Testimony of Dr. Michael Ruse - Page 3
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A: Yes. I think that I would want to say that, yes. But then again, so is a lot of science.
Q In teaching philosophy courses, do you ever teach theories or philosophies that you don't personally agree with?
A: In a historical context, certainly.
Q And a teacher should not have to teach only those courses which they agree with, isn't that correct?
A: Now, hang on. Try that one against me again.
Q Do you think a teacher should teach only those things he or she agrees with?
A: Well, you say "should only teach those things that they agree with." I mean, for example, I teach a lot of things that I don't agree with. But of course, as I say, I do this in a historical context.
I mean, it seems to me that a historian could certainly teach all about the rise of Hitler without being a Nazi themselves.
Now, one can teach and deal with things that you don't agree with, certainly in a historical context.
Q Are there scientists that you would consider scientists who feel the theory of evolution cannot be falsified?
A: Are there scientists that I would consider scientists— Well, now, you say the theory of evolution.
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A: (Continuing) What are you talking about?
Q Well, what would you consider the theory of evolution?
A: Well, I mean, are you talking about Darwinism? Are you talking about punctuated equilibria? Are you talking about—
Q Let's talk about Darwinian evolution.
A: Certainly some people have thought that Darwinian evolution cannot be falsified.
Q As a matter of fact, that's an increasing number of scientists, isn't it?
A: No, I don't think it is. In my opinion, it's a decreasing number of scientists.
I'm glad you made that point because, in fact, one of the leading exponents of the book, Unfalsifiability of Darwinism, is Karl Popper. And recently, certainly, he's started to equivocate quite strongly on this and so are a number of his followers, by the way.
Q When did you write an article entitled "Darwin's Theory: An Exercise in Science"?
A: Well, I wrote it, I think, earlier this year. It was published in June.
Q in that article, did you not state that, "Although still a minority, an increasing number of scientists, most particularly, a growing number of evolutionists,
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Q (Continuing) particularly academic philosophers, argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory is no genuine scientific theory at all"?
A: I think that I'd probably say something along those lines
Q So you did state in this article, did you not, that there was an increasing number?
A: An increasing number. I think I said an increasing number, of philosophers, don't I, or people with philosophical pretensions or something along those lines.
Q I think the record will speak for itself as to what was said. I think the word "scientists" was used.
A: You know, I'm not a sociologist of science. I'm not a sociologist of philosophies. You know, you want to take a head count, you could be right, I could be right. Who knows. I certainly know that a number of important scientists, or I'll put it this way, a number of important philosophers have certainly changed their minds.
Q Has Popper changed his mind about that?
A: I really don't know. Popper is an old man, you know. Without being unkind, I think Popper is getting to the point where mind changes aren't that important to him anymore.
Q Did he not state that evolutionary theory was not
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Q (Continuing) falsifiable?
A: Oh, no. Certainly at one point, Popper wanted to claim that Darwinism was not falsifiable. Now, where Popper stood on evolutionary theories per se, I think is a matter of some debate.
It's certainly the case that he himself in the early seventies was trying to come up with some theories which he thought would be falsifiable.
In recent years it's certainly true to say that Popper has argued more strongly that at least at some level evolution theories can be falsified.
Q At some level?
A: Yes.
Q But he also said, did he not, that evolutionary theory was, in fact, a metaphysical research program?
A: I think he said that Darwinism was. I'd have to go back and check to see whether Popper ever said that all evolutionary theories are unfalsifiable or metaphysical.
MR. NOVIK: Excuse me, your Honor. We learned from the Attorney General yesterday in his opening argument that the State is interested in demonstrating that evolution is not science, and that evolution is religion. This line of questioning seems to go to that issue. The plaintiffs contend that that entire line of questioning as to both of those points are irrelevant to
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MR. NOVIK: (Continuing) these proceedings. Evolution is not an issue in this case.
We have previously submitted to the Court a memorandum of law arguing this issue, and I would request the Court to direct defendants' counsel not to proceed along these lines on the grounds stated in that motion.
I'd be happy to argue that briefly at the present time, if the Court desires.
THE COURT: Is that the purpose of the questioning, Mr. Williams? Are you trying to establish that evolution is a form of religion?
MR. WILLIAMS: Not this particular line of questioning itself. But in view of the Court's ruling on the motion in Limine, that it is appropriate to consider whether creation science is a scientific theory, I think we are entitled to try to show that creation science is at least as scientific as evolution.
Indeed, the Bill on its face raises this issue in some of the findings of fact. And to the extent that they have been attacking the findings of fact in the Act, I think we are entitled to go into this to show one as against the other, the relative scientific stature of these two models.
THE COURT: Why don't we take a ten minute recess, and I'd like to see the attorneys back in chambers.
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(Thereupon, Court was in recess from 11:40 a.m. to 11:50 a.m.)
THE COURT: Mr. Williams, just to put this in some perspective, as I understand it, the State is not making the contention that evolution is not science. The purpose of the questions is simply to demonstrate that some scientists do not think that evolution meets all the definitions of science as this witness has given a definition
MR. WILLIAMS: That is it in part, your Honor. Also, just the point being to demonstrate that, we are not demonstrating that evolution is not science, but that if you, according to this particular definition, that creation science clearly would be as scientific in that neither could meet, according to some experts, the definition of a scientific theory.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)
Q Doctor Ruse, what is the concept of teleology?
A: Understanding in terms of ends rather than prior causes.
THE COURT: Excuse me. What is that word?
MR. WILLIAMS: Teleology. T-e-l-e-o-l-o-g-y.
THE COURT: What is the definition? That's not one of those words that's in my vocabulary.
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THE WITNESS: Shall I try to explain this?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
THE WITNESS: Well, a teleological explanation, for example, one would contrast this with a regular causal explanation. For example, if I knocked a book on the floor, you might say "What caused the book to fall to the floor." In which case, you are also talking about what happened that made it fall.
A teleological explanation is often done in terms of design. For example, in a sense of, "Well, what purpose or what end does this glass serve." In other words, why is the glass here," something along those sort of lines. Sort of things that were being talked about yesterday afternoon.
MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)
Q And is it possible to have both a religious and sort of theological concept of teleology and a nonreligious or nontheological concept?
A: It's possible. I mean, not impossible. I mean, there have been both concepts.
Q How would you distinguish the two?
A: Well, I would say the theological one is where, for example, you explain the nature of the world in terms of God's design, the sorts of things I find in 4(a), where one tries to understand why the world is, as it is because that's what God intended and that was God's end.
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A: (Continuing) A non-theological one would be the kind, I think, the kind of understanding that evolutionists, Darwinian evolutionists, for example, who says, "What end does the hand serve." In this case, they are looking at it as a product of natural selection and looking at its value in a sort of struggle for existence in selection.
Q So some modern biologists do consider themselves to be teleologists?
A: Let me put it this way. Some certain philosophers think that biologists are teleologists.
Q Do they always use the term "teleology"?
A: The philosophers or scientists?
Q The philosophers in describing this concept?
A: Not always. In other words, sometimes used as teleonomy, but I personally like the word teleology.
Q Is this word, teleonomy, used to show that they are using the concept of teleology in its non-theological, nonreligious sense?
A: I would think that's probably true, yes.
Q In other words, they are trying to overcome a problem of semantics?
A: Well, they are trying to set themselves up against their predecessors. Scientists like to do this.
Q Do you consider Thomas Coon's book, The Structure of
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Q (Continuing) Scientific Revolutions, to be recognized as an authority in either the history or philosophy of science?
A: Well, we don't have authorities in the philosophy of science. You know, they are all pretty independent types. I would certainly say that Thomas Coon's book is considered a very important book. I think it's a very important book.
Q In your book, The Philosophy of Biology, you state that the modern synthesis theory of evolution is true beyond a reasonable doubt, do you not?
A: Right.
Q And you further state that the falsity of its rivals is beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Right.
Q Is not the so-called punctuated equilibrium theory a rival to some degree to the modern synthesis theory?
A: I'm not sure that it's a rival in the sense that I was talking about it in the book, quite honestly. I dealt with a number of alternatives, and punctuated equilibrium theory certainly wasn't one of those which was there to be considered when the book was written.
What I was saying was things like the original Lamarckism, you know, are false beyond a reasonable doubt. It certainly holds to that.
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A: (Continuing)
What I also said was that the importance of selection, mutation, so on, are true beyond a reasonable doubt.
Q Again, to my question, is not the punctuated equilibrium theory a rival, contrasting to the modern synthesis theory which you think has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Well, that's a nice point. I think some people would think of it as such. I don't personally think of it as such, and I'm glad to find that a lot of evolutionists like Ayala doesn't think of it as such.
Q Others do, do they not?
A: Well, quite often I think some of the people who put it up like to think of it as a rival. But, you know, we're still- I mean, the punctuated equilibria theory is a very new theory. We're still working on the sort of conceptual links between it and the original theory. And I think it's going to take us awhile yet to decide whether we are dealing with rivals or complements or whatever.
But of course, let me add that in no sense does this at any point throw any doubt upon evolution itself. We are talking just about causes.
Q Is defining a science a task which falls to philosophers rather than to scientists themselves?
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A: Well, it falls to people acting as philosophers. Scientists can certainly act as philosophers.
Q So is science a question of philosophy?
A: It's a philosophical question.
Q Do philosophers uniformly agree on what is science?
A: I think that basically we would agree, yes.
Q They would not agree entirely, would they?
A: Well, philosophers never agree entirely. Do lawyers?
Q Do you think that in the society with a commonly held religious belief that religion could properly be taught in the public schools?
A: Try that one on me again.
Q Do you think in a society with a commonly held religion that religion could properly be taught in the public schools?
A: Yes. I think that for example, in medieval Europe where, in fact, everybody is a Catholic, I see no reason not to teach it in the public schools.
Of course, that has absolutely no relevance to us here today. We are talking about America and we are talking about Arkansas.
Q Is part of your opposition to creation science, and more specifically to Act 590, based on your belief that it's just a foot in the door, as you view it, for the fundamentalist religious groups?
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A: Yes, I think I would. It's part of my belief. I mean, I think it's important to oppose Act 590 in its own right. I think it's wrong, dreadfully wrong. But certainly I do see it as a thin end of a very large wedge, yes.
Q And you see it as some sort of wedge which includes attacks on homosexuality on women and on other races, don't you?
A: Insofar as it spreads a very natural literalistic reading of the Bible, which as you know and I know certainly says some pretty strong things about, say, homosexuals, for example, certainly, yes, I can see it as a thin end of a very big wedge, yes.
Q But Act 590 has absolutely nothing to say on those subjects, does it?
A: Well, I didn't say that it did. I mean, my point simply is that if you allow this, this is the thin end of the wedge. You don't talk about all the wedge when you are trying to shove the tip in.
Q We are dealing here with the law, Doctor Ruse. And is it not true that part of your reason for being against the law is what you think might happen in the future if this law should be upheld?
A: Certainly. But as I said earlier, my opposition to
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A: (Continuing) the law is independent in its own right.
Q I understand that. Who is Peter Medawar?
A: I think he's a Nobel Prize winner, a biologist or biochemist. Lives in England.
Q Is it not true that he has stated and as you quote in your book that there are philosophical or methodological objection to evolutionary theory; it is too difficult to imagine or envision an evolutionary episode which could not be explained by the formula of neo-Darwinism?
A: Medawar as opposed to Darwinism. But of course, that does not mean in any sense that Medawar opposes evolutionary theory in the sense of general evolution per se.
Q But isn't what Medawar is saying there is what we talked about this morning, that Darwinism can accommodate any sort of evidence?
A: But you are doing what we talked about this morning. You are confusing the causes with the fact of evolution.
Yes, Medawar was certainly uncomfortable, let's put it that way. I don't know where he stands today. I know that Popper has drawn back, but Medawar was certainly uncomfortable with the mechanism of neo-Darwinism.
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A: (Continuing) But to the best of my knowledge, Medawar has never, ever denied evolution.
Q Is Medawar a creation scientist?
A: I said to the best of my knowledge, Medawar has never, ever denied evolution.
Q Do you consider the Natural History Branch of the British Museum to be a creation science organization?
A: Of course, I don't.
Q Is it true that this museum has had a display which portrays creation science as an alternative to Darwinism?
A: Well, of course, this is hearsay. I guess we are allowed to introduce this, but my understanding is, yes, I read it in the "New Scientist." I've certainly been told about this, yes. I think it was a shocking thing to do, frankly.
Q That's your personal opinion?
A: That certainly is. It goes to show that this is a real problem we've got in Arkansas, in Canada and, alas, in England, too.
Q Whether it's a problem depends on one's perspective, does it not, Doctor Ruse?
A: I don't think so, no. I think the problems can be objectively identified. That it smells of problems.
Q Do scientists, after doing a degree, a lot of work
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Q (Continuing) in an area, sometimes, become emotionally attached to a theory?
A: Scientists are human beings. I'm sure they do.
Q And might they also be intellectually attached to a theory?
A: Individual scientists, certainly. But not necessarily the scientific community. I mean, Louie Agassiz that we talked about earlier was emotionally attached to his position, but the scientific community wasn't.
Q Had not, you written that Darwinian evolutionary theory is something which you can love and cherish?
A: Me, personally, yes, I do indeed. I think it's a wonderful theory.
Q Also, have you not advocated that the subject of creation science is a battle which you must fight?
A: That is why I'm here.
Q And how long have you been writing on Darwinism yourself?
A: Oh, altogether, fifteen years. I mean, quite frankly, some of my early stuff was done when I was a graduate student. I mean, I don't know whether you'd call that writing.
Q Doctor Ruse, in an article entitled "Darwin's Legacy", did you state-
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MR. NOVIK: What page?
MR. WILLIAMS: 55.
MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)
Q -did you state, first of all, that Christianity and other forms of theism and deism are not the only world religions today; that in many parts of the world there is a powerful new rival?
A: Marxism.
Q And then you write at some length, do you not, about Marxism, particularly as it is affected by evolutionary thought, as it affects that thought?
A: Right. I'm talking, of course, in the context, very much the context of discovery there as opposed to the context of justification.
In other words, what I'm saying is that certain scientists have tried to blend their position with Marxism, and certainly extra scientific ideas have been importantly influential in leading people to certain scientific theories.
I am not at all saying, for example, that evolutionary theory is Marxist.
Q I understand that. Back to the point you just mentioned, science is really not concerned, then, is it, where a theory comes from or a model comes from? The more important question is, does the data fit the model?
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A: Well, more important to whom? Certainly, to the scientist, of course, is a question of you get the ideas and then you put them in a public arena, and how do they fare.
For example, Copernicus was a Pythagorean, but we accept Copernicus' theory, not because we are Pythagoreans and Sun worshipers, but because Copernicus' theory works a lot better than the Ptolemaic system does.
Q Do you consider Marxism to be a religion?
A: In a sense. We talked about this in the deposition. As I said, religion is one of these very difficult terms to define.
I would have said if you are going to define religion just in terms of belief in a creator, then obviously not. But if you are going to talk of religion in some sort of ultimate concern, some sort of organization, something like this, then, as I said, I'm happy to talk about Marxism as a religion.
Q In your article at page 57, do you not state, "But cutting right through to the present and quietly admittedly basing my comments solely on a small group of Marxist biologists working in the West, what I want to point out here is that just like Christians, we find that the Marxists try to modify and adapt Darwinism to their own ends and within their own patterns. I refer
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Q (Continuing) specifically to such work as is being done by the Marxist biologist, Stephen J. Gould, particularly his paleontology hypothesis of punctuated equilibria introduced and briefly discussed early in this essay?"
A: I say those words. I certainly do not in any sense imply that punctuated equilibria is a Marxist theory. In fact, the co-founder who is sitting over there would be horrified to think that it is.
What I am saying is that Gould as a Marxist, from what I can read and what he has done, has probably been led to make certain hypotheses and claims which he finds certainly empathetic to his Marxism.
I do not want to claim that punctuated equilibria is Marxist, per se, and I certainly don't want to claim that only and all Marxists could accept punctuated equilibria. In fact, my understanding is that a lot of Marxists don't like this.
Q Please understand, what I understand you are saying here, in fact, what you state is, for example, with reference to Gould, that he is strongly committed to an ideological commitment to Marxism in his science. And you have previously equated Marxism with a religion. Is that not correct?
A: No. You know, you are twisting my words here. I'm
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A: (Continuing) saying, "Look, here's a guy who, to the best of my knowledge" - and, goodness, you are going to be able to ask him tomorrow yourself - "here's a guy who has got strong philosophical" - if you want to call them religious beliefs, I am prepared to do this - "who certainly would like to see the aspects of these in the world," certainly using his philosophy, his religion to look at the world just as Darwin did, incidentally, and just as Copernicus did.
And I see, you know, nothing strange about this. I see nothing worrying about this. Once you've got your theory, then, of course, it's got to be evaluated and is indeed being evaluated by independent objective criteria, and there's nothing Marxist about that.
Q What you are saying is that these Marxist biologists are conforming their science to some degree to their politics or if you consider politics religion?
A: No, I'm not. I don't like the word "conforming". You know, we can go around on this all day. I don't like the word "conforming".
What I'm saying is that some of their ideas are important in their context of discovering plus for formulating their ideas.
But as I say, you know, you could take Darwin, for
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A: (Continuing) example. Darwin was a deist, no doubt about it. The only reason why Darwin became an evolutionist is because it fitted best with his religious ideas. Copernicus was a Platonist.
Q Have you not said that Gould, for example, pushes his scientific positions for three Marxist related reasons?
A: What he does is, he pushes the ideas to get them out on the table. This is the sort of thing he likes. Of course, you do. You sharpen your ideas. Copernicus pushed his ideas.
It doesn't mean to say that Gould is going to be a punctuated equilibrist because he's a Marxist. It doesn't mean to say that Eldridge or anybody else is going to be a punctuated equilibrist because they are Marxists. What it means is that probably Gould pushes these sorts of ideas. You see, again the context of discovery, the context of justification.
People discover things. People come up with ideas for all sorts of crazy reasons and all sorts of good reasons. But once you've got them out, as it were, within the scientific community, then they've got to be accepted because of the way that they stand up, do they lead to predictions. I mean, does punctuated equilibria lead to predictions that are predictions within the fossil record.
Q Doctor Ruse, but you have previously stated, I
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Q (Continuing) think, and would agree that this idea of punctuated equilibria, this debate that you see in the evolutionary community is a healthy debate?
A: I do indeed.
Q And they are not challenged - "they" being the punctuated equilibrists - have not challenged evolution over all, have they? Just merely the mechanism?
A: Right.
Q But their challenge as you have stated in these writings states that it has come from a motivation based on Marxism which you have identified as religion, doesn't it?
A: Motivation. See, here we go again. What is motivation?
Q Is that correct? Is that what you have said?
A: Well, if you read the passage, I'm quite sure I said those words, but you are deliberately refusing to understand what I'm saying.
Q And then on the other hand, you simply, because someone challenges evolution, the theory of evolution itself, and you feel they are doing it based on religious reasons, and you are someone who is an adherent of Darwinian thought, you object to that. Is that not correct?
A: Look, you are twisting my words. The challenge is
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A: (Continuing) being done on an evidentiary basis, that is, moving into the context of justification. In that paper and other papers I'm talking about a context of discovery. What I'm saying is that when scientists discover things, often they have different sorts of motivations.
But whether or not one is to accept punctuated equilibria has nothing at all to do with Gould's personal philosophy, personal religion.
It's the fossil record. It's what we find out there that counts.
Q You call it a healthy' debate, but you also state that this fails as science. This-
A: What, fails as science?
Q This Marxist version of evolutionism, as you term it.
A: Well, I say it fails, as science. But what I'm saying is I don't think it's true, but I don't think it's true or false because of Marxism.
I personally don't accept it because I don't think they've made the case on the fossil record. Now, Gould thinks that he has. We can argue that one.
But when I talk about its failing as a science, I do not mean it is now nonscientific. What I mean is that I don't think as a scientific hypothesis that it will fly. But as I say, Marxism is a red herring here.
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Q I'm merely referring you to-
A: What I was doing, I was talking about the context of discovery. And if you want to talk about that, I'm prepared to do so.
Q Well, you've said that the Marxism version of evolution has failed as science, but that's healthy. But creation science fails as science and that's unhealthy?
A: Well, you see, you are putting words into what you want me to say. Marxist version of evolutionary theory. What I'm saying is, one prominent evolutionist is a Marxist. That led him, I think that encouraged him to try out certain ideas.
But I don't think that punctuated equilibria theory is Marxist, per se. I certainly don't think the judgment is going to get into evidentiary level.
Q Now, you are not a scientist yourself?
A: No, I'm not a scientist. No. I'm a historian and philosopher of science which I would say encompasses a great deal of other areas in philosophy.
Q The discovery basis you mentioned, if a creation scientist believes in a sudden creation, should that not be advanced and then fail or succeed on its merits of scientific evidence?
A: No. Because we are not talking about scientific theory here. We are talking about religion. As a
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A: (Continuing) philosopher I can distinguish between science and religion. We are not talking about the context of discovery here.
And as I say, in any case, creation science isn't science. It's religion.
Q Do you agree with John Stuart Neill that, "If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified silencing that one person that, had he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."
A: Well, the subject is so strange that- You can't shout "Fire" in a loud crowded cinema. Yes, I do, right. I think it's a wonderful statement. But of course, silencing somebody is different from not allowing the teaching of religion in the science classroom.
Q Teaching religion in the science classroom is your conclusion, is that correct?
A: Right.
Q And Marxism is a religion in your mind?
A: I certainly would not want Marxism-
THE COURT: Let's don't go through that again. He is not going to admit what you want him to.
THE WITNESS: Well, I'm glad I've got one philosophical convert here.
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MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing)
Q Do you feel that the concept of a creator is an inherently religious concept?
A: Yes, I do.
Q So that the Creator should not be interjected into the science classroom?
A: Well, I mean, let's be reasonable about this. I mean, for example, if you've got a biology class going, and one of the kids asks you about, say, what's going on in Arkansas at the moment, I wouldn't say, "Gosh, don't talk about that. Wait until we get outside." No. But I'd certainly say, "Look, if you want to talk about this religion, then, you know, maybe we could wait until a break," or something like that. Sure.
Q Does not The Origin of the Species conclude with a reference to a creator and state that there is a grandeur in this view of life with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator - with a capital C, I might add - into a few forms or into one? Does Darwin not call upon a creator in his book on The Origin of the Species?
A: Listen, before we-
Q Does he?
A: Okay. Before we start on that, just pedantic, could we get Darwin's book right. It's The Origin of Species.
A: (Continuing) You said The Origin of the Species, if we're going to be at this for two weeks-
Q Does he call upon a creator?
A: Darwin certainly says that. But as I've said to you a couple of weeks ago, Darwin later on modified what he says and says, "Look, I'm talking metaphorically."
Q But would this subject, this book be appropriate for consideration, in a science classroom?
A: I certainly wouldn't want to use The Origin of Species today in a science classroom. I'd certainly use it in a historical context.
Q Or History of Science?
A: Surely. Yes, I do indeed. It's one of the set books in my course.
MR. WILLIAMS: I have no further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Novik?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. NOVIK:
Q Doctor Ruse, you are a Canadian citizen?
A: I am indeed.
Q Does Canada have a constitution?
A: Well, ask me in a week or two. I think we might be getting one.
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Q Does Canada have a First Amendment?
A: I'm afraid not.
Q Is there anything in Canada that prohibits the teaching of religion in the public schools?
A: I think it's a provincial situation.
Q That means it's up to each province?
A: Yes. In fact, some provinces insist on it.
Q Doctor Ruse, I would like you to look at the statute again, please, particularly Section 4(b). Section 4(b) refers to scientific evidences. What are those scientific evidences for?
A: They are meaningless outside the context of the theory.
Q In the statute, Doctor Ruse, what is the theory that those scientific evidences are for?
A: Are we looking at 4(b) now?
Q Yes.
A: Well, as I said, I don't see a real theory here.
Q It says scientific evidences for-
A: Well, a theory of evolution.
Q Now, if you will look up at 4(a), it says scientific evidences for-
A: Well, it's the theory of creation.
Q Doctor Ruse-
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I will object for the
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MR. WILLIAMS: (Continuing) record. It doesn't say "theory" in either place.
THE WITNESS: No. But I said I can't understand it without using the concept theory.
MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q In 4(b), what scientific theory supports the scientific evidences and inferences referred to?
A: I'm sorry. Give that again?
Q In 4(b), what theory supports the scientific evidences and inferences referred to? -
A: I take it they are talking about the things covered in 1 through
Q What theory is that?
A: Part of it is the evolutionary theory.
Q And in 4(a), what theory unifies the scientific evidences and inferences referred to?
A: Creation science theory.
Q Mr. Williams referred you to 4(a)(2), the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection. What theory does 4(a)(2) support?
A: I take it, it's creation theory. As I say, it's sort of funny because in another level, I think it's supposed to be about creation theory, but in another level, it seems to me to support evolutionary theory.
Q But it's in the statute as a support for creation
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Q (Continuing) theory, is that correct?
A: That seems to be, you know, a bit of a mixup.
Q When the statute speaks of insufficiency in 4(a)(2), is that insufficiency because of natural processes?
A: I suppose not. I suppose supernatural processes would be presupposed.
Q When the statute speaks of insufficiency in 4(a)(2), is that because of the act of a creator?
A: Yes. Supernatural-
MR. WILLIAMS: I will object. I think it's conjecture on the part of the witness. He's saying why the statute speaks to this and why it does not. I think it is conjecture on his part.
THE WITNESS: Well, I'm not sure I agree. I am sorry.
THE COURT: That's overruled. Go ahead.
MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q: Mr. Williams took you through the statute, and I'd like to do the same.
When in 4(a)(3), the statutes speaks of limited changes, what theory is that evidence meant to support?
A: Creation theory.
Q: And in 4(a)(4) when the statutes speaks of separate ancestry for man and apes, what theory is that meant to support?
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A: The creation theory.
Q: And in 4(a-)(5) when the statute speaks of earth's geology, what theory is that meant to support?
A: Creation theory.
Q: And in 4(a)(6) when the statute speaks of the age of the earth, what theory is that meant to support?
A: Creation theory.
Q: Doctor Ruse, looking at the statute, what are evidences?
A: I just don't know. Evidences don't mean anything outside of scientific theory. That is meaningless and it's misleading.
Q: Are evidences facts or data or observations?
A: Well, evidences can be facts, observations, data. It doesn't make it scientific.
Q: I was about to ask you whether evidences are scientific?
A: We are thinking like one at the moment, Mr. Novik.
Q: I take it your answer is no?
A: No.
Q: When does evidence assume scientific significance?
A: Only when you bind it together within a scientific theory or a scientific hypothesis. Until that point-
THE COURT: That's all right. I've listened to that earlier today. You don't need to go over it again.
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MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q: Can science have evidence divorced from a theory?
A: No.
Q: Can a science have an inference divorced from a theory?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever seen anyone attempt to divorce an evidence from its theory?
A: Scientific creationists.
Q: What is the effect of talking about data without connecting it to its theory?
A: Well, it's meaningless.
Q: Can you teach science by only teaching evidences?
A: No.
Q: Can you teach science by only teaching inferences?
A: No.
Q: Do you have an opinion about why creation science tries to speak about its scientific evidences and inferences divorced from its theory?
A: Because it's phony. It's religion. It's trying to pretend it's something that it isn't.
Q: And even though some evidence may look scientific, is the theory of creation science scientific?
A: No.
Q: And even though some inferences may look scientific,
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Q: (Continuing) does it support a scientific theory of creation?
A: No.
MR. WILLIAMS: Excuse me. Your Honor, I want to object on the grounds, first of all, it's leading, and I think it's- I think we've been over this before.
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection.
MR. NOVIK: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Williams?
MR. WILLIAMS: Nothing, your Honor.
THE COURT: We will reconvene at 1:30.
(Thereupon, Court was in recess from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.)
MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I would like to be permitted to recall Doctor Ruse very briefly.
For the record, although plaintiffs do not believe that evolution or the scientific merit of evolution is in issue, the Court has permitted the defendants to raise that question. And for the limited purpose of responding, I'd like to ask Doctor Ruse a few questions.
Thereupon,
MICHAEL RUSE,
was recalled for further examination, and testified as follows:
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. NOVIK: (Continuing)
Q: Doctor Ruse, is evolution based on natural law?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Is evolution explanatory?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: Is evolution testable?
A: Yes.
Q: Is evolution tentative?
A: Yes.
Q: In your professional opinion as a philosopher of science, is evolution science?
A: Yes.
MR. NOVIK: Your Honor, I have no further questions of the witness.
In the course of the witness' direct examination, he referred to a number of documents, Exhibit 74 and 75, 78 and 84 for identification. I move they be admitted into evidence.
THE COURT: They will be received.
MR. NOVIK: Thank you very much. No further questions.
RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Q: You stated that evolution was a fact?
377
A: I have in my book, yes.
Q: What is a tentative fact?
A: Tentative fact?
Q: Yes.
A: I think it's the question of the approach that somebody takes to it. One holds something tentatively. But it's a fact that I have a heart. If you ask me my justification or something like this, of course, ultimately I have to say, logically I cannot logically prove it as I do in mathematics.
But I can simply say the fact that I have a heart. And you have a heart, too, Mr. Williams.
Q: The fact of evolution, you have testified to, has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: But yet you say you think it's still tentative? Is that your answer?
A: I'm using the word "tentative" here today in the sense that it's not logically proven. There are some things which, you know, I think it would be very difficult to imagine, but I'm not saying logically I couldn't imagine it, very difficult to imagine that it wouldn't be true.
I mean, I find it very difficult to imagine that neither of us have got hearts.
378
A: (Continuing) On the other hand, I've never seen one, or rather, haven't seen yours and I haven't seen mine. So in that sense I'm talking about it being a fact, that it's something I'm quite sure is true, but in that tentative sense, if you like the logical sense, it's tentative.
MR. WILLIAMS: No further questions.
(Witness excused)
(Reporter's Note: The testimony
of Francisco Ayala not included
in Volume II, and will be made a
separate volume.)
