying about this. Once you've got your theory, then, of course, it's got to be evaluated and is indeed being evaluated by independent objective criteria, and there's nothing Marxist about that.

Q What you are saying is that these Marxist biologists are conforming their science to some degree to their politics or if you consider politics religion?

A: No, I'm not. I don't like the word "conforming". You know, we can go around on this all day. I don't like the word "conforming".

What I'm saying is that some of their ideas are important in their context of discovering plus for formulating their ideas.

But as I say, you know, you could take Darwin, for



A: (Continuing) example. Darwin was a deist, no doubt about it. The only reason why Darwin became an evolutionist is because it fitted best with his religious ideas. Copernicus was a Platonist.

Q Have you not said that Gould, for example, pushes his scientific positions for three Marxist related reasons?

A: What he does is, he pushes the ideas to get them out on the table. This is the sort of thing he likes. Of course, you do. You sharpen your ideas. Copernicus pushed his ideas.

It doesn't mean to say that Gould is going to be a punctuated equilibrist because he's a Marxist. It doesn't mean to say that Eldridge or anybody else is going to be a punctuated equilibrist because they are Marxists. What it means is that probably Gould pushes these sorts of ideas. You see, again the context of discovery, the context of justification.

People discover things. People come up with ideas for all sorts of crazy reasons and all sorts of good reasons. But once you've got them out, as it were, within the scientific community, then they've got to be accepted because of the way that they stand up, do they lead to predictions. I mean, does punctuated equilibria lead to predictions that are predictions within the fossil record.

Q Doctor Ruse, but you have previously stated, I



Q (Continuing) think, and would agree that this idea of punctuated equilibria, this debate that you see in the evolutionary community is a healthy debate?

A: I do indeed.

Q And they are not challenged - "they" being the punctuated equilibrists - have not challenged evolution over all, have they? Just merely the mechanism?

A: Right.

Q But their challenge as you have stated in these writings states that it has come from a motivation based on Marxism which you have identified as religion, doesn't it?

A: Motivation. See, here we go again. What is motivation?

Q Is that correct? Is that what you have said?

A: Well, if you read the passage, I'm quite sure I said those words, but you are deliberately refusing to understand what I'm saying.

Q And then on the other hand, you simply, because someone challenges evolution, the theory of evolution itself, and you feel they are doing it based on religious reasons, and you are someone who is an adherent of Darwinian thought, you object to that. Is that not correct?

A: Look, you are twisting my words. The challenge is



A: (Continuing) being done on an evidentiary basis, that is, moving into the context of justification. In that paper and other papers I'm talking about a context of discovery. What I'm saying is that when scientists discover things, often they have different sorts of motivations.

But whether or not one is to accept punctuated equilibria has nothing at all to do with Gould's personal philosophy, personal religion.

It's the fossil record. It's what we find out there that counts.

Q You call it a healthy' debate, but you also state that this fails as science. This-

A: What, fails as science?

Q This Marxist version of evolutionism, as you term it.

A: Well, I say it fails, as science. But what I'm saying is I don't think it's true, but I don't think it's true or false because of Marxism.

I personally don't accept it because I don't think they've made the case on the fossil record. Now, Gould thinks that he has. We can argue that one.

But when I talk about its failing as a science, I do not mean it is now nonscientific. What I mean is that I don't think as a scientific hypothesis that it will fly. But as I say, Marxism is a red herring here.



Q I'm merely referring you to-

A: What I was doing, I was talking about the context of discovery. And if you want to talk about that, I'm prepared to do so.

Q Well, you've said that the Marxism version of evolution has failed as science, but that's healthy. But creation science fails as science and that's unhealthy?

A: Well, you see, you are putting words into what you want me to say. Marxist version of evolutionary theory. What I'm saying is, one prominent evolutionist is a Marxist. That led him, I think that encouraged him to try out certain ideas.

But I don't think that punctuated equilibria theory is Marxist, per se. I certainly don't think the judgment is going to get into evidentiary level.

Q Now, you are not a scientist yourself?

A: No, I'm not a scientist. No. I'm a historian and philosopher of science which I would say encompasses a great deal of other areas in philosophy.

Q The discovery basis you mentioned, if a creation scientist believes in a sudden creation, should that not be advanced and then fail or succeed on its merits of scientific evidence?

A: No. Because we are not talking about scientific theory here. We are talking about religion. As a



A: (Continuing) philosopher I can distinguish between science and religion. We are not talking about the context of discovery here.

And as I say, in any case, creation science isn't science. It's religion.

Q Do you agree with John Stuart Neill that, "If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified silencing that one person that, had he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."

A: Well, the subject is so strange that- You can't shout "Fire" in a loud crowded cinema. Yes, I do, right. I think it's a wonderful statement. But of course, silencing somebody is different from not allowing the teaching of religion in the science classroom.

Q Teaching religion in the science classroom is your conclusion, is that correct?

A: Right.

Q And Marxism is a religion in your mind?

A: I certainly would not want Marxism-

THE COURT: Let's don't go through that again. He is not going to admit what you want him to.

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm glad I've got one philosophical convert here.



MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)

Q Do you feel that the concept of a creator is an inherently religious concept?

A: Yes, I do.

Q So that the Creator should not be interjected into the science classroom?

A: Well, I mean, let's be reasonable about this. I mean, for example, if you've got a biology class going, and one of the kids asks you about, say, what's going on in Arkansas at the moment, I wouldn't say, "Gosh, don't talk about that. Wait until we get outside." No. But I'd certainly say, "Look, if you want to talk about this religion, then, you know, maybe we could wait until a break," or something like that. Sure.

Q Does not The Origin of the Species conclude with a reference to a creator and state that there is a grandeur in this view of life with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator - with a capital C, I might add - into a few forms or into one? Does Darwin not call upon a creator in his book on The Origin of the Species?

A: Listen, before we-

Q Does he?

A: Okay. Before we start on that, just pedantic, could we get Darwin's book right. It's The Origin of Species.



A: (Continuing) You said The Origin of the Species, if we're going to be at this for two weeks-

Q Does he call upon a creator?

A: Darwin certainly says that. But as I've said to you a couple of weeks ago, Darwin later on modified what he says and says, "Look, I'm talking metaphorically."

Q But would this subject, this book be appropriate for consideration, in a science classroom?

A: I certainly wouldn't want to use The Origin of Species today in a science classroom. I'd certainly use it in a historical context.

Q Or History of Science?

A: Surely. Yes, I do indeed. It's one of the set books in my course.

MR. WILLIAMS: I have no further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Novik?



Q Doctor Ruse, you are a Canadian citizen?

A: I am indeed.

Q Does Canada have a constitution?

A: Well, ask me in a week or two. I think we might be getting one.



Q Does Canada have a First Amendment?

A: I'm afraid not.

Q Is there anything in Canada that prohibits the teaching of religion in the public schools?

A: I think it's a provincial situation.

Q That means it's up to each province?

A: Yes. In fact, some provinces insist on it.

Q Doctor Ruse, I would like you to look at the statute again, please, particularly Section 4(b). Section 4(b) refers to scientific evidences. What are those scientific evidences for?

A: They are meaningless outside the context of the theory.

Q In the statute, Doctor Ruse, what is the theory that those scientific evidences are for?

A: Are we looking at 4(b) now?

Q Yes.

A: Well, as I said, I don't see a real theory here.

Q It says scientific evidences for-

A: Well, a theory of evolution.

Q Now, if you will look up at 4(a), it says scientific evidences for-

A: Well, it's the theory of creation.

Q Doctor Ruse-

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I will object for the



MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) record. It doesn't say "theory" in either place.

THE WITNESS: No. But I said I can't understand it without using the concept theory.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q In 4(b), what scientific theory supports the scientific evidences and inferences referred to?

A: I'm sorry. Give that again?

Q In 4(b), what theory supports the scientific evidences and inferences referred to? -

A: I take it they are talking about the things covered in 1 through

Q What theory is that?

A: Part of it is the evolutionary theory.

Q And in 4(a), what theory unifies the scientific evidences and inferences referred to?

A: Creation science theory.

Q Mr. Williams referred you to 4(a)(2), the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection. What theory does 4(a)(2) support?

A: I take it, it's creation theory. As I say, it's sort of funny because in another level, I think it's supposed to be about creation theory, but in another level, it seems to me to support evolutionary theory.

Q But it's in the statute as a support for creation



Q (Continuing) theory, is that correct?

A: That seems to be, you know, a bit of a mixup.

Q When the statute speaks of insufficiency in 4(a)(2), is that insufficiency because of natural processes?

A: I suppose not. I suppose supernatural processes would be presupposed.

Q When the statute speaks of insufficiency in 4(a)(2), is that because of the act of a creator?

A: Yes. Supernatural-

MR. WILLIAMS: I will object. I think it's conjecture on the part of the witness. He's saying why the statute speaks to this and why it does not. I think it is conjecture on his part.

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not sure I agree. I am sorry.

THE COURT: That's overruled. Go ahead.

MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q: Mr. Williams took you through the statute, and I'd like to do the same.

When in 4(a)(3), the statutes speaks of limited changes, what theory is that evidence meant to support?

A: Creation theory.

Q: And in 4(a)(4) when the statutes speaks of separate ancestry for man and apes, what theory is that meant to support?



A: The creation theory.

Q: And in 4(a-)(5) when the statute speaks of earth's geology, what theory is that meant to support?

A: Creation theory.

Q: And in 4(a)(6) when the statute speaks of the age of the earth, what theory is that meant to support?

A: Creation theory.

Q: Doctor Ruse, looking at the statute, what are evidences?

A: I just don't know. Evidences don't mean anything outside of scientific theory. That is meaningless and it's misleading.

Q: Are evidences facts or data or observations?

A: Well, evidences can be facts, observations, data. It doesn't make it scientific.

Q: I was about to ask you whether evidences are scientific?

A: We are thinking like one at the moment, Mr. Novik.

Q: I take it your answer is no?

A: No.

Q: When does evidence assume scientific significance?

A: Only when you bind it together within a scientific theory or a scientific hypothesis. Until that point-

THE COURT: That's all right. I've listened to that earlier today. You don't need to go over it again.



MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q: Can science have evidence divorced from a theory?

A: No.

Q: Can a science have an inference divorced from a theory?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever seen anyone attempt to divorce an evidence from its theory?

A: Scientific creationists.

Q: What is the effect of talking about data without connecting it to its theory?

A: Well, it's meaningless.

Q: Can you teach science by only teaching evidences?

A: No.

Q: Can you teach science by only teaching inferences?

A: No.

Q: Do you have an opinion about why creation science tries to speak about its scientific evidences and inferences divorced from its theory?

A: Because it's phony. It's religion. It's trying to pretend it's something that it isn't.

Q: And even though some evidence may look scientific, is the theory of creation science scientific?

A: No.

Q: And even though some inferences may look scientific,



Q: (Continuing) does it support a scientific theory of creation?

A: No.

MR. WILLIAMS: Excuse me. Your Honor, I want to object on the grounds, first of all, it's leading, and I think it's- I think we've been over this before.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection.

MR. NOVIK: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Williams?

MR. WILLIAMS: Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: We will reconvene at 1:30.

(Thereupon, Court was in recess from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.)

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I would like to be permitted to recall Doctor Ruse very briefly.

For the record, although plaintiffs do not believe that evolution or the scientific merit of evolution is in issue, the Court has permitted the defendants to raise that question. And for the limited purpose of responding, I'd like to ask Doctor Ruse a few questions.



was recalled for further examination, and testified as follows:




MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)

Q: Doctor Ruse, is evolution based on natural law?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: Is evolution explanatory?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: Is evolution testable?

A: Yes.

Q: Is evolution tentative?

A: Yes.

Q: In your professional opinion as a philosopher of science, is evolution science?

A: Yes.

MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I have no further questions of the witness.

In the course of the witness' direct examination, he referred to a number of documents, Exhibit 74 and 75, 78 and 84 for identification. I move they be admitted into evidence.

THE COURT: They will be received.

MR. NOVIK: Thank you very much. No further questions.



Q: You stated that evolution was a fact?



A: I have in my book, yes.

Q: What is a tentative fact?

A: Tentative fact?

Q: Yes.

A: I think it's the question of the approach that somebody takes to it. One holds something tentatively. But it's a fact that I have a heart. If you ask me my justification or something like this, of course, ultimately I have to say, logically I cannot logically prove it as I do in mathematics.

But I can simply say the fact that I have a heart. And you have a heart, too, Mr. Williams.

Q: The fact of evolution, you have testified to, has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

A: Beyond reasonable doubt.

Q: But yet you say you think it's still tentative? Is that your answer?

A: I'm using the word "tentative" here today in the sense that it's not logically proven. There are some things which, you know, I think it would be very difficult to imagine, but I'm not saying logically I couldn't imagine it, very difficult to imagine that it wouldn't be true.

I mean, I find it very difficult to imagine that neither of us have got hearts.



A: (Continuing) On the other hand, I've never seen one, or rather, haven't seen yours and I haven't seen mine. So in that sense I'm talking about it being a fact, that it's something I'm quite sure is true, but in that tentative sense, if you like the logical sense, it's tentative.

MR. WILLIAMS: No further questions.

(Witness excused)

(Reporter's Note: The testimony

of Francisco Ayala not included

in Volume II, and will be made a

separate volume.)

Continue to James Holsted's testimony

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