Deposition of Langdon Gilkey - Page 3

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different than religious theories; right? They func-
tion differently; they ask different questions; they
appeal to different experiences, though they may be
overlapping.

Okay. I can say, the world is a very
orderly place, and that reveals to me the presence
of God or the creativity of God. Generally, in doing
that kind of -- I'm taking it all as a whole; right?
I'm not selecting a particular kind of order. That's
a more specific question. But I can take the same
facts. But I'm asking for the why of them and the
ultimate origin of them in the sense we've used the
word; but also, the "why" is there very deeply in
religious questions. Why is the world as it is? Why
is it good? Why is it so messed up? What's going
to happen to us all? Where are we going? Why are we
here? What are we about?

Now, these are typical very important
questions, I think the most important questions that --
you can look through every science in the world, and
you won't have an answer to any of those things.

Now, let me be clear. When I say this,
I don't mean all scientists would agree with me; right?
But the kinds of experiences they appeal to, the
scientist is truck with shareable experience. And I

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don't mean shareable in a revivalist camp meeting or
a Catholic mass; I mean shareable to anybody who is
wiling to look and is able to look -- let's put it
that way. Thus, it's data or objective, I think the
word carries it's own weight here. You can look at
them; he can look at them; I can look at them; repeat-
able.

Now, while there are a wildly different
variety of experiences from which a religious view-
point arises, they certainly aren't shareable in
quite that way. They're not nonpublic because they're
often common. The Catholic mass, that's common; the
Southern Baptist experience of the Gospel, let's say;
but these aren't shareable in the same way. They're
not objective. Or, take that Fundamental experience
with the Christian faith experience of guilt and
forgiveness. I suppose one could say we all share the
experience of guilt, but we might not want to call it
guilt; but the analyst will have one way to talk about
it, and you and I, if we're Christian, would have
another way of talking about it. But the center of
our faith stems from that experience, insofar as it
stems from any experience.

Now, the scientist would be boggle-eyed
as to what to do with that, and a guy like Skinner

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would say, it ain't real. Freudian might say, well,
it goes back to Daddy and so forth and so on. So
that the experiences are significantly different,
and one can see in the example of Skinner, Freud, and
so on, that what is meant by the limitation of science
-- and I would say that's a very important issue
in this case -- the fact it isn't scientific doesn't
mean it's not there.

And just aside from the question of
religion, just on the issue of understanding humans,
the "why" question can't be got at; but I think it's
absolutely basic. Here, it's basic to law. They
can't adopt Skinner. They take intention seriously.
What did you intend with this? Was it accidental or
intentional? I take it these are important legal
categories. Well, that's a hairy one to get at,
as you know.

Now, there are experiences that are almost
impossible scientifically to deal with; right? If
you understand what I mean. By that, it doesn't
mean it's not true; it means that this is a method
with limits to it. And so I would say that the
experiences, the kind -- and the facts, the kind of
facts we're dealing with, the fact of guilt would be
very important to me; the fact of fear of death would

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be very important to me. These may be facts that
someone else would think were, what, effects rather
than causes, a phenomena, and so forth.

How many religions would take those
very -- as Buddhism did, suffering. This is a real
clue to what's real for them. This is not a scientific
point of view. So their very science is resident in
its theories; not its facts. And their very definite
rulings on what can count as a theory in this and
what cannot. There, the consensus of the community
is about the only real litmus paper as you go along.
There's nobody else.

We theologians and you lawyers can't say --
we can say, well, we were not experts, and I imagine
the same is true of law.

Q How are the kinds of authorities that
are appealed to different in science than religion?

A In our tradition, that is, the Christian
tradition, the fundamental authority -- and there's
been disagreement on this, obviously, between various
groups. There has been Scripture in church in the
Catholic tradition, Scripture in the early Protestant
tradition, among some groups that I don't know whether
we want to call them Protestant or not, but what we
call the left wing of the affirmation or the sectarian

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group, it was the spirit, the Holy Spirit speaking;
and if one asks about this group or that group, one
has a mix of these three in various forms.

Actually, I think it's pretty hard not
to find any group that doesn't add -- that's Christian
that doesn't add Scripture some way, the way we
interpret the Scripture is one way and experience in
some kind of a mix. This would be true of the Baptists,
and so forth and so on. It's hard to say just how
that mix works out.

Now, as I say, when you get a philosophical
theologian on the elite level or an intelligent lay
person trying to think all this out as everybody has
to do, they'll say -- they'll begin to talk about
the authority of coherence and adequacy, and back where
people are talking about what they believe, you'll
probably find that, as well as the Bible; right?

Now, this is simply very different from
authority in science, which is methodologically the
authority of repeatable experiment, combined with
-- now, mind you, I'm not an expert here; I'm just --
but I'm answering.

Combined with the fittingness of this
tested theory, it hasn't been classified -- right --
to other theories that are established; it's coherence

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with other theories, and they all see its fruitfulness.
It's hard for a nonscientist to put flesh on the
bones of that word "fruitful," but I can imagine what
it means. I think you can, too -- leaving to other
questions, to other insights. And they admin this
had been there from the beginning, simplicity. But
I would say the crucial experiment is always there;
the possibility of falsification is always there, if
not of the total theory, at least of its parts. And
by the very nature of the case, no religious theory
can be falsified; right? The meaning of faith --
one of the meanings of faith is anything that happens.
I still believe in God; so if a person says, well,
if that happens, if I stop being vice president, then
I won't believe in God, you've got a falsification,
but you haven't got a religion.

///

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(The luncheon recess was held.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) How are the characters
of the series which are appealed to different in
science than religion?

A Science, over the years of its modern
development, has come to recognize, again, this is
the concensus of a community, mind you, that what
they are looking for is -- what we ordinarily call a
law which more particularly I understand is a set of
invariable relations that applies universally.
Logically, it is the "if P, then Q." Granted, if
this, then such and such will follow. That is what
they are looking for. As I remarked, the historian
is in a little different ball park there. Somebody
may want a law about something historical. That is
a little different, though. "If P, then Q," is
universal. You don't have a scientific law that
isn't universal granted the condition that, "If P,
then Q." It is automatic, so to speak. The words,
"necessary," is a little heavy there. Modern
physics is uncomfortable with the word "necessary."
Since you have now random movements on the various
particles. So you have a statistical account. But
nevertheless, you have got, "if this, then that." So
you have a universalness automatic, and therefore

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tending toward the material. I think that is the
tendency, toward the physicalistic explanation. This
is why you have got such tremendous arguments in
psychology and so on, and arguments as to whether it
is scientific or not. And the groups that start
talking about introspection and purpose and intention
are called by the others nonscientific. This is what
the behaviorists say to the analysts and so forth and
so on. So that is a shady area, is Freud scientific
or not.

I would say the argument is because if
what I have been talking about. Also, what kind of
sharable experience do you have in a dream or in the
interpretation of that dream? The same obviously is
true with sociology and so on. The hard scientists
laugh when these people use the word: "science." And
the other people are deeply, mortally insulted. But
you tend in this direction as a scientific theorem.

This is certainly what Darwin thought to
do and Lyle thought to do in geology. This has built
within it the principle of some sort of uniformity.
Otherwise, we can't possibly observe these processes
which are part of the rule. This is not just an
aspect of certain kinds of science, it is basic to its
procedure. There, the historian would agree.

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I can come along and explain why
Constantine was over his brother by the fact the
angels appeared at the bridge. I am not giving an
historical explanation. I am not appealing to
processes that you and I can look at, to disease, to
excellence of generalship, to supplies, so forth.
Notice that at that level you don't have an exclusion
of intentional causes.

Purposes, most historians would say, are
very deeply part of it. But that doesn't mean it is
not stuck with secondary causes and so on. But
generally, one wouldn't call that science. At least,
I would be hesitant to use the word there. Certainly,
it is not a natural science or physical science.

So you have a necessary universal automatic
formula or law as the character of a scientific theory.
This is testable, but limited. A religious theory
seeks to talk about the whole. It is immediately
then beyond, as I said, beyond falsification, beyond
crucial experiments. It generally appeals to things
we don't experience all the time. In fact, the
doctrine of creation is a different denial of ordinary
experience. None of us experience creation out of
nothing. When the doctrine of creation was originally
formulated, that is, reflectively, in the early church,

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it said the two types of creation that we experience
were denying. That is, the creation was typically
say of the Father, of the Son, right, where out of
the substance of something comes something. This
is the model we have for the Trinity. We don't mean
you and you and you. And the image of the carpenter
and the cabinet, because the wood is already there.
These two meanings of creation, this is a unique
act. You and I can't repeat it. We can't even
begin to repeat any of its component parts. Thus,
it's authority is Revelation, because it is not
ordinary experience. It is not the opposite of
ordinary experience, but certainly is defined as
outside of it. It is explaining how ordinary
experience got there. And that can't be part of
ordinary experience, logically. Any process you can
find around us is going to be the process in which
ultimate original appear or in which that question
is resolved. Within that tradition, in every one
of its cases, the ultimate question of "how,"
received. No one knows how God did it. From beginning
to end, they don't answer that one. You won't find
anybody from Augustine on that will say how. They
will all say why. They will say that and why.

That is precisely the opposite of what the

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scientist is interested in. He is bored with anything
that isn't a "how" explanation. Tell me how it
happens. You say, well, I don't know that. I tell you
that it happened, and I believe that. I tell you
why it happened, because I believe God is a loving
God and so forth. Also, you have certain Scriptural
passages. God looked at the world and saw it was good,
and so forth and so on. If you take that all apart,
you will find lots of differences.

I have divided it up, what kinds of facts
and experiences are appealed to, what kinds of
questions are asked, what kinds of authorities are
recognized, and what are the different characteristics.

Q Have you had an opportunity to read Act
590?

A I don't remember it verbatim. Let me say
that. But I have read it.

MR. CAMPBELL: Off the record.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

(Gilkey Exhibit 1 was
thereupon marked for identi-
fication by the reporter.)

MR. SIANO: Let the record reflect
that we have marked from the papers produced
by Plaintiff, from Professor Gilkey's file,
as Gilkey Exhibit No. 1, a copy of Act 590

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of 1981, the State of Arkansas.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) First, Mr. Gilkey,
when did you first recognize a copy of Act 590?

A When a discussion began to take place as
to whether I would be a witness.

Q When was that?

A I would have to look at the correspondence
to know the exact date.

MR. SIANO: Let me state for the
record that that occurred in the summer
of 1981.

(A recess was held.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) We established before
the break that it was approximately in the summer of
1981 when you first examined Act 590?

A Yes.

Q As a person, certainly not as an expert,
I know you will not be testifying to this, but what
does balance treatment mean to you?

A Roughly equal time, I take it.

Q In Section 2 of Act 590, what does the
phrase "prohibition against religious instruction"
mean to you?

A It means one doesn't mention the word
God, I would think,except in a -- as I say, in a course

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on comparative world views. This is very appropriate.
I take it in this context, it means that the bringing
in of God as a cause in this case, first cause,
obviously is religious instruction.

Q Looking at Section 4A of Act 590, which
is the definition section, there is a definition of
Creation Science which states that Creation Science
means the scientific evidences for creation and
inferences from those scientific evidences. Creation
Science includes the scientific evidences and related
inferences that indicate -- and then it lists six
different parts to that definition. You stated a
moment ago Creation Science might be considered a
rational form of religious tradition?

A Right.

Q In what respect is the sudden creation of
the universe, energy, and life from nothing, a rational
form of religious tradition?

A Well, No. 2 gets striked out as purely
negative against another view, right.

Q I'm sorry. No. 2?

A No. 2, A4, A2, so we have the sudden
creation of the universe from nothing. We have the
concept of permanent species, as it has been called
in the discussion, fixed species, right. We have the

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concept of a special creation of human beings. I take
it, also, a special creation of apes. In either case,
a special creation. We have the concept of catastro-
phism, which is interesting. I am not sure from the
context what the cause of catastrophism is certain to
be.

Certainly, the world-wide flood is taken
as Got to be the cause of it. I suppose one could
have a catastrophe that appeals to secondary causality.
The first one is not a theory until one introduces
God. There is no concept there. This is admitted
in the literature of Christian Science. From nothing
means nothing else is there. Therefore, the only thing
that could make this a theory is to bring in the agent
God. There you are in religion.

I myself, am not functioning as a
philosopher of science, which I am not, but as an
amateur in this, and would wonder what the phrase
"scientific evidence" means. I think one could
just say evidence.

If one adds the word scientific, one means
sensory, sharable data. As I indicated, it is my
understanding that science resides in theories, not as
data. They may have been uncovered in the process of
scientific exploration of data. It is the theoretical

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structure that makes a science. And so the words
scientific facts is a kind of popularization. Science
doesn't reside in the facts; it resides in the theories.

Now, I would say that my general impression
is that "A" has no theoretical content. It is in
fact not a model until God is introduced as the
central agent. In that sense, while Nos. 1 through
6 don't mention God, they all directly entail God,
or there is nothing that is said, except for No. 2,
which is merely negative, a useful and interesting
negative criticism of the theory of evolution.

If dear, old Newton was criticized, then
anybody is up for grabs in terms of the history of
science.

Number one is meaningless without the
divine activity. As I have indicated, permanent species
going right back to the beginning, are equally
meaningless without the divine activity. That is,
there is no explanation for them unless God created
them. This is historically the view. The origin of
species was a theological, not a scientific problem.
This is the origin of the hills and the valleys and
so forth, was a theological, not a scientific problem,
prior to geology. And the same with No. 4, because
it really implies 3, doesn't it? No, 5, I don't know.

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As I say, that is ambiguous, because there
are many distinctions between secondary and primary
causality. I would have to read the literature of
catastrophism, the catastrophism that was popular
among the scientists from about 1790 to 1820, and was a
scientific theory. It moved into the Minister's
realm, so to speak, after that. But anyway, it
certainly entailed the divine activity for those
catastrophies. The definition of a catastrophe was
not like Mt. St. Helen. That is a catastrophe, but
not what we mean here. We mean something of which
the causes are quite out of line with ordinary causes.

Now, is that a natural explanation or
supernatural? I leave it to you. That is to say,
one would have to explore that a good deal in order
to find out whether God is involved there. To me,
catastrophism is a perfectly respectible -- I guess
that is a good word -- scientific theory if it
offers secondary causality as its theory. It has no
theory up to that point. It merely says such and
such are facts.

To have a theory, you have got to have an
explanation, what kind of a process brings this about,
and as I am saying, there is no theory or model
without introducing God.

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Now, I am not going to be committed on
No. 5, that point. I am pretty sure about No. 6,
because I think you can't explain anything in terms
of fossils, as this is admitted. A recent history
of the earth demands a supernatural cause.

If you adopt the fact we are not going to
try to talk about it in terms of supernatural causes,
then you are stuck with a long, long time. I think
the geologist, as well as the biologist, would agree
there. But I am not speaking as an expert. I would
say Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 6 are meaningless as theory
without God. Therefore, No. 4a is, to me, taken
literally. But the books don't do this. This is a
theory without content, as so stated, a model without
being a model, setting forth certain -- well, I don't
want to say so-called, because that sounds as if I
don't think they are true -- but certain things that
are claimed to be facts, but leaving out the
explanation. But a model without the explanation
principle is not a model. It is merely -- it merely
sets you a problem. And insofar as the model is
going to be taught, God is going to be right there
in the center. We have the teaching of religion, as
I say, and the particular form of a particular
religion. I would argue that section 4a is in

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contraction to the first full sentence in Section 5.

Q Recognizing you are not going to testify
to this, but do you think that the -- as a teacher --
that the presentation of divergent views in the class-
room may lead to a better appreciation by students
of the subject matter which is being discussed?

MR. SIANO: I am going to object
on the grounds that that question is very
vague. But I will let Professor Gilkey
answer it.

A (Continuing) It all depends, for its
usefulness, on squaring up views with something
fundamentally in common. It also depends upon being
perfectly clear that these are not the only two
alternatives on the scene, which is part of the problem
we have. I would say that with regard to the question
of where do we come from, as an ultimate question,
and why are we here, it is extremely useful that various
points of view be put forward. I would be the first
to argue for the teaching of this. And I would welcome
anybody doing Creation Science; or in that case, they
could really come forward, full-blown, onto the
center of the stage, and say, let's present the
Biblical view as this group interprets the Biblical
view.

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Then I would want to get in the act and
say, this is what I think about it. I would be inter-
ested in getting a Jew in there, and whoever else is
relevant to the scene, and talking about Greek myths,
and see why each one of these makes more sense to
the whole business than the others. This is a
comparative necessarily, comparative religion,
comparative this, that, and the other kind of class.
These are not generally alternatives, it seems to
me, that we have here. In that case, I don't see
the usefulness, and I do see the problem. They are
not alternatives in the sense that one of them has --
does follow the rules. Here again, I am not an
expert, but I have looked at it, the rules of scientific
inquiry. The other one, on the other hand, is clearly
based upon religious authority. However, it prunes
itself and gets a haircut. But as I say, if it gets
too much of a haircut, the head is gone. And they
really aren't comparable. They are not mutually
exclusive.

And when I say these are alternatives,
it misleads the situation. It leads to the conclusion
that my view is not an alternative, which personally,
I find offensive. You either believe in Darwin or you
believe in Genesis. I do not think this is the case.

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I am not arguing for Darwin there. That is simply not
true, as far as I can see. And the main body of
Christian churches in the world agree on that. At
that point, this is very, very tricky. They aren't
alternatives in that sense. Especially presented them
as the alternative means you have either got to be
a literalist and fundamentalist, or you have got to
be an atheist. This would empty our churches. I
would be worried about that. I am speaking quite
personally. It would get rid of the Presbyterian
Church in Little Rock and get rid of the Methodist
Church, and get rid of a good section of the Southern
Baptist Churches. If they want to do that, and they
may -- I am speculating there -- that is why the
churches are against it. So I would say, setting
them as alternatives is wildly misleading, and that
is really the point of my witnessing.

Now, in a sense, these two views come
across as the legal alternative, as saying either/or.
And in the writing, you find this admitted and then
taken back. As in many of the writings, this is the
test. Without this, you are an atheist. But then in
other sections, they would say, of course, one doesn't
need Creation Science to be religious. But I would say
the impact educationally would be you either are a

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Christian or you are involved in the whole operation
of modern science. This isn't just evolution. This
is geology. This is astrophysics, physics. This
penetrates all the way out to the missile.

Q With regard to apologetics, which were
the third item you may talk about at trial, would you
again define for me what apologetics means?

A It is the enterprise on the part of
certain people within a given religious community
to argue for the truth, the meaningfulness and the
truth of that religious position; maybe not all of
it. They may say say some of this, we can prove, and
some of it we can't. Okay. But it is the effort to
show the credibility of a religious community's
belief, convictions, doctrines, truths, whatever you
wish to say. This is the meaning of apologetics.

Let me say that is the fundamental
enterprise at stake here, which, when they are not
writing this way, is very clear. They are seeking
to argue for the scientific aspect of the Genesis
account. In that sense, it is apologetics.

We make better sense of the facts that
have been unearthed in modern inquiry than any other
view. It is an apologetic argument. I would say
the Christian view of history makes more sense than

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a naturalistic view of history. That is an apologetic.
It seeks a common ground and the argument one makes
that that common ground is more intelligent than the
other. That is really philosophical argument. It
is not scientific argument.

Q What is atheism?

A Just what it says, the belief that
reality does not include anything to which the word
God is appropriately attached, I suppose. Though,
that is a pretty quick definition.

Q Would atheism be a religion, as you have
defined religion today?

A Yes. Yes -- well,no. I don't know. Let
me take that back. It doesn't have a community.
It doesn't have a way of life, necessarily. The
humanist society may well come to function the
ethical culture society as it was formed by Adler
in New York. They met regularly. They have a way
of life and so forth and so on. It is a religious
view in a certain limited sense. I wouldn't call it
a religion under my own definition. It is a religious
view in the sense it gives a picture of the whole.
And probably as you begin to spell it out, it fits
pretty well with that number one. It tries to tell
us what is wrong with our world and how we can be,

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insofar as it begins to talk about the problem of
life and rescue from it. It begins to have religious
characteristics. I would be more inclined to call it
a philosophy.

Q Would there be -- given that definition,
would there be such a thing as atheistic apologetics?

A Yes, sure. Any guy coming along and
saying religion is bunk, I can show it is wrong.
Freud is an atheist apologetic when he talks about
religion. Marx is the same way. There are a number
of them around. I am debating with them all the
time. "Marx: Religion doesn't make any sense. It
is incredible; it is harmful," and so forth and so
on.

There is a religious humanism. But as
we usually use the word, it indicates someone who
doesn't believe there is any diety anywhere, and there
shouldn't be. And they will give arguments, of course,
for it. I am using the word in a pretty broad sense,
because generally, apologetic has been associated
with the community.

Q In religion -- and I will confine that
to the Western religion which we have been talking
about today -- if you are ultimately concerned or
committed to one thing, are you automatically

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uncommitted or disassociated with its opposite?

MR. SIANO: I don't understand
that question. I object to it. It is
very obscure. I will ask you to rephrase
it.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Do you understand the
question?

A I am glad to have you rephrase it, though
I can probably put it together into a question that I
can answer.

Q You can probably do that better than I,
but I will try to rephrase it.

A Right. You rephrase it.

Q If a Christian as we have talked about
today in the sense of the Western religion, is
committed to creation, which we have established is
an inherently Christian ethic, so to speak, is a
Christian automatically then opposed to noncreation?

A There we have to unpack your word
"opposed."

MR. SIANO: I would also like to
unpack "noncreation." I am a little
confused on that term.

A (Continuing) Let me say I am interested
in unpacking the word "opposed" here. Historically

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it meant I would like to cut off their head. That is
the heavy meaning of opposed, let's say. They are
no longer a citizen. They get put in jail, persecuted.
Our joint tradition, Baptist tradition, said this
isn't right. That is the best thing they ever said,
though many of them now will happily cut off the head
of some of those who disagree. That is our tradition.
That is what Roger Williams said. He was a great
founder of our tradition in this country.

Now, if you mean intellectually opposed,
in terms of disagreement, I would say, of course.
This is a fair argument. You mean opposed in the
sense of -- let's use the word charity, tolerance,
love, brotherhood, I would say absolutely not. And
this is what we have learned. Otherwise, I couldn't
discourse with the Buddhist. I couldn't be friends
with the Buddhist, couldn't respect the Buddhist.
So I would say I will argue with the Buddhist, but
he or she is a brother or sister.

I personally respect their position as
to say I recognize it has truth in it. That gets
touchy. That gets very touchy. And I would say
this isn't a new problem for us all. It has always
been there, and we have given the wrong answer.
I am speaking personally.

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With the Jews, I think Paul gave the
right answer, they still have the Covenant, but that
certainly hasn't been the church's answer. But as I
indicated earlier, they are a special case. That
isn't a fair treatment of what you are getting at.

We certainly learned to live with the
atheists. And often, they have shown they are better
citizens than we are. Anybody who consigns Mahatma
Ghandi to hell, it seems to me they ought to have
their Christian head examined. That is my opinion,
because there was an obvious Saint, according to almost
every criteria of Jesus' teachings, this man did
everything for everybody. The early church, incidentally
felt this about Socrates and spoke even about the
covenant with the Greeks, because they could not
put Socrates down the drain. And when one reads the
dialogues, one can see why. This is not Jesus, but
it is a figure, a tremendous figure. Whether this
is the historical Socrates or not -- and they, of
course, thought it was, and I think it probably was --
the issue of Socrates' salvation came up. Most of
them didn't want to say, it is too bad that he is
going to fry, you know. This is a very interesting,
difficult problem. I would say it is a new problem
because the question of the truth content of other

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points of view is now arising for the West in a new
way. Now we can go on forever about this. I don't
want, as an expert, to be testifying in this. This
is way off base. But I am quite willing to say this
is an interesting problem.

No one, under any circumstances, can
stand nowhere in particular. That is the first
think. If I stop being a Christian in a discussion
with a Buddhist, I become sacrilegious. I am still
standing somewhere. I am in a position. There is
no way of escaping that. So there is no way of
even raising the question without standing somewhere.
Now, the question is, if you are standing there, you
affirm it, you have got to affirm it. There is an
absoluteness here. I see the world as a question.
But I have to see the world so that that guy can stand
where he is standing and I don't cut off his head.
That is the problem and you can't make an easy, logical
solution to that absoluteness. I first realized
this in talking to a Buddhist.

If we are involved in a conversation, I
didn't want him to stop being a Buddhist. He merely
became a Japanese secularist. By the same token,
I wasn't going to stop being a Christian. This
raises a question of the dialect of the absolute

128

and the relative, which is not easy to put together.
I don't want to get in a court and put it together.
This is kind of an intellectual puzzle in the human
problems that our generation has the task of
exploring. This is involved in anything called a
dialogue, and I am deeply involved. I thoroughly
believe this is closer to what God wants us to be
in relation to each other than my saying I have
absolute truth and you have absolute error. So it
depends upon what you mean by the word opposed. But
that is my view of it.

Q Is evolution an inherently impersonal
concept?

MR. SIANO: I am going to object to
the question unless you can define evolution
and impersonal, and probably inherent, too.
But I will let that go.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Speaking of it in the
sense of Darwin's Theories of Evolution, is it secular
as opposed to religious?

A It is a very complicated matter. As a
scientific theory, it is by definition secular. This
doesn't say atheistic. It includes only natural
processes. Darwin interpreted it that way, though
he was pulled about it. But he was so afraid of

129

messing up the theory that he was developing, that he
wanted to leave any kind of divine causation out of
it. His friends said he was crazy, and Wallace argued
he couldn't make any sense out of it without some kind
of divine activity. And he always said, I don't know
about that. That is not what I am trying to say.
Therefore, your question asks, really, what level are
we talking about when we use the word "evolution"?
Or what do we do with this? As a scientific concept,
I would say it is like every other scientific concept.
It can only recognize secondary causality. And,
therefore, is a preory, non-religious.

Now, many people can take it as an
explanation of the whole of the universe and say
this is the exclusive explanation. There is
nothing else to say. Then it has expanded into a
philosophical, semi-religious, mythical concept,
as with Herbert Spencer, as in the implication of
T. H. Huxley, as in a number of people. I would
say that it is the last chapter of a good number of
books. And I would be prepared to argue with this.
This is clearly an expansion of a biological law
into a universal law. And it was very common in
the Nineteenth Century, and is much less common now,
though the aura of this remains.

130

There, it is functioning as a philosophical
religious symbol, or a symbolic system, and I would
be inclined to agree.

But I would disagree with this. This is
quite different. Actually, Marxism is an interesting
parallel, if I might say. Here is something that starts
out in political economy and expands its way out. It
is functioning not unlike what I said, one, two, three.
It is holding the communities together, providing
the bases of education and behavior of the whole works,
and it is answering the question of good and evil.

Many people have argued Marxism as a
religion. I wouldn't say evolution, because it is
a Johnny-come-lately idea, but I would say the
liberal theory has become a civil religion, secular
religion, and so forth. It is what we believe in,
what we think is going to resolve all our problems.
It is balanced by Marxism; both of them starting in
science and moving up. When they move up, that is
something else. I don't think evolution is inherent
in this way any more than Newton is. And there were
many ways that theology accepted and dealt with
Newton. And that is, these are the theologists of
the Eighteenth Century, largely. I don't think they
were very good theologists. As I said, the theologists

131

of both the reformed Jewish tradition, reformed and
the liberal Protestant tradition, are taking the
scientific doctrine of evolution and expanding it.
This is a way of explicating the atheistic belief,
as is Creation Science. So I would say evolution
in one sense is inherently atheistic; in another
sense, not at all. It depends on how one is using
it. Is that clear?

///

132

Q Yes. What does metaphysical mean?

MR. SIANO: Are we trying to get a
dictionary definition here, Mr. Campbell?

MR. CAMPBELL: We have talked about
physical and metaphysical.

MR. SIANO: Are you just trying to get
a frame of reference, then?

MR. CAMPBELL: Right, for our dis-
cussion.

A (Continuing) Well, this is one of those
words, when defining, one spells out one's own posi-
tion. This is a controversial definition. I would
use the word as examining the general structures of
realigy in every one of its forms, those structures
that apply to every aspect of experience. This is
Whitehead's definition. Now, one can say, isn't that
science? No, because science doesn't include the
subject. The guy in the white coat is left out.
You and I stretched on the table is what they are
talking about. But the guy in the white coat with
the stethoscope is omitted. Skinner isn't talked
about in books about Skinner. That is a controversial
argument. I think you get what I am talking about.
If one begins to include the subject as well as the
object, you are in philosophy. Obviously, you have

133

moved out of science; you have examined the scientific
mind, as well as the inquired object. Immediately,
you are into arguments about materialism, idealism,
is everything spirit, is everything matter, neither
one of which can make an awful lot of coherent sense.
I mean, everybody's arguments are probably right at
this point in time.

I am a theologian; I am not a physician.
I think that God transcends the metaphysical categories
because those are the structures of our experience, and
our experience is creaturally experience, though we
can still talk about God. That is where I am in
regard to that. I am interested in it, but I don't
put my money on it.

Now, metaphysics comes into our conversa-
tion in that I would say naturalism, not in the sense
of a botanist, but is a metaphysical position; aetheism
is a metaphysical position; dualism is a metaphysical
position. There are a number of alternatives here,
each one with its different doctrine of origin, though
they don't mean by that what we mean by it, as I
have said. They ask those kinds of questions, what
is it all like, what is the whole like, what is the
whole universe like, the kinds of questions that make
scientists very nervous. They think this is verbiage

134

or preferences, as they put it. There are also a
lot of scientists who are religious and might be
interested in metaphysics. But generally, when I
talk about Evolution expanding itself into a world
view, you are quite right to bring up metaphysics.
For it to be a metaphysical doctrine, it would have
to be explicated in terms of the rules of metaphysical
thinking. I would say probably the greatest example
of this is Whitehead, in our tradition.

MR. SIANO: His name has come up
before in this.

A (Continuing) I am sure. Here is a system
setting out not to be a theology, but to explain all
experiences, to explain it as a process developing
so that it can take in physics, biology, artistic
experience, moral experience, et cetera. You see
immediately you have moved out of science there. We
assume responsibility in law that we have to put into
our system, so that every aspect of experience is
made intelligible in terms of one set of ideas. This
is what the metaphysician is after.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Is scientific inquiry
as we have talked about today generally set within
a framework of presupposition?

A (Witness nods head affirmatively.)

135

MR. SIANO: You are going to have to
define presupposition in this context.
Professor Gilkey is not a scientist. That
word may have particular meanings in a
theological and philosophical context,
and then have different meanings in a
scientific context. I am troubled by it.

MR. CAMPBELL: Let the record
reflect the witness shook his head yes.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held
off the record.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Assuming that scientific
inquiry is based on some -- within a framework of
presupposition, could a theory ever be truly falsified?

MR. SIANO: Now, that is a hypothetical
question.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Do you understand
what I am asking?

MR. SIANO: You started out with
"assuming," and that is why I asked if it
is a hypothetical question. Is it a
hypothetical question?

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it can be a hypo-
thetical question. Actually, it is a
philosophical question.

136

MR. SIANO: It may be a philosophy
of science question.

THE WITNESS: It is a totonogy. He
has just uttered a totonogy.

A (Continuing) Falsification itself has
presupposition, which is your answer. Without the
presuppositions that lie in back of the scientific
method, there is no meaning to the word falsification.
We have to agree to having a mode of falsifying what
kind of data are relevant, what kind of experience
gets us in touch with those data, what kind of
methods are relevant. We have to agree on that. You
and I might say, if we live somewhere else, we have
to have a Shawmanic (phonetically) experience to
falsify an interesting view. When you say falsifica-
tion, you are probably talking westernly A Hindu
falsification might be quite different.

Now, there are two kinds of -- should I
say two kinds of meanings referenced to the word
presupposition here, it seems to me, that are rele-
vant. I agree thoroughly with the fact that science
exists within the matrix of Western culture insofar
as it moves outside of it and it converts that culture.
That matrix here is not directly religious, though
it has religious roots. It believes the material

137

world is real. They may say, oh, we don't. But I
think they do. Therefore, sensory experience gets
in touch with reality. This is not a necessary
proposition at all and not necessarily agreed to.
It is a way of wandering through the world of
illusion, so to speak. Your word falsification would
have a different meaning. These are metaphysical
presuppositions. There are a whole number of them
that come to be in our Western culture. They have
partly biblical roots, which we could talk about,
and partly Greek. They certainly involve the sense
of the reality in order of the material world, which
arises out of the doctrine of Creation, which I have
argued in many of my books. It also has certain
Greek roots. It also argues that we don't know what
is going to be out there until we look and see. We
don't know God's ways, so let's see what He did. We
don't understand God's ways in creating, and therefore,
we have got to look and see what they are. These
are some of the metaphysical aspects.

Now, you don't need to be a Christian to
hold these. That is one set of presuppositions to
modern science. In this sense, I am not a Positivist
who thinks it exists by itself. This is useful in
metaphysics, then it explores those presuppositions.

138

That is what the metaphysicist is doing.

I would prefer to call them canons of
the science, rules, limited requirements, which is a
better word, to science. You might call those pre-
suppositions. I would prefer to call them canons,
which are the ones we have been talking about, the
limitations; this kind of theory, not that kind of
theory. Those are not presuppositions. The scientist
comes into the laboratory with them. This is what
you mean by the method and its limits. I have tried
to stress that. That is another sense of the word
presupposition. It is entailed, but it is in the
canons. It is the rules of the road, the particular
rules of the road which do have their presuppositions.
They are the same ones we have been talking about.

Material reality is real. This is what
we wish to explain. We can understand it rationally
in some sense if we go at it empirically, and so forth
and so on. I think they also have presuppositions
about the subject, which science itself doesn't
give us any explication of.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) I know you have dis-
cussed your writings, the idea of leaps, scientific
leaps of creative vision that you have talked about.

A You have done your homework.

139

Q Are there any common characteristics
of those men which you have written about in terms
of creative leaps?

A (Witness nods head affirmatively.)

Q Have you ever sat down and tried to pin
down some common characteristics?

A I suppose I thought about them. But that
takes a different kind of expertise than I have got.
This is something for the philosopher and historian
of science who really knows the biography of these
people. This is a biographical matter, to some extent,
and notes in great detail the scientific theoretical
world of the person as they enter, let's say, the
mythical laboratory at this point, or sit under the
tree and the apple falls on their head, or something,
and they can see what happens here.

MR. SIANO: You are not going to
speculate, are you?

A (Continuing) I am not going to speculate.
That is beyond my capacity, that there is something
like a unifying intuition that takes place; I don't
think there is any doubt, whether you are talking
about Archimides or Newton or Capernicus or whoever;
those that write about it, be an expert on it,
demand an intimacy of what is going on. It will have

140

ifs own presuppositions, anything written about that.
You may figure it out in terms of toilet training,
for all I know.

MR. SIANO: Mr. Campbell, we are
getting, not close to plane time, but
plane time is approaching here, the day
before Thanksgiving, and I would offer that
to you so you do not miss any of the salient
aspects in your outline of questioning
Mr. Gilkey.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Were those men who
took the leaps generally considered as in the main
stream of the scientific community in those times?

MR. SIANO: I object to the question,
unless we identify who we are talking
about.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Well, let's talk about
Newton, for an example, or Capernicus, or Galileo.

MR. SIANO: All of them?

Q (By Mr. Campbell) We will start with
Newton.

A He was a pretty strange bird, because he
was a rather wild creature on certain things, much
more so than the others, because he was building on
Galileo. Galileo was new, and Capernicus was even

141

newer. The originators of the scientific view are
not in accord with the scientific consensus at that
point.

Q Is truth a legitimate goal of science?

MR. SIANO: Objection. Again, Mr.
Campbell, you are outside the witness'
expertise. I don't know what sort of an
opinion question that is.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, the witness
has written volumes and volumes concerning
this issue. This is not something he is
just --

MR. SIANO: I am not going to argue with
you about what the witness has or has not
written. I am suggesting to you he has
been tendered in a certain capacity. I am
not going to direct him not to answer.

A (Continuing) No scientist thinks he or
she is going to get the truth. In fact, science has
rearrange the view of truth for most of us. This has
been a very important creative activity, to make us
realize human truth is always an approximation of the
truth. This, in turn, has had great effect upon the
religious community and has partly led to that. I
wish it had penetrated to some of the other social

142

sciences. But that is neither here nor there.

I would say there is nothing to science if
it is not directed at approximating the truth. This
is a cognitive endeavor. The cognitive endeavor
gets its meaning from erost towards the truth, it's
longing to find it. When you get a genuine scientist,
this is all he or she cares about. If it is directed
at making money, forget it. I would say the same
with the legal profession, in some sense. Without some
concern for justice, it is not going to happen. This
sounds sentimental, but it is true. If everybody
can be bought, then forget it. In that sense, the
truth is related to the cognitive activity of human
beings. I would insist that science is not the only
way to get at the truth. This is their basic erost.
That is the only word to use. Desire is not the
right word, but it is that which draws me, or the
ultimate concern. If a scientist doesn't have an
ultimate concern for truth, he or she is not a
scientist, and they will fiddle with the evidence,
and you don't have science.

Now, their science as a community begins
to sound not only moral, but a little bit religious.
I would be quite willing to explore that. But the
erost for the truth here is held by the commitment to

143

the canons. That is the intention within which a
guy like Saulk or Einstein or whoever functions.

Q Looking at these documents, this folder
that is marked Scientific Creationism, Morris, is
this simply a reprint of his book?

A Yes.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, if I wanted
to make copies of these documents, a few,
not necessarily all of them, would you
please send them to me?

MR. SIANO: I would be glad to if
you would just tell me what you want
copied. I will see that these are sent
to you.

MR. CAMPBELL: I would like a copy of
the documents contained in the folder,
Pro-Evolution documents.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Mr. Gilkey, are you
on the mailing list of any organizations which
support the teaching of Creation Science in the public
school system?

A No.

Q Are you on the mailing list of any organiza-
tion which is opposed to the teaching?

A Yes, the AAAS; that is, I am restrictedly

144

on their mailing list. We have had correspondence
about this subject; that is, the folder in there
(indicating). I am not a member of that organization.

There is a group called the Committee of
Correspondence -- why, I don't know -- in Chicago,
one meeting of which I have attended; and which
regularly send me their documents. That is in a
folder there called the Aulie Group. This is a group
of biology teachers, geology teachers, and so forth,
that are concerned about this whole subject. They
send out articles and this and that and the other,
all of which I have received is in that folder. I'm
not a member in the sense of having joined, paid
dues. I attended these meetings, and I am generally
interested in what they are doing. I am not a member.

Q How was it that you accumulated a great
amount of information from the Kelly Segraves
organization?

A Well, the "how" is sitting on my right.

MR. SIANO: Let the record reflect
that counsel for Plaintiffs have made
materials available to the witness.

THE WITNESS: Though I brought the
book there.

MR. SIANO: Meaning?

145

THE WITNESS: I want to say it,
because they didn't send me that. I want
to be accurate here. The Creation explana-
tion was bought by me in the Moody Bookstore
in Chicago.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held
off the record.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Professor Gilkey,
have you prepared a summary of your testimony or what
you expect to testify to at all?

MR. SIANO: I will state for the
record you ought to quantify that apart
from the dialogue with the lawyers, which
is where we seem to be getting into problem
areas in this.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Have you prepared any
report or documents which generally summarizes what
you expect to testify at trial, and given it to Mr.
Siano?

A I have.

Q Do you have a copy of that with you?

A I understand that that is part of what
are called the lawyer's working papers or something
to that effect.

Q Just for purposes of the record, I have

146

got to ask you for it, and Mr. Siano is going to
object.

A So go ahead and do what you want to do.

Q Do you have a copy of it with you?

A Yes.

Q May I see it?

MR. SIANO: No. Objection. The
record should reflect the documents exist
only by virtue of Professor Gilkey's
dialogue with the lawyers. And the docu-
ments, under Rule 26, reflect the operation
of the lawyer's input on the case, and
in our view of the case, constitute trial
preparation material.

MR. CAMPBELL: I would like a copy
of the AAAS file.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Professor Gilkey, in
one file, you have marked, the Aulie Group. Who is
Richard P. Aulie?

A I really don't know. I think he is a
high school teacher in Chicago, of one of the
natural sciences.

Q How is it you happen to have some --

A Well, that is the little group I spoke
of. He called me on the phone and got my name -- I

147

don't know how -- probably because he had heard my
name in one connection or another -- and explained
to me what the group was doing, though I don't think
it is a formal group, as I say, and invited me to
come to a meeting, which I did, and then he sent me
some of these documents, or gave them to me. I asked
him for them. I saw those documents and was interested
in reading them, so he gave them to me.

Q This is the Committee of Correspondence
in Chicago?

A That's right. You will see it in the first
letter. I believe it identifies itself there.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, I would
like a copy of the letter addressed to
Dr. Gilkey from Mr. Aulie, dated September
7, 1981.

In addition, I would like a copy of
a letter which appears to be drafted in
memorandum form, from Dr. Richard P. Aulie,
to Professor Gilkey, dated September 8,
1981.

And finally, I would like a copy of
the memorandum dated September 4, 1981,
the Chicago Area Committee of Correspondence
signed Dick Aulie at the bottom.

148

In addition, I would like a copy of
the pamphlet entitled, "Origins and Change,"
which appears in the Journal of the
American Scientific Affiliation.

MR. SIANO: Sure.

MR. CAMPBELL: And finally, a copy of
an article entitled, "The Doctrine of
Special Creation," by Richard P. Aulie,
reprinted from the American Biology Teacher,
April 1972 and apparently again in May --
excuse me, it is April and May of 1972.

Professor Gilkey, I have tried to
keep all of these in order, these files,
hopefully kept them in order to return to
you. I enjoyed the deposition today, and
I appreciate your responsiveness and your
help. Thank you, very much.

MR. SIANO: I take it you have no
further questions?

MR. CAMPBELL: I have no further
questions.

MR. SIANO: Mr. Campbell and I have
agreed that the same stipulations as have
been obtained in the two previous deposi-
tions of Plaintiffs' experts will be carried

149

forward through this deposition; is that
right, Mr. Campbell?

MR. CAMPBELL: That is correct.

(Deposition concluded.)

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